The Private Letters

OF

BARON DE VIOMÉNIL

ON POLISH AFFAIRS

WITH A LETTER ON THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN

du Roux de Rioménil





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

From the Portrait by Fouquet in the Collection of Count de Montmort

ANTOINE CHARLES DU HOUX
BARON DE VIOMÉNIL
ÆTAT. XXXV

The Private Letters

OF

BARON DE VIOMÉNIL

ON POLISH AFFAIRS

WITH A LETTER ON THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN

Translation and Notes by
JOHN FRANCIS GOUGH

COLLINS DOAN COMPANY
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The Private Letters

OF

BARON DE VIOMÉNIL

(General Officer sent by France to direct the military operations of the Confederacy)

ON POLISH AFFAIRS

In 1771 and 1772

Prefaced by a historical note upon the principal French agents, on the same mission, especially *DUMOURIER*, and by memoirs containing facts hitherto unknown both as to the latter general and the Partition of Poland in 1772.

A collection for use as a history of the times, and as a supplement to *The Anarchy of Poland*, by M. de Rulhière who did not refer to the period in which these letters were written.

PARIS

TREUTTEL AND WURTZ, Hotel de Laraguais No. 17
Rue de Lille, Opposite The Theatins

STRASSBURG, The Same Publishers

1808

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DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF
RICHARD BYRNES COLONEL OF
TWENTY-EIGHTH REGIMENT
MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS
WHO FELL MORTALLY WOUNDED
AT COLD HARBOR VIRGINIA
ON THE THIRD DAY OF JUNE
EIGHTEEN HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR

PUBLISHERS' NOTICE

We offer to the public an interesting collection of writings which in themselves make a good story. They seem, moreover, to be a much needed complement to *The History of the Anarchy of Poland,* by Rulhière, a work which, although uncompleted, was welcomed with great public interest. The late Lieutenant-General Baron Vioménil achieved a distinguished reputation, and these letters of his are of all the greater import since they are probably the only manuscripts of his which survived the disorders of the French Revolution, in which he fell an early victim. All who knew him agree he wrote with facility and possessed great courage, high military talent, and an exceptionally vigorous mind. The other papers published here give intimate and otherwise unknown details and throw a new light upon the history of Poland and those Frenchmen who labored in that country.

ADVERTISEMENT

A MAN of letters, praiseworthy both for his accomplishments and the strict probity of his judgments, published in 1807 the best possible edition of *The History of the Anarchy of Poland and the Partition of the Republic,* by Claude-Carloman de Rulhière, a member of the French Academy, who died January 30, 1791, at the age of 56. The publisher regrets with the public that Rulhière left his work unfinished; the publisher (1) adds, *but we have in our hands the notes and articles which Rulhière gathered to complete it; and although the publisher was able to avail himself of some of this material in 1806, the unused portions are so important, especially in regard to the year 1771, that he has rearranged all of the material, and nothing further need be done, except the task of actual composition. . . . His plan is to put all the extracts in order, connect them properly and as soon as possible print two volumes which will bring to completion the work Rulhière had in mind.*

Both this plan and its execution are, of course, to be commended, but the publisher himself freely admits that the material assembled by Rulhière bears

(1) See volume I, pp. lv and lvi, in the sketch of M. de Rulhière.

chiefly upon the year 1771, whereas it is generally accepted that the most interesting period of the Anarchy of Poland is the year 1772, for it was then that the partition of this Republic-Monarchy brought to a simultaneous end the difficulties, the Confederation, and the political ambitions of the Polish people. Then, too, a companion of Rulhière was told by this author himself, in his last years, that he had experienced numerous difficulties in assembling authentic material which would enable him to write, in a satisfactory manner, the concluding part of his *History,* and that he had been able to collect but very few documents and little information of a reliable nature. He had gone so far, he said, as to ask a distinguished person, who had been repeatedly honored by His Royal Highness, the late Prince Henry of Prussia, to try to procure the fullest possible details from this Prince, who was then in Paris, and with whom there were arranged for Rulhière, early in 1789, two interviews. On leaving Paris, His Royal Highness promised to search for and send the requested material, but shortly after his return to Prussia, he became more dissatisfied than ever with Count Hertzberg (Prime Minister of the Prince's nephew, King Frederick William II), to whom it was necessary to go to obtain from the Prussian archives copies of the desired papers. The disgust the Prince experienced in making requests of this personage prevented him,

at least for the moment, from fulfilling the wishes of Rulhière, but he promised to keep the matter in mind and await a more favorable opportunity. Then came the Revolution and Rulhière's hopes of obtaining the desired information were quite blasted.

He later confidently expected that from Prussia particularly there would come to him the details (which if not actually regarded as secrets, were yet at least carefully guarded) of the negotiations among the Courts of Berlin, Petersburg, and Vienna, which led to the partition of Poland; for it was evident that they could be ascertained more conveniently in the Prussian archives than elsewhere, as it was Prussia which initiated the communications which led to the partition.

At the beginning of this volume we have put *The Recollections of Count* . . . a veteran general officer, as to the first partition of Poland. They contain the salient facts, as he heard them related by Prince Henry of Prussia, or as drawn from sources quite as reliable, and they are substantially the information that was to be furnished by His Royal Highness to Rulhière or what is contained in the latter's notes, if they have been lost.

We have brought the material to a close with the definite treaty of partition, concluded between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, $\frac{\text{July 25}}{\text{August 5, 1772}}$, no part of which, we believe, has ever before been printed, at

least not textually. It appears that Rulhière had little or no information on the mission of Baron Vioménil to the Polish Confederation, for all that he has written of him is contained in these few lines (1) *Dumourier left Poland, and was replaced there by Vioménil. The chief task of the latter was to direct the French officers and soldiers, troops auxiliary to the Confederacy, in waging a noteworthy campaign in 1772; they commenced well by surprising the citadel and the city of Cracow. Obliged to take refuge in the citadel, they sustained a long siege there. Choisi (2) particularly gained great renown; but finally it was necessary to surrender, and they were made prisoners of war.* One may admire the use of the laconic style, and yet concede this to be an illustration of its misuse, for the passage is meaningless, because of the gap which it leaves in the story of *The Anarchy of Poland.* To complete that story and at the same time to pay to the memory of Baron Vioménil the respect due him, we have decided to publish his private correspondence, during his stay with the Confederacy, that is to say from the latter part of 1771 until the treaty of the partition of Poland. These letters, written with that freedom, simplicity, clearness and preciseness which befit a soldier so

(1) See *History of the Anarchy of Poland,* Volume IV, p. 246.

(2) Details as to this brave and respected commander are set forth elsewhere.

well, are a monument all the more valuable for history, since they leave nothing to be desired as to the materials they contain. They should not be confused, any more than should the papers which accompany them, with the official correspondence of the several civil and military agents who because of the necessity of writing regularly, and often, with nothing to say (as the editor of *The Anarchy of Poland* observes) (1) filled their reports with worthless details or vain conjectures. Vioménil sent to his correspondent only useful conclusions, drawn from a body of materials which called for fine discrimination, both in reading them and rendering them succinct. Then, too, these letters have this quality, like the few papers here printed with them: they become indispensable parts of the whole story; and it is therefore quite proper to bring them to the light of day and thus increase interest in them. We have added some notes in those places where it seemed necessary. We have also thought it proper to precede everything with short accounts of Vioménil and the two representatives whom the French Ministry had previously sent to Poland, the first of whom Rulhière has not mentioned once, although he must have known him, since they had served together as gendarmes of the Royal Guard.

(1) *The History of the Anarchy of Poland,* Vol. I, p. lviii, in the sketch of Rulhière.

A Short Account
OF THE
THREE CHIEF AGENTS
SENT BY FRANCE
TO THE CONFEDERATION OF POLAND

As soon as it became evident to the French Ministry, then under the direction of the Duke of Choiseul, that Catherine II, Empress of Russia, sought to intrude into the affairs of Poland, the Duke's political insight led him to conclude it was highly important to the tranquillity of Europe that Russia be kept within its own boundaries and prevented from disturbing the repose of the neighboring nations; but the dislike Louis XV felt for strife in view of the poor results of the Seven Years' War, and the general apathy of a monarch who preferred to grow old in the pursuit of pleasure, prevented Choiseul, who understood the King's intentions, from adopting any but indirect (and therefore unavailing) methods of attaining the desired end, that is to say, to keep in check the ambition of Russia. If the Minister had had any choice of method, doubtlessly, in accord with his strong character, he would have taken a more vigorous and efficacious means than simply

and quietly inducing the dissatisfied Poles to combine against Russia, or rather to revolt against Stanislaw Poniatowski whom Russia had placed upon the Polish throne on September 7, 1764 to rule the nation nominally. Choiseul having succeeded, in October, 1768, in compelling the Turkish Empire to take up arms to uphold, against Catherine II, the independence of Poland, judged it opportune to cause a diversion in favor of the Turks, by means of the Polish Confederacy, which would be able to keep busy a considerable body of Russian troops, if among the Poles order and cooperation could be secured and maintained in their military enterprises, but it was highly essential that to the Confederacy there be given a directing officer, not of so high a rank as to cause a sensation, in Poland, and therefore out of keeping with the humble rôle then played by France. On the other hand this leader must need be of such intellect and talent as to be able to direct to a common goal a numerous group of Poles who, because of the diversity of their interests, were difficult to manage, although they were justly armed in the same cause. Such a choice was not easy. The author of *The History of the Anarchy of Poland* tells us (1) *that in 1768, Rulhière missed being sent on a secret mission to Poland;* and he adds that, if, *as may be presumed, this mission was of a kind with*

(1) Vol. I, p. x, of the short account of Rulhière.

that which was given to Dumourier in 1770, Rulhière should have congratulated himself for having escaped the task. However this may have been, Choiseul preferred another agent, endowed with the qualities required for so difficult a mission.

His choice fell upon Chevalier Taulès, who in 1754 had joined the gendarmes of the King's guard, and who, ten years later, that is to say in 1764, adopted diplomacy as a career. The troubles that stirred the City of Geneva in 1766 having induced the King to send there Chevalier Beauteville, his ambassador to Switzerland, Taulès accompanied the latter. The object of this mission was to reestablish peace in that diminutive Republic. The necessity of acting in concert with the cantons of Zurich and of Berne, whose views and principles were absolutely at variance with those of France, made the negotiations difficult and barren. From Geneva, Taulès went into Switzerland, and dwelt for a year at Soleur, to pursue there the same object. It was during his stay at Geneva, that he became acquainted with Voltaire, to whom his original turns of mind and character were infinite delights. Voltaire wrote to Madame Argentae on April 18, 1766 (1): *Henin (2) is extremely enraged about the retirement of the*

(1) See Voltaire's *General Correspondence,* Vol. 69 of his works, page 340.

(2) A resident of France, then at Geneva, and afterwards first secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Duke of Pralin (1) and of Saint-Foix (2); Taulès, who also has an independent mind, does not, it seems to me, become vexed, whatever the occasion. A long letter which Voltaire wrote to Taulès himself on March 21, 1768, (3) shows that he placed a high value upon his judgment, and liked to discuss with him doubtful or obscure matters of history, the clearing up of which required a sagacious mind. In 1768, Taulès was named captain of dragoons, and the Duke of Choiseul sent him into Poland and towards the frontiers of Moldavia (a province of Roumania). There he rendered exactly those services required by the nature of his mission. A dreary unsuccessful campaign with the Confederates against the Russians in Podolia (a government in western European Russia) gave him an excellent opportunity to ascertain definitely that nothing was to be expected from this group of disorderly and undisciplined nobles who were directed by leaders who took no common counsel. Having been entrusted by the Court of Versailles with a considerable sum of money for the Confederates, he decided, on his own responsibility, that any expenditures in their behalf

(1) He at this time exchanged with his cousin, the Duke of Choiseul, the department of Foreign Affairs for that of the Navy.

(2) Then first secretary of Foreign Affairs, and afterwards Superintendent of the finances of Count Artois.

(3) See Voltaire's *General Correspondence,* Vol. 50 of his works, page 437.

would from the French point of view be money thrown away, and he returned home, bringing the money with him. Fearful that a letter from him to the Duke of Choiseul, informing the latter of his decision, might be intercepted and the mystery of his journey disclosed, he contented himself by sending to the minister a letter, entirely metaphorical, but easy to understand: *As I have not found in this country a single horse fit for the King's stables, I am returning to France with my money, which I have thought should not be used in buying nags.* This dispatch as if it were from a horse dealer, greatly amused Choiseul, whom Taulès undertook to convince that a war by the Confederacy should no longer be fomented, because it would result only in the loss of life, without any benefit to anybody.

Following the present *Account,* will be found a *Memoir* by Francis-August, Chevalier Thesby de Belcour, a French officer who campaigned in 1769, with the Confederacy. His experiences and reflections alike confirm the opinion reached by Taulès.

This loyal and interesting negotiator was in conference one day with Choiseul, when du Luc, a citizen of Geneva, who had come to Versailles to induce the French Government to protect the common people against the ambition of the Council, asked for an audience which Choiseul at first refused, asking, *What answer shall I make to this*

man, who will surely insist upon telling me all about the tiffs and the back-biting in his own bordello, of which I know nothing? Taulès then said: *See him immediately; his effort will certainly be to have France break her promises, made sometime ago, to the Genevan Government, in the King's name. You so propose to du Luc and, according to the way he justifies himself, I shall inject myself into the conversation, and relieve you of any embarrassment.* Upon this assurance, Choiseul had the Genevan come in, who immediately, as Taulès had predicted, began to argue in effect that France should break her plighted faith. Choiseul, as agreed, pointed out that this was essentially the demand of du Luc, who thereupon, at great length, held forth, in defense of his position; Taulès tore his arguments to pieces, and, after reducing him to complete silence, added: *There is, my dear du Luc, an excellent way to fix up everything.* The minister and du Luc listened with rapt attention, as the adroit friend of Voltaire continued: *You, my dear du Luc, should stick your head under a poohbah's wig.* The Genevan winced at this shaft of wit, but smiled at the implied compliment as to his possible advancement. (1)

(1) Years later, Grenville, a distinguished Englishman, while at Geneva, listened at different times, first to a group of ordinary citizens, and then to a group of officials. He was unable to come to any opinion, so opposed were their respective contentions; and he therefore consulted Voltaire. This wise old man said: *My answer is short and sweet. It's a case of about nine hundred little-wigs who fight against fifty big-wigs, simply that they themselves may become big-wigs.* The answers of Taulès and Voltaire thus indicate that the Geneva officials were then distinguished by their enormous wigs, while those worn by the ordinary citizens were of medium size or very small.

At the end of 1769, Taulès, upon his return from Poland, was put in charge of an important phase of the negotiations between France and Switzerland. In 1771, after the disgrace of the Duke de Choiseul, the French factors in Syria and Palestine, finding themselves in trouble as a result of the disorders which inevitably follow civil wars, it appeared essential, in accordance with instructions signed by the King, *to send to those countries a tried and trusted subject of a resourceful mind, who could be relied upon.* Taulès was sent, with the title of Consul-General. He had hardly arrived in Syria, when he found himself shut up in the City of Seyde, which was soon beset by a force of thirty thousand Turks, bent on forestalling the French, whom they accused of having invited a Russian fleet into this part of the Orient: the Turks spoke of nothing but the massacre of the French; but Taulès succeeded in overcoming any such dangerous inclinations and gained the confidence of both factions of the Turks. At no time was France esteemed more highly in Turkey than during the administration of French affairs by Taulès; and never was the suzerainty exer-

cised in the name of the King more respected and efficacious there. The Turks, to honor the French name all the more, seemed, on various occasions, to forget their own laws, customs, and usages. The Grand-Emir of the Druses, the rebel leader, on the one side, and the famous Dgezzar-Pacha, re-invested with all the authority of the Grand-Seigneur, on the other, wished Taulès to be the arbiter of their disputes. Despite the large personal profits that this position would undoubtedly bring him, reasons, based entirely upon the benefit to accrue to French commerce, led him repeatedly to refuse to act in the desired capacity; and although both leaders continually and strongly urged him to assume the task they wished him, he so bore himself that neither of them took offence at his refusal to accede to their wishes.

In the war of 1778, English corsairs, regardless of international law, had the temerity to seize several of our vessels in the harbors of Turkey. Vainly the French Ambassador and Minister protested to Constantinople against such actions. As like outrages, if they went unpunished, would render the French contemptible to the people in all the ports of the Levant, there remained but one way for France to re-assert itself and to secure due consideration. This was by reprisals. It was important to make the Turks see that the French themselves knew how to secure justice, when denied it. Taulès seized the first

possible opportunity of putting this idea into effect. Encouraged and emboldened by the knowledge that he was serving his country well, and shutting his eyes to every aspect of personal danger, he employed the captain of a vessel to seize openly in the port of Larnaca, in Chypre, a French ship that the English had brought in, after they had captured it. This action produced the result that Taulès had foreseen. The astonished Porte, dreading war in the Turkish harbors, quite changed its policy, and when the English started anew upon their piracies, they were promptly compelled by the Turks to restore the vessels that they had taken, and to pay for the damages that they had occasioned. They thus returned seven vessels taken in the harbors of Syria and Egypt. Without the reprisals that M. de Taulès had taken upon himself to carry out, these ships would have been lost for France. This exhibition of courage was essentially necessary to force the Turks to be just to us. To the captain's mate of the vessel taken by the English, who had been detained as a prisoner by them on his own vessel, after having been seriously wounded by the gun-fire of our soldiers when the vessel was retaken, Taulès generously gave, in addition to a pension, which was very slight, a special gift of two hundred francs.

In 1779, the health of Taulès having been almost completely shattered by the extreme heat of Turkey,

he was forced to ask that he be retired. The Minister wrote him: *His Majesty would have desired to keep in his service for a longer period an officer whose zeal and talents were so well known, but it had been decided to accede to the proposed retirement out of regard for the urgent reasons that compelled him to give up the duties that had been entrusted to him.*

An earlier letter evidences still better the judgment of the Minister upon his conduct: *I quite appreciate,* he informed Taulès, *the high quality of your service for the King which you have shown in the stress of the Syrian troubles, the consideration which you enjoyed among the leaders of two factions, the intelligence, the impartiality, and the honesty, that marked all your proceedings, and the evidences of approbation that you have received on different occasions from the late King and his Council.*

These merited praises were the only reward for Taulès. We understand he died several years ago. (1)

(1) While examining the public records, Taulès came across a clue, which he followed with his accustomed perserverance and sagacity, until it seemed to bring him to the very point of discovering the truth as to the man in the iron mask. Upon this subject he wrote at considerable length a work which we have read. Of its contents we shall say nothing, as it is only fair that those to whom he left his manuscript should enjoy the advantages to accrue from his interesting discoveries.

Dumourier, who has become famous since, left France in July 1770, by order of the Duke of Choiseul, to associate with the general Council of the Confederacy of Poland, then established at Eperies in Hungary. The Minister then expected, although with no just reason, to be able to embarrass the Russians considerably by a diversion, since the Council, if strongly supported, would succeed in regulating better the enterprises of the Confederacy, and consequently the use of subsidies, which the King was willing to grant them, would not appear of any moment, nor of a compromising nature, as Taulès had feared.

The various rôles which this new French agent played in the Polish situation make it proper for us to pause and consider briefly this truly remarkable man.

Charles François Dumourier was born on January 26th, 1739, at Cambrai, where his honest, witty, well educated father served faithfully as a commissary, and was noted as the translator of the charming poem of Richardet (1). He educated his son very carefully, and in 1757 had him enter service in the cavalry regiment of Escars, with the rank of cornet. Naturally brave, the son soon distinguished himself. He was wounded in several battles in 1759 and

(1) It is in verse. The author of the poem, written in Italian, is *Carteromaco* or *Fortiguerra.*

1760, and he attained the rank of captain in 1761, with the cross of Saint Louis, and was retired on half pay at the end of 1762, after the peace. But his wild nature and his queer turn of mind gave him no rest, and he could not subscribe to the order of things which would, in the usual way, bring him promotion. He made up his mind to concern himself in political and military affairs, and went to Italy where he offered his services in succession to the Genoese against Paoli, the leader of Corsican rebels, and to Paoli, against the Genoese. Spurned by both sides, he remained in Corsica for whatever personal gain there was, allied himself with the foes of General Paoli, and made a pretense of fighting before Bonifacio. After having intrigued for some time in Corsica, he returned to France and sent to the Duke of Choiseul plans for taking possession of this island. Of these plans the Minister made no use. He evidently, however, furnished to their author some aid that he might travel in foreign lands, for Dumourier went, in 1766, to Spain and to Portugal (1). In 1768 when the conquest of the Corsica was determined upon, he made the knowledge he acquired of the country appear so valuable that he was commissioned as a sergeant-major in the army that was sent

(1) One of the results of this journey was a work entitled *Present State of the Kingdom of Portugal,* in 1766, printed in 1775 in a *duodecimo* volume.

there. He went through the campaigns of 1768 and 1769, and obtained the rank of colonel, in spite of his frequent arguments with the generals, especially with Count Marbeuf, and his evident mania for trying to direct everything that did not concern him. In 1770 he was sent to the Confederacy. Any other man would have doubtlessly concluded that since a very wise man had not wished to take upon himself that burden, he, too, should have declined it; but Dumourier was too eager for missions to refuse even the worst, and he accepted it. As long as the Duke of Choiseul was in office, Dumourier held himself in proper check, but this minister having fallen from royal favor on December 24, 1770, the author of *The History of the Anarchy of Poland,* observes (1) that Dumourier took it upon himself to assume greater power, and began to give orders, instead of advice and subsidies, to the Confederacy, and that although at first, by establishing a kind of discipline among the troops, he won the confidence of several leaders, he soon saw it wane, after he had gratuitously insulted the intrepid Casimir Pulawski, when the latter experienced a defeat, seemingly, but not in fact, through lack of courage (a very common experience in war). Then because after he himself, very imprudently risked and lost, on June 22, 1771, at Landskron, an engagement of half an hour's dura-

(1) Volume IV, page 219.

tion, he kept insisting upon every occasion, that his failure had been the fault of the Poles, who numbered only twelve hundred, against fifty-six hundred Russians. The same historian adds: Moreover, he exhibited towards the Confederacy the greatest disdain, an attitude quite at odds with the real character of his mission. The net result of all this was that he became the enemy of those he had been sent to aid; and as they, in turn, were disappointed, and stood aloof, he wrote to France that since they were responsible themselves for their disasters, they must be regarded as unworthy of help, which as affairs then stood, would in any event be futile (1). This resumé by Rulhière is quite correct, but he should have set forth the exact expressions of Dumourier, which are extraordinary. However, we shall here expand somewhat the concise style of the historian, and set forth a few lines taken from Dumourier's dispatches and other writings which deal with Poland.

The Court of France, he says, *was clearly informed at this time of the weakness of the Turks. Chevalier Taulès, who had been sent with funds, to the Confederacy of Bar, had witnessed its dissolution, brought back the money entrusted to him, and demonstrated the sheer impossibility of making use of part of the Confederates.* This admission is costly,

(1) See Volume IV, pages 228 and 229.

and justifies this question, which might well be asked of the man who made it: Why, conceding that success was impossible, did he with no resources of any kind, nevertheless, tempt fortune, expose himself to quick and certain disgrace, and make a sudden and complete change in his plans, especially since the Polish leaders were blind as well as undisciplined?

This war, he continues, *must be ended. The diversion attempted by Poland engaged only a few Russians; it helped them, and gave them a lawful excuse to increase and strengthen their army at the expense of Poland. . . . . Of military strength the Confederacy has not an ounce. An agreement reached by the various protecting powers is the only means of raising Poland from the low state to which she has fallen because of the scandalous morals, the sloth, the license, the dissensions; and the incapacity of its defenders.* He then adds: *I thought it appropriate to end my campaign there, and until a new order should be made, not to commit France any further, and to withhold the aid which my country was still willing to give to those who so little deserved it. I hastened to Novitarg, so that I might withdraw into Hungary.*

Once more, it may be asked, why did not Dumourier follow the example set by Taulès, save the French money, and give over these vain attempts which the latter had demonstrated could never suc-

ceed. It is only too clear that the conduct of Dumourier was that of an inconsiderate and inconsistent intriguer, who brought his work to an end by making appear discreditable the very task he himself had put awry or which he could not accomplish, after having boasted he would succeed. Despite all this, he was, however, greatly piqued when Baron Vioménil was sent to replace him.* Having returned to France during the course of 1771, Dumourier himself informs us, in the sketch of his life which closes his *Memoirs* (1), that he was employed by Marquis Monteynard, Secretary of State for War, upon a compilation of the military ordinances; that at the end of the same year, he was entrusted by Louis XV himself with a mission relative to the revolution in Sweden; and that the Duke of Aiguillon, minister of foreign affairs, in whom the King had not confided, caused his arrest, with Faver and Segue, at Hamburg, in 1773. It was thought that Dumourier's self-esteem and befogged mind had led him to exceed his authority. Whatever it was, after six months' close confinement, he was sent, in March 1774, to the Castle of Caen, and immediately was allowed the whole city as his prison limits. He left Caen shortly after the accession of Louis XVI to the

* See translator's note.

(1) The article is entitled: *Sketch of the Life of General Dumourier taken from a Letter to one of his Friends.*

throne. Deeply in love, almost to the point of distraction, with his cousin, he married her, after extra long consideration in the month of September. *I have finally put an end to my romance,* he wrote, in merry vein, to an acquaintance. This union, however, neither made Dumourier constant nor his wife happy; and after neglecting her, he abandoned her completely; at least during his last years in France he was seen only with his different mistresses. He relates that in 1774, almost at the very moment of his liberation, Count Muy, minister of war, sent him as a colonel to Lille for the new military maneuvers which Baron Pirch had brought from Prussia, and also entrusted to him the examination of a project for improving La Lys and of a plan for a harbor in the English Channel at Ambleteuse; and that he spent the end of the year 1774 and the whole of 1775 upon these various matters. In 1776 he was associated with Chevalier Oisi a senior captain in the navy, and with Brigadier General Rosiere (1) for the purpose of selecting on the English Channel a site for the construction of a harbor; and he spent all of the year 1777 in the country, at Romilli, near the Pont-de-l'Arche, in Normandy. He was apparently quite justified in resting after such arduous undertakings, but nevertheless quiet was so foreign

(1) Now lieutenant-general.

to his nature, that after trying it, he foreswore it for the rest of his life.

Dumourier was not only a compiler of ordinances, a judge of military maneuvers and an expert in the selection of harbors; he was even a prophet, and, as he had (like everybody else) predicted the American War, he assures us that as soon as French intervention was certain, Prince Montbarey, who had become Minister of War, hastened to call him to his side, to assist him in the necessary preparations; that he took advantage of his position by having restored for himself in 1778 the post of commander at Cherbourg, which he ascertained to be the most suitable place on the English Channel, and that aided by the influence and support of the Duke of Harcourt, Governor of Normandy, he caused to be decided, in favor of Cherbourg, the dispute which had lasted for a century between that locality and that of La Hougue, in regard to the establishment of a military port; and that thereafter until 1789, he was busy in and about this harbor. But his modesty, it seems, leads him to conceal these facts: that during the war, which lasted from 1778 to the end of 1782, his seething brain was in continual torment; that it would be impossible to imagine anything more extraordinary than his perturbed mind and his consequent agitation; that almost consumed by his desire to play a leading role, he dreamed of

nothing but expeditions and attacks against the coast of England; that he made his superiors weary (by his endless addresses and plans); and that he proposed no less than ten different plans for attacking the islands of Jersey, Guernsey and Wight. Appointed brigadier of infantry December 5th, 1781, and field-marshal March 7, 1788, *his allowances and perquisites* he said, in the extract from the letter to one of his friends, amounted to *twenty thousand francs, which was all he needed.* In penning this, M. Dumourier was mistaken, or wished to deceive his friend, or quite lacked memory. He should have remembered, having known Count Saint-Priest, that just as soon as he learned that the Count had entered the Council with the rank of Minister of State, he sought, through the Count's good offices, to become connected with foreign affairs, with perquisites of twelve thousand francs, without prejudice to the twenty thousand francs he already had, and which probably did not supply his needs as well as he assured his friend. It was from this double point of view, that he wrote January 7, 1787, to the new Minister, the following letter:

Dear Count Saint-Priest:

"Political events in England apparently justify the feeling of security and the inaction which at bottom characterize the conduct of affairs by the Ministry.

This indeed is well, from their standpoint, for no advantage is thereby taken of our weakness; but we should reflect very soberly and in good time upon the sudden swiftness of the movement by the King of Prussia against Poland, and upon all of its consequences.

It is easy to foresee that during this winter there will be no separate peace between the Emperor and the Turks, as well as no general peace between the Turks and the two Empires. Therefore, the hereditary states under the Emperor will be stripped to furnish subsistence to both the Austrian and Russian armies which must be maintained the whole winter. Poland will keep its grain for the Prussians and its own military organization. In the Spring the Austrians and Russians will be without any supplies, while the Turks, the Prussians and the Poles will have much more than they need. Add to this the diversion by Sweden, which will no longer be hindered by Denmark, which in turn, will be restrained by the Prussians, the Dutch and the English, and judge the danger of the two Empires.

This situation must be watched very closely, and requires more adroit management than anybody apparently imagines. In it I could be very useful, and this is my reason for suggesting my own appointment. Although I have drawn up only a general plan and I am alone in stating that it will be neces-

sary to undertake direct negotiations, I have more than one reason for putting myself forward. First, I am not a stranger in foreign affairs: I am a pupil of Count Broglie and Favier, have had the advantages of long study and traveling, was *chargé des affaires* in Poland in 1770 and 1771; and had some insight into the Swedish situation in 1773. Secondly, I am fifty years old and a general officer. Thirdly, I am the commander of a very strategic post, closely watched, and only eighteen leagues from England. This post is quite exposed, and the interest of my honor and that of the Kingdom itself make it imperative that I state fully what I think is essential to avoid all risks, until this may be put into a proper state of defense. If our inaction and the clear fact of our weakness alike lead some day to the greatest dangers, before Cherbourg is put into a state of defense, I shall regard it necessary to protest, before the King and the nation, and to recall what I did to avoid these dangers. You have made me two very reasonable propositions. The first was to have the aged Baron Houze retire, to have Count Eterno go to Denmark, the Vicount of Vibraye to Prussia, and to name me as minister to Saxony, where I shall be very useful under present circumstances. Montmorin's reply is that this cannot be arranged, because order in promotions must be observed, as many subjects seek appointments, and there are too many

persons already in the state department. The answer to this is that when out of a clear sky Gouffier was made ambassador to Turkey only because he had written a book about that country, no one gave any attention to the general picture. No attention is ever given to it, especially in crises, and the appointment should always go to the person best fitted, in preference to the head of the list. Moreover, I repeat, I am not an intruder in matters of state; on the contrary I have more substantial rights than have all the beginners.

The second proposition was that I should concern myself with matters of state, with appointments amounting to 12,000 francs, to devote some attention to the politics of northern Europe, and to hold myself in readiness to go on any necessary missions, which would otherwise be undertaken by others, less reliable and not so skilled. Montmorin objected to this, upon the pretext of economy. I consider this the weakest excuse he could have set forth, and from it I can perceive that he makes the matter personal. I surely do not deserve this; for if, after eighteen years, consideration is to be given to the matter of recompense, no one has a better claim than I who was ruined by my trip to Poland. Through the enmity of the Duke of Aigullon I have been deprived of all compensation, although long ago I should have been awarded either a pension, or patronage in the

department of state. Therefore, my request is not indiscreet, since I now offer my services in return for this patronage. I have neither resorted to intrigue nor made myself a nuisance to the minister, although I could have overwhelmed him with influence and requests from the inner circles of the court. Deeply convinced that I may be useful, and sustained in this opinion by the esteem you have always held for me, I have appealed in my own behalf, frankly, in the hope of being useful. I will now renounce even this hope, until it happens that circumstances make it necessary that men be employed, according to their talents."

De Saint-Priest evidently saw in this letter evidences of an intriguing mind. It displeased him. His reply which was non-committal and a trifle rude follows:

"Versailles, January 8, 1787.

I have your letter of yesterday. I understand that it will be disappointing for you to rein your talent for the consular service, for which you are exactly suited; but circumstances at present are against you; only in the event of a strong press of matters is there a chance of your employment, and as soon as I realized the real political views of the cabinet, I concluded not to submit formally the proposition about which you spoke to me. I have but one vote, and no

other weight, and I keep myself very exactly, and very willingly, too, in my place.

I have the honor to be, with appropriate appreciation, your humble and very obedient servant.

THE COUNT OF SAINT-PRIEST"

After this short and disagreeable correspondence, which Dumourier kept to himself, he returned to Normandy, where he vainly sought to have himself elected as a deputy to the States-General, and, to his great chagrin, wasted his time writing pamphlets in support of the principles then in favor. The revolution which broke out soon afterwards inspired him with the hope of playing a brilliant part in the large and important province of Normandy, where the Duke of Beuvron was in command, under the Duke of Harcourt, his brother. Dumourier was accused of having forgotten his obligations to this esteemed family, and went as far as to incite the people of Caen against the first, and did his utmost to induce the second to leave the province, which he imagined he might himself come to control. He succeeded in embarrassing the two brothers to a great extent; but his success stopped there. The purpose of his plans was divined, and since the Normans did not trust but despised him, he was compelled to leave the province to exercise his talents in another theatre. He was in Paris in 1790, where he enjoyed the favor

of the Jacobins and tried to ally himself with Mirabeau against whom he had written, and with Lafayette, to whom he proposed that there should be adopted for the Parisian national guard, the same plan of organization as he had given to that of Cherbourg, of the excellence of which he continually boasted. Lafayette, who had under him too many warriors who busied themselves with paper campaigns, and who undoubtedly was afraid of intrigues, lost no time in sending Dumourier, in June 1790, to Belgium, to stir up trouble there. This brilliant mission resulted only in a pamphlet of 110 pages in *octavo,* entitled *The Guide of Nations,* or *Political and Moral Correspondence upon France and the Low Countries.* As the morals of Dumourier made it necessary for him to establish contact with all classes of revolutionists, he had his little book printed in the shop of that Gorsas, who was so highly ridiculed in the *Song of the Chemises,* and guillotined on October 7, 1793.

In 1791, Dumourier, in his rank of field-marshal in the Twelfth Military Division, which included the district from Nantes to Bordeaux, under the command of lieutenant-general Verteuil, a feeble octogenarian, who displayed no initiative, soon usurped the latter's authority, in order to become the real commander of that division; and always ready to put himself in the foreground, he took advantage of his

position, by his own authority, upon the news of the flight of the King, to assemble a body of seven or eight thousand men for the purpose of marching at their head to Paris. He wrote to Barrère and other deputies that he was hastening to defend the National Assembly, although the fact was that he had no other aim, by offering it his services, except to obtain consideration from the faction he should find in power; but the quick return of the King put a sudden end to this idea, and Dumourier fell again into the obscurity and inactivity from which he so deeply desired to emerge.

No longer able to bear his idleness, and desperate, because he had no employment of importance, and especially since he was unable to make a stir of any kind, he resolved to make a supreme effort to obtain either credit or occupation, and accordingly went to Paris in the last days of February, 1792. At this time he held the rank of lieutenant-general, by seniority, and while he was securing the intervention of La Porte, supervisor of the civil list, of whom he had been a college mate, in an endeavor to clear up the well-founded suspicions which the King had formed against him, he burdened, with military and political plans, the King, the Queen, the Ministers, and the party leaders, flattered the Jacobins more than ever, attempted to reach those members of the legislative body who exercised any kind of influence, no mat-

ter what their opinion was, and wrote and bestirred himself into the greatest activity. Finally he proposed to Lessart, Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom he had known in his youth, in the College of Louis-le-Grand, to aid him with his political talents while at the same time by using Gensonne, he made firmer his contacts with the leaders of the Girondists, who were the enemies of that Minister, and who were just beginning to assert their leadership in the National Assembly by the talents which their speakers there displayed. He moved in and out so actively that, on March 10th, the unfortunate Lessart was denounced by the Girondists, formally accused and delivered to the National High Court established at Orleans, and his rival put in his place, on the 15th, despite the repugnance of the King. It was a report by Brissot which precipitated what had happened: Dumourier states in his *Private and Public Life* (first part, chapter six) that this deputy *was never more contented than when he could do evil;* nevertheless Brissot used to say to any one who would listen that he had based his report wholly upon the notes of Dumourier, his superior in matters of diplomacy. It is easier to believe that Brissot told the truth than justly to acquit Dumourier of the guilt of having pieced together a tissue of lies. His ambition was not satisfied when he became a lieutenant-general in the army and a minister. He

sought to control the Council, and began by usurping the principal branches of the administration of Chevalier de Grave, then directing the war department. Soon afterwards, on April 20th, he induced the King to propose to the legislative body that war be declared against Austria; at the same time he prepared and had adopted, for the invasion of the Low Countries, an absurd plan, based solely on the vain hope of a general insurrection of the natives, who remained quiet, with the result that the operations of the French troops resulted, both in the vicinity of Mons and of Tournai, in nothing but a disgraceful retreat and the massacre of several of their officers.

Dumourier was contented only when he was driving his colleagues, who let themselves be driven blindly; he gave to Rolland, Minister of the Interior, the name *Thermosiris,* that of an aged high-priest of Egypt who, according to mythology, is said to have given excellent advice to Telemachus; to listen to him, Claviére, a native of Geneva, Minister of Finance, was greatly superior to *Sully* and to *Colbert,* but especially to his compatriot Necker; and as pictured by Dumourier, General Servan who, on May 9, succeeded Chevalier de Grave, who preferred to retire rather than endure any longer the despotism of his colleague, was *Louvois* come to life again. Of all these sobriquets, from which it could easily be

inferred that Dumourier himself might at least be considered a Cardinal Richelieu, the last alone had some justification, for Servan was a combination of rare honesty, clear head, capacity for work, and had completely mastered the details of the administration of the war department. Whatever the situation may have been, the ministers could not understand why, in return for empty compliments, they should be regarded as little more than messengers of Dumourier and either sacrifice their reputations on his account, or avoid their responsibilities. They began to show their opposition, especially Servan, as soon as it became clear to them that Dumourier was scheming against the welfare of the public, and that, in his reports to the ministers Dumourier attempted to ridicule the King and Queen, while in his reports to the King and the Queen, he held his fellow ministers up to scorn. He described *Thermosiris* as nothing more than an old fool, dominated by his wife; *Sully-Colbert* as an ignorant, easily-led rattle-brain; and *Louvois* as a morose man. It was thus by praising and deprecating everybody, as occasion seemed to require, and in the end making prevail those prejudices which he had insidiously raised in the King's mind against these ministers, that he succeeded in convincing the King they were trouble makers at heart and concerned only with overturning the throne in order to substitute a

republic, which he himself hated, both because of his attachment for the monarch, and because such a government would be an absurdity in France. The virtuous Louis XVI, thus fooled by this chameleon Dumourier, dismissed his three ministers, on June 12 and 13, 1792. Dumourier then became head of the war department, but, forced to indicate measures to be taken by the King, he was unable to propose any but those which he had previously criticized when they had been approved by his victims. The monarch, disillusioned by this performance, refused to confer with any official. Moreover, the legislative body, irritated by the duplicity of Dumourier, evidenced to him sure signs of its displeasure, and left him convinced that he could not continue in his place without peril. He therefore resigned on June 16, regretting that he had been ensnarled, so to speak, in his own intrigues.

No longer a public official, and covered with the disgrace that always accompanies deceitful conduct, Dumourier had nothing else left but to go serve, as Lieutenant-General, in the army of the North, where he was disagreeably received by both Marshal Luckner and General Lafayette, who showed proper contempt for him as a man who had recently misled all factions, and who cared for nothing but his own interests, if he could be said to have been able to recognize what they were, something which is not

at all clear, in view of his natural incompatibility, both with his superiors and his equals, his seething brain, and his penchant for ideas that were essentially romantic, purposeless, and disordered. It is at least certain that his double-dealing in Paris, and especially the unjust and impolitic dismissal of the ministers, Servan, Rolland and Clavière, were the real cause of what happened on June 20, and August 10, 1792, and consequently of the execution of the King.

Thus, become a person to be shunned as a matter of principle by Royalists, Feuillants and Republicans alike, Dumourier had no refuge, except among the most evil-minded disgruntled; before this he had indicated the possibility of joining the revolutionists, and it is apparent that while his contacts with the party of the Duke of Orleans dated as far back as the time he joined the Army of the North, yet it was not until later that they became firmly established. The small number of general officers then in the army obliged Marshal Luckner to use Dumourier; in July he issued his orders, which Dumourier disobeyed. Arthur Dillon became at this time his general, and Dumourier likewise disobeyed him, after August 10, 1792, and meanwhile stealthily set about having Dillon removed from command that he himself might have Dillon's place. On August 17, the Jacobins finally secured for him the

place of General Lafayette, who had fled from France to escape the wrath of part of his troops and of his numerous enemies; but as Lafayette left the Army of the Meuse totally disorganized, Dumourier, who preferred to remain in the north, in order to attack Belgium, arrived at Sedan on August 28th, after having made it evident that he did not wish to go, and perhaps he would not have gone at all, had it not been for the insistently repeated orders of the Executive Council, set up in place of the royal authority, after the fall of Louis XVI.

At this time, a combined army of Prussians and Austrians menaced France with invasion of the Meuse district; and it was necessary to appoint a commander in chief to replace Marshal Luckner, who had been wrongfully discredited. The Executive Council, in which were the three ministers slandered and dismissed by Dumourier, did not, of course, care to select him. The command was therefore offered to other generals, who refused it, because they either regarded it as too scabrous or the existing order of things too repugnant to their principles. To the Ministers, who complained how embarrassed they were by these refusals, one general finally said: *Almost every one of you weeps about Dumourier; but now is the moment to forget your grief, because the general you select must be like him, an adventurer, an acrobat, who has nothing, not*

even his reputation, to lose. If he succeeds, so much the better for you; if he blows up and is hanged, that will not be so bad; it is better that it be he, rather than any other man. Suppose he succeeds; you can hold him down. You do not have to keep him in command too long, because, despite his bravado and wit, he is too notional and mercurial to be relied upon. He will wind up, as he did in Poland and in the Cabinet, with blunders that may put you in a worse hole.

What followed proved that the speaker understood Dumourier perfectly. While exercising this command, which came to him under such circumstances, Dumourier established some slight reputation, which from any point of view, was earned with but little effort; for it was his good fortune that the allied powers selected as his opponent the Duke of Brunswick, who lacked vision, a clear mind, and real talent, and who was possessed of nothing except his title of Prince, the ability of a grenadier, and a false reputation, even at that time destroyed in great part, and which through absurd tactics, he completely buried under the ruins of the Prussian monarchy, at the end of 1806. Moreover, Servan, the minister of war, managed to send to Dumourier forces which greatly outnumbered those of the allied powers. From the borders of Moselle he sent into Champagne, for instance, a small army to help

Dumourier hold the enemy in check momentarily: General Kellermann, who commanded it, should have remained at its head, because he had a particular destination; but Dumourier, ever faithful to the principle that everyone near him should play second fiddle, and be the object of his calumny, contrived to have Kellermann directed to take orders from him.

On September 21, the National Convention abolished the monarchy, established the republic, and sent to the armies commissioners instructed to have the troops approve the change in the form of government. Dumourier, pursuant to his habit of making it appear that he was from the beginning of the same mind as those whose favor he sought, in order that he might finally sway them, found out exactly what the commissioners required, assured them that his natural disposition had always been to prefer above all others the republican forms of government, and made every effort to have the troops peacefully swear allegiance to the new government. Finally, after having seen the Duke of Brunswick repulsed and discouraged by the cannonade at Valmi, on September 20, Dumourier now happily rid of the allied forces, less through his own skill and efforts than by reason of the bad weather, dysentery, sickness, and one of those arrangements, obscure at the time, and involved, of which he alone could have conceived the plan, instead of completing the destruction of the enemy by pursuing with all his troops, or rather by crossing the Rhine and invading Germany, a maneuver which would have led to the capture of the Low Countries, without firing a shot mistakenly, directed the greater part of his army towards Valenciennes, and came immediately to Paris to show himself, as he thought he would be received there in triumph. He should have been arrested for having come to Paris without permission and at such a crisis; but nothing happened, except that he was treated coldly, save at the club of the Jacobins, to whom he hurried to offer the homage of his laurels and the zeal with which he was burning for their cause. There, wearing a red bonnet, he declared himself the *General des Sans-Culottes,* and had the signal honor of being embraced publicly and fraternally by Robespierre and other villains of his gang. After a few days he left to put into execution his favorite plan of attacking Belgium. On November 6th, he began it by winning, against an Austrian army vastly inferior to his, a victory at Jemappes, glorious, without question, but very costly to the French troops, and a very serious military mistake, as it was easy to have won without fighting. At any rate, the revolutionists saw themselves masters of Belgium, and Dumourier was at the apogee of his fame. As was said of another,

Gilles le Grand, it could be said of Dumourier, with still more reason, he was *Scapin-Heros.*

Nevertheless, in spite of the prestige of his lucky victories, he had to submit to several charges of treason; but Danton and Marat successfully defended him.

At this period the whole of France awaited anxiously and fearfully the *dénouêment* of the final catastrophe which menaced the good, virtuous Louis XVI. The over confident conqueror of Belgium hastened to Paris. He states in his *Memoirs* that he made every effort to save the unfortunate monarch; nevertheless at the time of the event it was the common rumor that on the contrary he had strongly insisted that the King be executed, because the King could not forget Dumourier's conduct as a former minister, and besides, Dumourier wished the throne to become vacant though not in favor of the Duke of Orleans, so despised that no one wished him to be King; and it was rumored Dumourier intended to imprison him. Dumourier supported the Duke of Chartres, his son, against whom there was no apparent prejudice, and who had displayed great courage in Champagne and at Jemappes. If Dumourier's assertion relative to the punishment of the King could be justified otherwise than by appearances, such proof would place him irrevocably in the class of the worst villains. It is set forth here because,

having been circulated, it belongs to history, like so many other possible facts, but it is supported by no trustworthy proofs. Finally, Louis XVI perished on the scaffold on January 21, 1793.

Dumourier returned to Belgium and busied himself with ambitious, but ill-conceived, projects. According to some authorities he went as far as seriously thinking of establishing himself as the Duke of Brabant, and of marrying Mademoiselle d'Orleans; but it is thought that he aspired only to rule France, in the name of the King, whom he imagined he could raise to the throne after Holland had been conquered, an object he sought to accomplish, it is said, after negotiations which he secretly carried on, through others, in order that at the same time he could intrigue with the French emigrés whom he pretended to serve, and against the Statholder who, from his standpoint, it was necessary to drive from office, and whose power was trembling in the balance, by reason of the fact that Batavia hated him. Dumourier felt so sure of success that as early as February 6, 1793, he thus wrote to General Miranda: *At Niménue and La Haye, I will dance the carmagnole without stopping, and I hope in the end to enjoy more monkey-business with the despots;* but these fond hopes vanished very soon. While the French general ordered against Maestricht a too feeble, and consequently a futile attack, and though

he directed in person the siege against the first line of fortresses in the United Provinces, his army of observation was beaten, March 1, 1793, in the Ruhr district, as a result of mistakes in placing the troops under orders given by him. This check relieved Maestricht and compelled Dumourier to speed his efforts to correct his errors. In this, he failed to succeed, and instead made matters worse by risking, contrary to all military reasons, the battle of Neer-Winden. His only justification for his action was that since the Marshal of Luxembourg had there gained a brilliant victory, in 1693, it would make excellent history to be able to say that in 1793 another French general plucked new laurels, almost upon the same battlefield; but Dumourier was not Luxembourg; he really caused his own defeat, (1) sought to throw the blame for his failure upon his subordinates, and retreated towards Brussels, wear-

(1) The author of the *Biographical and Historical Dictionary of Noted Men of the Last Years of the Eighteenth Century,* notes that Dumourier felt that his reverses might encourage his enemies and bring him to the end of his rope, and, *having knowledge of the fate in store for him, he determined to risk everything in order to silence his critics, by a victory; and that this political motive was the only justification for the manner in which he attacked the Austrians at Neer-Winden.* Of course, this reason may have entered into Dumourier's calculations, but only slightly, for anyone who knows his character can hardly doubt that his determining motive was his desire to equal, if not surpass, the Marshal of Luxembourg.

ing out his brains in an attempt to conceal from the eyes of the public his chagrin for having through his errors lost the Low Countries even more quickly than he had conquered them. He thought he could reenter France, overturn the National Convention, and establish himself as arbiter of the French government, a project of extraordinary extravagance, for a beaten and discredited general leads no revolutions; and, moreover, the state of his weakened and disheartened troops, did not allow him to count on being successful. Nevertheless, he flattered himself that he could overcome these disadvantages, by securing the support of the Austrian generals, and he began negotiations, or rather a veritable imbroglio, without clearly seeing or contemplating where his peculiar conduct would lead him. Having arrived in the vicinity of Valenciennes, he set about carrying out his plans, which came to nothing, because no one in authority would see him, and several regiments mutinied. On April 2, 1793, he arrested, and surrendered to the Austrians, the Minister of War and the commissioners sent by the National Convention for the purpose of taking him into custody and rendering futile his plans, which had been discovered in time. Thus, accused of treason by some, and of downright folly by others, he was compelled on April 4, 1793, to take refuge with the enemy, after he had risked being killed by his own troops,

whom he had exasperated. The enemy, seeing that he had no support of any kind, treated him with marked contempt and disdainfully refused his services, which always meant trouble, and which he had offered them only through his inordinate desire to appear a man of importance. At first, he lived quietly at Brussels, but his turbulent spirit would not permit him to remain tranquil, and as a result of unwise utterances and participation in matters which did not concern him, he was compelled to leave Brussels on the 16th of April, 1793. He then went to Switzerland; and during the month of June, 1793, he departed thence for England. His stay there was made uncomfortable and he then returned to Switzerland, but despised alike by the emigrés who favored a king and a constitution, and by the revolutionists, he found himself welcome nowhere. After wandering about for some time incognito, and afraid to establish himself anywhere, after much difficulty he finally found asylum in the Danish States, in the north of Germany.

It is a fact worthy of being remarked that this gentleman, in the three most important situations in his life, accomplished nothing: his mission to Poland, his ministry, and his command of the army. It is not wrong to say that on these three occasions all he did, to use a popular phrase, was *to shoot at the man in the moon.* The reason for this is quite simple:

certain causes always produce the same results. With nothing now to do, the greatest misfortune from his point of view, Dumourier began the composition of his *Memoirs,* remarkable alike for the excessive vanity and stupidity they display, and written with no respect for truth. He attempts to palliate his mistakes or rather his crimes, and to set forth in the best possible light, whenever he is concerned, those misfortunes which came upon him, all of which made him appear inept. The truth about him may be briefly stated: a Proteus of a kind, he had never been sincerely on any side, except that of the Duke of Orleans; he had no military talent, except presence of mind, and especially the art of encouraging his troops; and his unexpected successes centered upon him the attention of different factions, and the hope they had of making him useful to themselves was the sole motive of the support and praise he came to enjoy; his instability and his victories, too, for that matter, made enemies for him among all classes; in view of his general unreliability, none put any faith in him; the zeal he manifested in behalf of the party of the Duke of Orleans made it impossible for either the true friends of the King or the revolutionists to resume friendship with him; and finally his reverses were a signal for all who desired his downfall to set to work to accomplish it. By striving to misrepresent facts known to everybody, he made

more bitter the contempt and hate everybody bore him. He should have recollected, moreover, that there were preserved in France authentic papers, either written or signed by him, which gave him the lie in the matters which he contrived to misrepresent; and so his books, which carried their own refutations, secured for him no adherents despite his pretence that he had turned philosopher and would henceforth busy himself reading and meditating upon Plutarch, his favorite writer of all time, of whose works he must have purchased a new set in Germany; for the author of the present sketch, who was imprisoned, towards the close of 1793, by the Committee of Public Safety, saw under its control a trunk of Dumourier, which had been seized in the apartment of one of his mistresses. In it was found the pretended breviary for which he expressed his fondness: it was an old compilation, of several enormous volumes, very badly arranged, in short, such a *Plutarch* as Moliére mentions in his comedy, *Les Femmes Savantes,* better fitted by far to press neckbands in than to be a consolation to a downcast man. At any rate, the recluse Dumourier very soon tired of reading moral philosophy and gave it up in favor of his former pursuits. His anxiety of mind and want of employment made him ponder, as usual, upon political and military undertakings; and he hastened to communicate them to Paul I, the Emperor of Rus-

sia, who, however, would have none of them. He then left St. Petersburg, and succeeded in 1799 in effecting a kind of reconciliation with the princes of the House of Bourbon, of which he had been the most dangerous enemy; and he was then allowed to enter England, where he now lives, upon a pension granted by the British Government, and in exchange for its good gold he furnishes plans directed against the present order in France. The projects he contrives are as useless as those of which he heretofore brought none to a successful issue. The author of *The Biographical and Historical Dictionary of Noted Men of the Closing Years of the Eighteenth Century* ends his article upon Dumourier by remarking a trait too evident to be passed by: He is plainly set forth as *the inconsiderately ambitious man, for whom obscurity is a punishment, and who would sacrifice the world to be a public figure once again.*

It is thus evident from this impartially drawn picture, which is clearly justified by facts, that General Dumourier does ill and well, with like indifference; and that no one, without running the risk of being duped, can repose in him the slightest confidence, in view of his remarkable imagination, nearly always out of control, his great and unrestrained ambition, to which he would sacrifice everybody, his shallowness and his mercurial temperament, his inconstant character which if need be, permits him to take any

side and makes him the slave of circumstances, his lack of principles, of any steadfast quality, and of wisdom, his readiness to decry in the evening what he has praised in the morning, his slight regard, like that of a gambler, for his promises and oaths, in fine, in view of his sin of changing sides for the slightest personal advantage.

Personally, from another viewpoint, he is charming, of an easy and obliging nature socially, provided, of course, he is permitted to have his head. It is difficult, when he so wills, for any one else to be more amiable and gay, especially *dans un souper de filles,* and he constantly gives expression to those pleasant and original thoughts with which he is naturally endowed. A good example of this originality was displayed by him recently: As he is rarely in funds and is often forced to borrow, he thus concluded his reply to a friend who had written to remind him of an old loan: *I SHALL BE, FOR LIFE, YOUR SINCERE FRIEND, ZEALOUS SERVANT, AND DEBTOR, DUMOURIER.*

The Duke of Aiguillon, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs on June 6, 1771, did not delay in giving consideration to the claims of the Council-General of the Polish Confederacy, which, more discontented with Dumourier than he could be with them, asked that a successor to him be appointed. Even if no complaint had been made against him,

and he had not written what we have already seen, it was enough that he had been employed by the Duke of Choiseul, for which reason the Duke of Aiguillon recalled him. He selected, therefore, at the end of July, to succeed him, probably upon the recommendation of the Prince of Condé, Baron de Vioménil, field-marshal, an estimable officer, having both character and judgment, and capable of directing well the military enterprises of the Confederates.

Antoine Charles du Houx, Baron de Vioménil, born about 1725, lieutenant in the Limousin regiment, September 26, 1740, ensign December 21, 1741, captain March 28, 1747 and colonel of the volunteers of Dauphiny, February 10, 1759, constantly distinguished himself as a soldier, particularly at the head of the light troops in the army corps, which were commanded, during the campaigns of 1761 and 1762, by the Prince of Condé, who ever afterwards held him in high regard. Appointed brigadier July 25, 1762, and colonel of the legion of Lorraine, June 5, 1763, he went with this corps to Corsica, where he campaigned in 1768, under the Marquis of Chauvelin, and in 1769, under Count, afterwards Marshal, de Vaux, who quickly conquered the entire island. Raised to the rank of field-marshal on January 3, 1770, and appointed commander of the Order of St. Louis on December 9th of that year, he left for Poland in August, 1771, with

a selected group of officers and the money which France had granted the Confederates. As his operations are sufficiently detailed in his own correspondence, it is unnecessary to speak of them; but fairness demands that it be set forth that Baron Vioménil deserved the esteem and confidence of the Poles, and did everything he could under the circumstances. He returned to France in 1772, after the dismemberment of Poland was determined upon.

In 1780 he went to North America with the army corps which the King sent, under the orders of Count Rochambeau, to the aid of the United States, which were fighting to be independent of England. He attained in 1781 the rank of lieutenant-general, but upon the condition that at the next promotion of the general officers, his seniority would not be advanced; as to this restriction he was consoled on December 5th of the same year, by a promise of the dignity of the *grand croix* of the Order of St. Louis, and permission to wear the decoration, provisionally. The decoration was bestowed as of August 25, 1782, and he became governor of La Rochelle on June 13, 1783. In the promotion of January 1, 1784, he assumed, according to seniority, the rank of lieutenant-general. Engaged in July, 1789, in the army gathered in the environs of Paris, under the order of Marshal Broglie, up to the very moment of its disbandment, he showed himself inviolably attached to the King;

he was even at the point of accompanying this unfortunate monarch when he started for Montmedi, in June, 1791; but he found no room, either for himself or for another general officer no less resolute, and with whom he fully concurred, in the carriage in which Madam Tourizel, governess of the Dauphin and of Madame, his sister, demanded insistently a place which the Royal family could not refuse her. This was a misfortune for the King; a competent man would have without any doubt corrected the mistake of the Duke of Choiseul or rather of Chevalier Goguelas, which contributed to the arrest of the King at Varennes. Baron Vioménil, who kept close to the King in the morning of August 10, 1792, was seriously wounded in the knee by a bullet, in the attack upon the Tuileries. At first he was taken into and nursed at the home of the Ambassador from Venice, but he was soon compelled to conceal himself elsewhere. His devoted loyalty to the throne inspired the hate of the revolutionists; and the continual fear of being discovered, or led to the scaffold and murdered, and the revulsion he felt upon the execution of the King, doubtlessly contributed to the infection of his wound which would not close; his blood became poisoned and he died in February, 1793, aged about sixty-seven years.*

* See translator's note.

Memoir of

CHEVALIER THESBY DE BELCOUR

COLONEL IN THE SERVICE OF THE CONFEDERATES OF POLAND

Upon the Campaign Which He Made With Them in 1769

PRINCE GEORGE-MARTIN LUBOMIRSKI, marshal of the Confederation of Cracow, sent to France one of his colonels, who was authorized to employ French officers for service on the side of the Confederation. I was among these and, on May 17, 1769, I reached a tentative agreement with this colonel (1).... I asked one of my friends (2) to find out the intentions of the cabinet in respect to the matter. As soon as he reported back to me, I hastened to the Bureau of Foreign Affairs; the issuance of my passport was there expedited and some very fine promises made to me. I left Paris on the 23rd of May and arrived at Vienna in Austria on the 9th of July, 1769. There I found ten other Frenchmen who had met for the

(1) The Memoirs of Chevalier Belcour contain many details which are of interest only to himself, and these we have omitted. These omissions are indicated by ellipses.

(2) The present Senator Bougainville, then the captain of a warship.

same object. . . . We left Vienna on the 21st. As soon as we arrived, on the 29th, at Eperies in Hungary, Commandant . . . told us that he would have to detain us, until he received his orders from the Governor-General. . . . Our arrival and detention were immediately divulged in the Polish camp at Gabholtou, which was distant seven miles from Eperies. Several camp-marshals came to see us. One of them whose name I did not know recited to us a thousand wrongs attributed to Prince Lubomirski. He apparently wished us to decline association with that prince. This officer made no impression upon us.

Our detention lasted for some time. . . . The Commandant several times sent for me. . . . I simply state that he spoke to me in the highest terms of the marshals of the Confederation (of Gabholtou) but always painted Prince Lubomirski to me in the blackest colors. . . . (One day while) I was explaining our situation to him, he stated to me that he had just then received an order that we might depart. At the same time he apprised us that Prince Lubomirski had been defeated and that it was thought that the Prince had been taken a prisoner (1). Some days having passed without news of the Prince . . . we began to listen to propositions made to us by the marshals of the Confederation. . . . On September 8, 1769, I reached an agreement with them to raise a

(1) This last detail was false.

regiment of infantry of two thousand men . . . and on their part they promised to secure the approval of this plan by their commander-in-chief, Count Potocki. . . .

On November 13th, the Confederation entered Cracow, and the citadel was assigned to me so that I might form and assemble my regiment. To undertake to gather troops and to put them under military discipline, almost without aid, in a foreign country, and among a people who wished to command and not obey, was no slight task. . . . I experienced several intrigues on the part of some gentlemen; but I was not dismayed and at the end of fifteen days I had gathered together about three hundred men.

In the meanwhile, the marshals formed a staff of generals at Biala. Marshal Dzarzanoski, who commanded the whole confederation, ordered that all forage be stored in the citadel and gave me strict orders to permit none to be distributed, except to the extent indicated by billets, signed by him and presented to me. Several days later four gentlemen arrived with a train of wagons to take away forage, but they had no billets. I stated to them, with the utmost exactness, the orders which I had received. After a good deal of discussion, one of them, with drawn saber, rushed upon me. Thus forced to defend myself, I put myself on guard. He concluded his attack would not surprise me, and that undoubtedly he would receive the point of my sword, so he fled.

. . . I ordered the guard to arrest all four of them and take them to Marshal Dzarzanoski, who, in a loud voice said that he would make an example of them. Nevertheless, out of fear, they were let go. This adventure was the first of many for me . . . everybody became disobedient; even the soldiers paid no respect to the orders as to their quarters and insisted on living at full liberty. I had one of the culprits arrested. He passed the guards and disappeared. . . .

I had overcome all these obstacles and had hardly drilled, and to a slight extent put under discipline, four hundred men, when on the 9th of November, 1769, Marshal Dzarzanoski gave the order that Cracow be evacuated. No one, however, could say with any reason, that any movement by the enemy had been perceived, but everybody rushed from the village. There was the greatest confusion; the bridge was destroyed, and the soldiers almost completely disbanded. Nevertheless I kept my own troop in good order, but I found myself in the open country, without having received instructions to go any place or given a stand. Past me the frantic inhabitants streamed by incessantly, hurrying as fast as they could, and repeating that they were pursued by the Russians. Nothing could have been more untrue; for the Russians did not appear at Cracow until two days later. These rumors, which might have been well founded, led me to put my troops in battle

order, so that we might offer some defense . . . and I finally marched them to Wadowicz, a small town seven miles from Cracow.

Perhaps this is the proper place to make some observations on the conduct of the Confederates at that time. Our leaders, the marshals among them, lived in an atmosphere of misunderstanding. If they had made an honest attempt at cooperation, united their forces under a common leader, who could have insisted upon fair obedience, and instead of spending their money on too many useless horses, had used it to set up infantry and artillery they might have been able to undertake successfuly some military operations, but as soon as one marshal came to the command of a little troop of cavalry, even without infantry, he left the others and went off by himself in the hope of accomplishing something which would give him a reputation. This was not doing things according to the principles of military art, although, of course, it indicated courage. I must render the Poles the justice which is their due: they are brave and courageous; unhappily they rely too much upon their courage and neglect to study the art of war, while their neighbors, more enlightened and better disciplined, have attained every possible advantage from their study of military affairs.

In Cracow, our forces numbered more than five thousand men. In the surrounding country Marshal

Birzinski had more than thirty-five hundred under his command. With proper orders some good could have been accomplished; but the body of troops in the town seemed to be openly at war with those in the outskirts; the way both forces carried on made them appear as if they were on different sides. If they had acted in concert and in good faith, the cavalry could have guarded the approaches to the city, helped gather food, forage and munitions for the city, and entrusted the care of them to the infantry; and they could have gone out on small detachments to gather the funds due the Crown . . . which could then have been used, either in reinforcing the troops, or for the purchase of supplies. All things being thus arranged, the Russians would not have been able to attack the Confederates, unless with vastly superior numbers. But how in fact did the Confederates behave? In the first place, they tried to cover too great a territory and were constantly harassed by little bands of troops of other Confederates. Those from Cracow could and should have joined the forces of Prince George-Martin Lubomirski, who had a very good body of infantry, and who was a good example of true patriotism and high courage; this they finally concluded to do, in effect, but it was too late. The noted Marshal Pulawski should not have hesitated to join Lubomirski, but the spirit of cabal and self-esteem, quite out of place especially in the hard cir-

cumstances in which the Poles then were, ruined everything; one might truly have said they regarded themselves as enemies determined to exterminate each other; and before they knew it, their opportunity was gone. Their ill-considered course of conduct speedily brought them to very unhappy plights. They beheld themselves compelled to evacuate Cracow, to retreat, without provisions or ammunition, to roam about, without any definite place of refuge, and to comb the countryside in search of subsistence. I vainly pointed out to them that they could not avoid surrendering if they continued to go on in this fashion; and I repeated my admonitions constantly, both at Biala and Cracow, but to no effect. It may be truly said that they did not have the faintest glimmering of the principles of war. . . .

The Poles had a very excellent opportunity of distinguishing themselves. As soon as several French officers joined them, the Poles strengthened themselves at Tiniec, Landskron, and in other small places, where the Russian pressure was strongest; and these they held grimly until the Austrians, by the use of trickery, compelled them to yield. They also defended Czentochow against the attacks of Colonel Drewitz, who displayed his entire ignorance of military matters by attempting to capture that place by the use of cavalry, alone; and he was very nicely singed. . . . In another place, Count Oginski, com-

pletely surrounded by Russians, beat them, killed their colonel, and made six hundred of them prisoners. (1) What essential was missing? The cooperation of Pulawski. I do not presume to say what happened to the latter; but the Count surrendered. The truth is the Poles vanquished themselves. They should have directed their operations against those enemies, who, it seems, were in Poland to do nothing but pillage, ravage, and perpetrate the most revolting and atrocious cruelties. (2) These enemies made no pretense of acting like the soldiers of a civilized nation. They either carried away or destroyed the property of Prince Radziwill and of others; the men of the country they led into captivity, and I saw with my own eyes a train of more than five hundred wagons loaded with goods they had pillaged and stolen, which they were taking into Russia. But an end to these sad reflections which

(1) This was in September, 1771.

(2) Belcour, as is not unusual with soldiers, was taken prisoner, and consequently colors his narrative; he imputes to the Russian people, generally humane and hospitable, excesses in fact chargeable to individuals, perhaps even foreigners, like Poles or Germans, in the troops of Empress Catherine II, who would have unquestionably repressed, if she had knowledge, the atrocities mentioned by Belcour. It should be noted that Drewitz, frequently criticized, was a German, and under him were Cossacks, savages and therefore barbarians, and native Poles, who were even more bitter enemies of the Confederates, and their allies, than were the Russians themselves.

take the heart out of me, and let us go on with this diary.

After having fixed my posts and ordered all the boats to my side of the river, I placed a guard there, and sent to Biala the adjutant of the regiment to ascertain the intentions of the Generals. I got back a lot of praise and compliments flattering me on what they referred to as my very clever retreat and, at the same time, they ordered me to proceed with my troop below Zator, five miles from Biala, where Marshal Czaniaski was in command. I hurried to general headquarters and made the following representations: My troop had barely begun to function, was neither even yet clothed or armed, and most of my men were in no condition for a campaign; that it would be infinitely better to use only two hundred of my men who had had a little experience and to set up a camp for the others, until they had the adventure of having been drilled. Marshal Czerni's answer to me was: *The plan is made; you must follow it and march.*

My troop was sent to encamp in a wood near Zutor, where I found it in the greatest distress, without tents, cooking utensils, axes for cutting wood, clothes, or bread; they were even forbidden to go to the town, the only place in the neighborhood where purchases could be made. I had to send to a distance that we might secure absolute necessities, and I ap-

pealed to the head of the commissary. His answer was: *It is impossible for us to do otherwise, but we shall very soon leave this place to look for a better.* Nine days went by, and when we did leave, it was a repetition of the same disorder that had marked our departure from Cracow. I presumed to ask: *Where are we going and what are our plans?* The answer came: *Counter march.* This was all the information given. Day by day things went from bad to worse, desertions and the number of the sick increased, no correct information could be obtained, and, in fine, everything indicated our destruction. . . . After having spent a month in the woods, without having camped more than twice in the villages, we marched for three days and three nights, and on December 10, 1769, we found ourselves in the little town of Royana, about three miles from Petrokow. We had hardly entered it, when there were shouts: *Muscovites! Muscovites!* Immediately fear seized many of the men and they fled. I nevertheless kept my little troop in hand, and in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the supply-wagons, I went and placed my men along several little elevations at the edge of a wood, and sent two officers to reconnoiter. The enemy discovered them and halted to prepare for battle in proper order. Some detachments of the Confederates seeing my preparations, joined me and promised to help me. They knew so little about the

country, that when I questioned them about the lay of the land and the location of the bridges, and the rivers near-by, they were unable to give me any information. Meanwhile the enemy continued to advance, and my men started to shoot as they should. I began to have some hope from the way my men were acting, when suddenly the Muscovites came over the crest of a hill near-by and commenced banging away with their artillery. Terror seized my men, and with eighty or a hundred of them, I was driven into the wood. I implored several officers to run after the others and rally them; but this they could not do, in spite of great effort. Just then a Cossack came towards me. . . . I took him at first for one of my Polish allies, but I soon saw he had his lance ready to spear me; I was, however, fortunate enough easily to rid myself of him. While I was going into the wood again to rejoin my troop, my horse was wounded, and I was suddenly surrounded by a band of Cossacks, to whom I could offer no resistance, for I was alone. So I was captured; and in an instant these clever *valets de chambre* made me ready, in the language of country-folks, to go to bed, *à la française,* that is to say, naked. Fortunately for me, one of their corporals . . . came along at the very moment when the point of their deliberation was whether I should be killed . . . and told them to give me back my clothes and take me to their commander

who wished to talk to me. Sore, because they had to return my clothes, my captors prodded me only too many times with their lances, and then turned me over to the corporal, who led me to Lieutenant Colonel Drewitz (1). He treated me at least as roughly as had the Cossacks who captured me. He began to abuse and swear at me . . . and no common soldier could have used viler language. He ended by paying me the compliment of stating that he would see I was hanged. I told him that although the rules of war made me unafraid of such a sad fate, I did not doubt but that at his hands I should suffer great cruelty. I went on: *You have had your Cossacks cut off the hands of some prisoners and the feet of others, and of still others les parties naturelles qu'on leur mit ensuite dans la bouche; and other captives you have ordered cut into pieces, simply because their faces displeased you. All these things you have seen with your own eyes, and apparently with pleasure.*

I expected to go out of the picture with a lashing. I should never forget, but he seemed satisfied to do nothing more than heap insults upon me, and put me under the guard of Captain Odem or Uden, a native of Courland, who he knew would treat me exactly as he himself would. I turned over to this

(1) He was later made colonel.

captain my purse which, by chance, the Cossacks had missed. He never returned it.

The Russian troops pursued the Poles for almost three-quarters of a mile, to a wooden bridge just beyond which the Poles made a stand. It was difficult for the Poles to demolish the bridge. Unluckily it was not marked on my map; if it had been, I should not have been captured. After putting up a good fight for an hour, the Poles escaped. They were hotly pursued, as far as a nearby village, where I witnessed a cruel performance on the part of Drewitz. We had stopped here; and the Cossacks were killing a hussar. Drewitz noticed that he still breathed, and shouted to them: *He is not dead; crush his head.* . . . I believe we had been taken to this village for the express purpose of being shown how inhuman the Russians could be towards the Poles. Nobody was safe from the moment he fell into their hands. They locked two hundred of us, officers and men, in one room, in this town, and left us without fire or food.

We were so tightly packed in that we had to keep standing to make room for one another. The Russian officers came or sent for whatever it pleased them to steal from us. Some of our men who refused to give up their shoes were beaten until they consented, and others were forced, by similar barbarous treatment, to present their breeches to the Russians.

The following day they made us begin our march on foot. . . . We had not eaten since we were captured, and we had had nothing at all in the way of nourishment, except the little spare food the soldiers who conducted us had the charity to give to us. I found the Russian soldier more humane than the Russian officer. So we arrived at the city of Wolburche-Wulborg. . . . And then for the first time they began to give us something to eat. While we were devouring the little food which had just been given to us, there came into our lodging a mother in tears, who told us that her daughter had been tied by the arms and legs to the table of Lieutenant-Colonel Drewitz so that his subalterns might work their will (1).

After three days, they ordered us to resume our march; but as I was sick and had a high fever, and was wholly unable to continue the journey on foot, they put me into a cart, with the wounded. I thought I would die of cold the first day. But there was in store for me misery that lasted much longer. The next day we proceeded on our journey towards Warsaw, where we arrived December 30, 1769 . . . after marching ten days without any other nourishment except whatever gruel was left over, and for this we

(1) We should keep in mind what has already been said in the note on page 56.

were indebted to the soldiers who gave it to us, out of pity. (1).

(1) Belcour states that he underwent similar hardships on his journeys to Kiow and Casan, whence he was sent to Tobolsk in Siberia. There he remained until October 1773, when he was freed to return to France. He arrived at Morbilow March 29, 1774, and departed April 6, 1775; it was on this day he left Russian territory, after a captivity of four years, four months and ten days.

Reminiscences
OF COUNT . . . . . .

CONCERNING THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND IN 1772

About 1775, I became acquainted with Rulhière, at the establishment of Abbé Mabli; I met him again later in company, and there soon grew between us a mutual affection which, however, never ripened into intimacy. Knowing that I applied myself assiduously to the study of war, public questions, and historical subjects, and that I was in contact with high officials and members of the diplomatic corps, he besought me, now and again, to communicate to him whatever important information might come to me, either about the revolution in Poland, upon the history of which he was working, or about the reign of Louis XIV, and especially in regard to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, on which he afterwards published an excellent treatise (1).

The particular favor with which His Royal Highness, Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of Frederick the Great, regarded me, and the leading part which he had played in the plan to partition Poland, having put me in a position to advance Rulhière's desires

(1) Under the title of *The Real Facts Concerning the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes*, 1788, 2 vol. in 8 vo.

as to this subject, I begged the Prince, during his last visit to Paris, at the end of 1788, to help me in the matter. He replied that he was willing enough to do what I asked and, moreover, would have liked to have read to him the volume of Rulhière upon the revolution in Russia in 1762, but he was hindered by the reason that he had daily to meet Grimm, the correspondent in France of both himself and the Russian Empress, Catherine II; she, moreover, had always placed great confidence in him and had indicated in a lovely way her friendship for him, so that it would not be pleasant for her to ascertain, in any way whatever, that he had voluntarily given anyone the opportunity of examining into a matter the details of which, from her point of view, should perhaps not be brought to light. I then said to His Royal Highness that I thought he could satisfy himself this could be accomplished, without either the Empress or Grimm knowing anything about it. My plan was that he should come to my home, and there meet Rulhière, whom I would pledge to secrecy. This arrangement was carried out. We spent together two entire mornings, during which Rulhière read his anecdotes about the revolution in Russia in 1762, and put question after question to Prince Henry, who liked Rulhière's turn of mind. The Prince promised to send to me, for the latter, copies of whatever important documents might be found in the Prussian

archives, but he was not able to keep his promise, however, because he was continually at odds with Count Hertzberg, the leading official of his nephew, King Frederick William II, and so I received only a transcription of the treaty of partition concluded on $\frac{\text{July 25}}{\text{August 5, 1772}}$ by Prussia, Russia and Austria, which the Prince happened to find among his papers (1). What now follows upon the partition of Poland I heard told to Rulhière or ascertained from other sources of a reliable nature.

At the peace of Hubertsbourgh, signed on February 15, 1763, and ending the seven years' war between the Court of Vienna and the King of Prussia, the latter, who had been deserted by England, which seemed in fact to have been very unfriendly towards him, found himself without an ally. Under the necessity of securing one, he sought out Russia with which, on April 11, 1763, he concluded for a term of eight years, a treaty of alliance, by which the two powers mutually guaranteed to protect each other in their possessions; in case of need, to aid each other to the extent of ten thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, or a subsidy of 480,000 crowns of Prussia, equivalent to 400,000 roubles, in Russian money; not to declare war or peace without mutual consent; to oppose any movement to make Poland

(1) This instrument is printed at the end of these Reminiscences.

an hereditary monarchy, in the House of Saxony; to support the Polish dissenters, that is to say, the sects professing the Greek and Protestant religions, against the Catholics, and, finally, at the death of the King then reigning, August III, Elector of Saxony, to put upon the throne a native born piast or Pole, an object which was attained on September 7, 1763, in the person of Count Stanislaw Poniatowski, a Lithuanian nobleman, previously the Polish Ambassador to Russia, and a lover of the Empress.

The latter, both to facilitate this choice and to extend her influence in Poland, sent troops there. Frederick posted his troops along the boundaries between Poland and Prussia. The demands of Russia and Prussia in regard to the dissenters were curtly refused by the Polish government, and the new king gave offense to Catherine II, his protectress, by opposing several of her wishes; she then determined to support the dissenters by force and, on April 23, 1767, signed, with the King of Prussia, an agreement upon the subject, a step the King could not avoid, in view of the recent treaty of alliance. The Empress and her envoys at Warsaw from then on held their position with such despotic arrogance that not only the Poles, but also Turkey, Austria, and France took offense, and especially the last named country, for there the Duke of Choiseul, who governed in the name of Louis XV, had adopted, very

justifiably, the policy of preventing Russia from extending its influence in Europe.

Several noblemen, notably the bishops, who are the ranking senators of Poland, were irritated against their King, Stanislaw-Augustus, whom they considered the cause of the troubles which their country was experiencing at the hands of its neighbors. The Duke of Choiseul had some person propose quietly to the discontented Poles that if they would confederate to resist oppression, help would be furnished them, and the Court of Vienna would favor, although very quietly, the measures he had in view. On the other side, the dissenters, supported by the Russians, complained all the more because, on February 4, 1768, their rights had not been restored to them. Thereupon, immediately, the bishops, who, in their dioceses, had large numbers of dissenters, at the expense of whom they hoped to increase their revenues by having them forced to pay tithes after their conversion to the Catholic faith, seeing this hope thwarted, spread the rumor that Russia, by agreement with the King of Poland, intended to abolish the Roman religion in the support of which all good Christians in the country should take up arms. This extreme view fostered by the fanaticism and intrigue of the time, quickly brought together a considerable number of Poles of every rank, and shortly afterwards these Confederates found them-

selves in conflict with the Russian troops: the latter, whose assistance was demanded by the King of Poland, pursued into Turkish territory some of the Confederates whom they had beaten in Poldolia, and set fire to the little town of Balta where these Poles had taken refuge. The Porte, under the urging of the Duke of Choiseul, made this violation of territory the pretext for declaring war against Russia, on October 30, 1768. This measure quite embarrassed the King of Prussia. He had not yet had time to close the wounds of every kind suffered by his states in the ruinous war of seven years, and this motive, and that of getting all his people in accord with him, led him to adopt the course of paying the stipulated subsidy to Russia, rather than to furnish troops to that country.

The outbreak of the war was as fatal to the Turks as it was to the Poles, whose country was destroyed, from one end to the other, by trouble and fighting which seemed endless. The Russians won battles from the Ottomans, took Choczim and overran Moldavia. These successes alarmed, alike, both Prussia and Austria: the latter hastened to imitate the former which, under the excuse of guaranteeing its states from the plague and incursions by the Confederates, sent troops into territory of Poland, at the cost of which these soldiers subsisted, at least in part. Frederick feared lest, in time, Russia, becoming too

powerful, would attempt to dominate Austria, as it ruled Poland. The Court of Vienna, which was opposed to the aggrandizement of Russia, which it did not wish as a neighbor, began to prepare for war and assembled large bodies of troops in Hungary, near the theatre of war, where the Turks and Russians were at one another's throats. Their mutual interests brought together Vienna and Berlin. Emperor Joseph II, son of Maria-Theresa, had at Neiss, in Silesia, August 25, 1769, conferred with Frederick and assured him that Maria-Theresa, his mother, would never permit Russia to stay in possession of Moldavia; and on the 28th, the two monarchs signed an agreement to the following effect: If war should break out between France and England, which then seemed probable, they would not participate in it; and if other troubles arose from unseen causes, they would both observe strict neutrality, so far as their respective states were concerned, the King excepting always the stipulations in his treaty of alliance with the Court of Petersburg, which he had no desire to violate. But he was giving serious thought to the means of cleverly putting an end to the Russian conquests, for it was highly essential for him that the Turks should not be conquered, for they could, at any time, start diversions against either Russia or Austria. He therefore had submitted to Catherine II different plans of conciliation, but none

of them succeeded, for the reason that the Ottomans, on both land and sea, experienced more disasters.

Joseph and Frederick met again at Neustadt, in Moravia, on September 3, 1770. The Prince of Kaunitz, prime minister of Maria-Theresa, was also present. He reiterated that this Princess was more determined than ever to prevent Russia from annexing Moldavia and Valachia, the possession of which would make Russia a neighbor of Hungary, and he added, that the Queen-Empress would not even permit the Russians to cross the Danube and advance further into Ottoman territory. Above all, the ambition of Catherine had become such a menace to Europe that the only barrier, by which her designs could be blocked, was a union of Prussia and Austria. Frederick, who was wise enough not to rely wholly upon such a plan, replied that while such a union would insure endless friendship between the two kingdoms, which he had always cherished, yet he had to consider the duties imposed upon him by his alliance with Russia, which he could not violate; and this was the only obstacle which prevented him from binding himself more closely with Austria, and since their dominant desire was to prevent the war between Catherine and the Turks from becoming general, he proffered, so that Russia and Austria might become friends again, his good offices, which he would use immediately, in an endeavor to iron

out whatever difficulties existed between the two countries, before they became the cause of an open rupture. The next day there arrived from Constantinople a courier to request both Vienna and Berlin to offer to mediate between the Turks and the Russians, a proposition which was joyfully accepted, and which the King of Prussia took upon himself to submit to Catherine.

It was at the camp of Neustadt that Frederick, who did not ever change his dress, but for whom the basest flattery and the vilest seduction meant nothing, provided he could gain his end, appeared in the uniform of the Emperor's infantry regiment, and during the time he was on Austrian soil he wore no other. It was likewise at this meeting with Joseph that when the latter desired Frederick to take precedence he refused to do so, except after the greatest urging, and then only by reason of being the older general. In rising from the table, after repeated compliments, and great bowing and scraping at the different doors, the King, so as to pass the last exit, said with a charming smile: *Since your Imperial Majesty begins to maneuver, I can only go where you want me to go.* As to the Emperor, the Prussians confirmed, at Neustadt, the judgment they had reached at Neiss: He displayed a keen mind and a desire to learn, but he was too impatient to be taught anything.

Frederick communicated to the Court of Petersburg the propositions of Turkey, and let it be known that if the mediation of Austria was rejected, it was likely that the Sultan would call upon Louis XV for support. This suggestion was sufficiently adroit in that it indicated hostility towards France, and thus engaged the attention of Catherine in an effort to come to an understanding with Maria-Theresa; but Russia's answer was that since it had already declined the intervention of England, it would be an affront to that nation to accept the good offices of another power. It was an idle gesture, however, which had been made only because Russia feared Austria would set up an objection to the aggrandizement which Russia sought to achieve through a treaty of peace; and, as a consequence, Russia then attempted to negotiate directly with the Grand-Vizier; but as this effort failed completely, in the end Russia agreed to accept the good offices of the Court of Vienna. Frederick, although delighted by the change in Russia's attitude, clearly saw that the final solution would bristle with difficulties, and still feared there would break out between the two imperial courts a conflict in which he would have to take part, because of his alliance with Russia, an extremity which he was more determined than ever to avoid, as much as he could.

The Confederates persisted in their determination to compel King Stanislaw-Augustus to abdicate. The Polish leaders even went so far as to assure him that in the Polish republic he would have a satisfactory position, but only upon condition that he would consent to give up the crown. The virtues and talents of Prince Henry of Prussia, and the deserved praise given him generally in Bohemia and Saxony, where he had displayed in the Seven Years' War good judgment, kindness, and humanity, had made a very strong impression among the Poles, who imagined they could put him upon their trembling throne which he alone could steady and defend. Moranowski, Palatine of Mazovia, concretely proposed such an arrangement to the King of Prussia, who rejected it, either because he feared that the opposition of Russia and Austria to such a plan might bring on a war in which he would not wish to participate, or because, being jealous of his brother, he wished neither to see him crowned, nor run the risk of a comparison which might be disadvantageous to himself, for it is very probable that the Prince would have brought to Poland happy days, like those long passed.

Some time before this, the Empress of Russia, who during her early years, while her father, the Prince of Anhalt-Zerbst, was only the commandant at Stettin and simply a major-general in the service of Frederick, had met Prince Henry of Prussia, and

had invited him to spend some time at her court. The King now insisted upon his brother availing himself of this invitation, and told him to keep in mind only one thing; this was to employ every resource at his command to lead Catherine to commit herself to such plans as would most probably preserve Prussia from the inconvenience of a new war. The Prince arrived at Petersburg towards the end of 1770. Naturally charming and insinuating, he easily succeeded in having the Empress promise to communicate freely with Frederick about the terms of peace she required of the Turks. She therefore sent to the King of Prussia a letter, accompanied by a memorandum, the preamble of which was apparently moderate, but which ended with demands that were beyond all reason. She demanded the great and the lesser Kabarda or the two Cabardies, countries in the highest parts of the Caucasus Mountains, which surround Mingrelia; the city of Asof, with its territories; the independence of the Cham of Crimea, who was then in submission to the Porte; the sequestration, for twenty-five years, of Moldavia and Valachia, as indemnity for the expense of the war; free navigation of the Black Sea; an island in the archipelago to be used as a port of entry for commerce; general amnesty for the Greeks, subjects of the Sultan, who had taken sides for Russia, and, provisionally, the release of Sir Obreskow, the Russian min-

ister, arrested at Constantinople, and put into prison by the Turks at the moment war was declared. As the King of Prussia felt that such unreasonable demands would probably lead Austria to break off negotiations abruptly, he did not communicate them to that country. He saw that the Court of Vienna was firmly determined to prevent the war from spreading on the right bank of the Danube, to augment its forces in Hungary, to negotiate with the Porte, in the hope of obtaining from it, by relieving it of the embarrassment caused by the Russians, the restitution of the provinces ceded to the Ottomans by the peace of Belgrade in 1738, and that at the same time Austria hoped to have this arrangement at least approved, if not supported, in France, by ceding to that country all or several small parts of the Low Countries or of Luxembourg. In the meanwhile, the Empress-Queen of Austria requested, in case Russia should be attacked, not in Poland, but elsewhere, that Prussia would remain neutral. Frederick refused to accede to this request, because he wished neither to depart from his alliance with Russia nor to make it easier for Austria to expand. Frederick's reply to Catherine was most diplomatically phrased: She could hardly hope that the Turks would consent to the independence of Crimea, in view of the determined opposition of Austria to any plan that Catherine hold possession of Moldavia and Valachia; the

cession of an island in the Archipelago would alarm all the maritime Powers; it seemed, therefore, in order for her to insist only upon her demands in regard to the two Kabardas, the territory belonging to the city of Asof, and free navigation in the Black Sea, conditions to which Turkey would consent readily, exactly as it had already agreed to amnesty for the Greeks and the release of the Russian minister. The King ended by assuring the Empress of Russia that his plea for moderation was not based upon any jealous fear that Russia might unduly expand, and that he honestly thought that if Russia adopted a milder policy such a course would make it almost certain that the other Powers, if they took part in the war, would greatly limit their activities. Catherine received in good spirit the arguments of Frederick, told Prince Henry that she was not accustomed to encounter opposition from an ally, and persisted in her demands, except for some very slight modifications. The King of Prussia found it necessary, therefore, to communicate at once with the Court of Vienna, and, as he did not wish to excite it in any way, made the observation that Russia would probably yield to some extent upon those matters which would be subject to strong opposition.

Nevertheless Prince Henry neglected nothing, in his frequent interviews with Catherine, to impress upon her the necessity of moderation; but she did

not conceal from him the fact that uppermost in her mind was the idea of a conquest which would result in her own personal renown, the esteem with which she sought that all Europe would regard her, and the interests of her Empire. This declaration, in which the Prince saw all the evidences of a resolution that would not be changed, gave him much concern, but luckily something occurred that brought his troubles to an end. The news reached Petersburg that the Court of Vienna, without any pretense of formality, had sent its troops to take possession, in Poland, of the seignory of Zips, in which it had some alleged right. The boldness of this action surprised and worried Catherine; she said to Prince Henry that if the Austrians were permitted to invade Polish territory, the other neighboring Powers should do likewise, and not withdraw until the Austrians withdrew. This thought, which carried the idea of a simple reprisal or at most that of a momentary intimation,* was an inspiration for the Prince: it gave him a chance to relieve with advantage, his embarrassed brother; he came to the conclusion that if Russia wished to expand by retaining Moldavia and Valachia, the Court of Vienna, in spite of its hypocrisy, would be likewise eager to enlarge its dominions; but that it would not permit

* *imitation* in original.

Catherine to hold these two provinces, as they would constitute a menace to the peace of both Powers; that the point of the difficulty was to give equal advantages to each of them and to the King of Prussia so that the balance of power would not be upset. These three results could not be achieved, unless there was set off to each of the three Courts some part of Poland, the rest of which might continue to function as an independent State, for which it would be highly essential to set up a constitution that would prevent a state of anarchy in the future. Prince Henry made no pretence to anyone that this plan of invasion was in the slightest respect anything but unjust and despicable; but it could not be helped, and it would be far better that Poland lose some of its territory than to have a general war break out, which could not help but be very bloody and ruinous for all the Powers which would be drawn into it, and of which no person could prophesy the consequences.

These details prove that the partition of a part of Poland was not, as has been said and written, an immoral scheme, dictated by the rapacity of the King of Prussia, in short, downright theft, based only upon the law of convenience. On the contrary, it is clearly evident that the plan did not originate with him, that only necessity led him to concur in it, and that of the three Powers participating, it was

Prussia that showed most moderation and was contented with the least territory. Nevertheless the politicians, both in Paris and the country, doubtlessly misled by the Prussian monarch's reputation of old, have been more bitter against him than against anybody else. A very important consideration, moreover, appealed to Prince Henry: The negotiations in regard to the partition would require time, and it was evident they would not be concluded before April, 1772, the date set for the expiration of the alliance between Russia and Prussia. Frederick, who would then be a free agent, could then decide for himself what part, if any, he wished to take in the war which might break out between Austria and Russia, if in the end they did not come to terms.

Prince Henry communicated his plans to Catherine, and called her attention to the fact that the restoration of Moldavia and Valachia would not later be regarded as detracting from her reputation and renown, because by her share of Poland she would receive an indemnity for this sacrifice, which would then appear voluntary. The Empress, after reflecting for several minutes, came over to the views of the Prince, to which, however, she stated two objections: first, Russia, when its troops entered Poland, had solemnly declared that it would maintain that Kingdom as it was then constituted; and, second, the King of Prussia would have to assume

the burden of having Austria agree to the partition, for that country would scoff at such a proposition, if made by Russia, and so inevitably retard the general plan.

When Prince Henry informed the King of Prussia of the result of his negotiations, the latter at first saw nothing but the difficulties attendant upon the plan of partition. He thought that his brother had been carried away by an illusion, or had been tricked by the Russian Court, which was bent on gaining time, by submitting details of the proposition. To remove his doubts, it was necessary for the Russian cabinet to impress upon Count Solms, Frederick's minister at Petersburg, the necessity of insisting that his master as soon as possible explain to the Court of Vienna the details of the plan in view, to which Catherine attached all the more importance since its success would repay the Prussian monarch for the subsidies which he had paid to her during the past several years. It was not until then that he said to Prince Henry: *Ah, my dear brother, you were right; a God has inspired you.* These particulars differ, in several respects, from those which Frederick sets out in his *Historical Memoirs,* from 1763 to 1775; but always jealous of his brother, he was eager, in this situation, as in several others, in the Seven Years' War, if not to take unto himself a part of the glory which belonged in fact to Prince Henry, at least to

deprive him of any, and one who has actually held in his hands the letters which passed between the Empress and Frederick himself cannot help but conclude that it was Prince Henry alone who originally conceived the partition of Poland. Whatever the fact is, the King of Prussia in the end instructed Baron Van Swieten, the Austrian Ambassador to Prussia, to make to his Court the overtures desired on the part of Catherine, and to assure Vienna that the Princess showed no resentment against Austria for having occupied the seignory of Zips; and that Austria could therefore extend its influence, just as it pleased, in that part of Poland; an example which would immediately be followed by both Russia and Prussia.

As the sincerity of this invitation became more and more apparent, the astonishment of Prince Kaunitz increased. He looked upon the partition in the same light as the King of Prussia had at first, and accordingly replied that if his Court had taken possession of a corner of Poland, on the border of Hungary, it was not with the intent of retaining it, but solely to compel the payment of a sum of money owed by the Poles to the House of Austria, which had not conceived that so slight a matter could give rise to a plan to partition Poland, the execution of which would bristle with insurmountable obstacles because of the difficulty in arriving at a perfectly equal division among the three Powers, and since,

moreover, the plan would only serve to make the general situation in Europe more critical than it was, he believed it his duty to beg the King of Prussia to abandon it, and that, moreover, the Court of Vienna was ready to quit the Polish territory it occupied, as soon as the other Powers would do likewise. It is possible that private motives might have induced Prince Kaunitz to dissimulate, and to express himself at first in a manner that was not at all convincing. The Duke of Choiseul, on whose good offices the Court of Vienna always relied, had retired in disgrace at the end of December, 1770, and this incident made Vienna uncertain of the final attitude of the French cabinet; it correctly feared that any concerted action on its part, with Russia and Prussia, might furnish Louis XV with an excuse for breaking the alliance of 1756, which generally was not highly regarded in France, but which Prince Kaunitz keenly desired to maintain all the more because he considered it his political masterpiece; moreover, in addition to the fact that the Austrian cabinet would find it perhaps more advantageous to ally itself with the Turks than to come to an understanding with Russia, in any case, the first plan would be more in accord with the views of the French government, which would naturally then maintain its alliance with Austria. Nevertheless, there was absolutely no reason to hope that Louis XV would agree to give

him any help, especially in view of the fact that it was generally known that he intended to end his reign at peace.

None of these reflections escaped the King of Prussia, who transmitted to the Court of Petersburg the answer of Prince Kaunitz, and called attention to the fact that although the reply was not at all categorical, Austria would evidently agree to a treaty of partition, as soon as Russia and Prussia had agreed between themselves. Frederick in his *Memoirs* solemnly states that the slowness and the habitual laziness of the Russians led them to neglect the matter, until the Court of Vienna began to evince its contempt for Russia and to adopt devious methods in its dealings. Then the Russians began to fear that Austria might conclude with the Turks a treaty concerning aid, which it was said, was under negotiation at Constantinople. The Russians also believed that the formidable army gathered in Hungary was intended by Austria for something more than a review.

Through another quarter, the Austrians, after having, by various means available to them in their capacity as mediators, contrived to render peace between the Turks and Catherine almost certain, sent word to Frederick that as the conditions proposed by Catherine were diametrically opposed to the interests of the Austrian monarchy, Austria

clearly saw that it could not avoid taking part in the war, and that it assumed that Frederick would remain quite neutral, since his engagements with the Russians concerned only Poland, the territory of which the Austrians would respect.

The predicament of the King of Prussia, thus caught between the two imperial courts, was very embarrassing; he was unwilling to help either of them extend its dominions; but if they came to a rupture and he remained neutral, he greatly feared that they would make peace afterwards at his expense: it seemed to him, therefore, that the worst position he could take was that of a neutral who would be left without an ally. Thus placed in the position of choosing between the Court of Vienna and that of Petersburg, a wise policy would lead him to prefer the latter, which did not have against him the same reasons for rivalry and enmity. He stated, therefore, to the Austrian minister that if there came a break between Austria and Russia, he could not avoid aiding Russia, as he was bound by his obligations; but he had by no means given up hope of having Russia show more moderation towards the Turks and, to give weight to his statement, he increased and remounted his cavalry, and ordered his army on a war footing.

This vigorous attitude impressed both Vienna and Petersburg. At the Austrian court, the perils war

would bring were duly considered; and at Petersburg, Catherine concluded to modify the conditions of peace with the Turks, and to make clear Russia's attitude in regard to the partition of Poland; but, with only slight regard for the interests of Frederick in the situation, she insisted that with all his force he should be prepared to aid Russia, in case Russia should be attacked by Austria, but if the latter attacked Frederick, Catherine was not to furnish aid to him, until she and the Turks had concluded a treaty of peace. The Prussian monarch protested strongly against the inequity of these conditions and insisted that if this were the arrangement, his share in Poland would have to be enlarged, and that Russia would have to agree definitely that, in the end, it would relinquish all claim to its conquests between the Dneister and the Danube: to this Catherine reluctantly consented, insisting at the same time, however, that the King of Prussia involve himself in some matters, which did not concern either his rights or his obligations. In the end, the bargaining stopped, mainly, but not completely; the Turks released Obreskow, the Russian minister, and it was then apparently certain in view of the relief felt at the Court of Vienna when it learned that Catherine would return Moldavia and Valachia, that there would be no war.

Nevertheless, Frederick acted as if he feared the danger was not past and that new misunderstandings might yet arise. His congenital impatience, which often stood in the way of his success as a soldier, led him to protest strongly to the Court of Petersburg that neither Thorn nor Dantzick was included in his share of Poland. Prince Henry assured me that both cities would have been alloted to Frederick, if he had been less precipitate in his conduct and had shown less haste in concluding the preliminary agreements of partition, which were signed at Petersburg on February 17, 1772.

All that remained to be done was to bring Austria to the same point; but Emperor Joseph and his mother were not in accord between themselves, and Prince Kaunitz did not wish to oppose either of them. Joseph, consumed with ambition, at first seemed amused at losing an opportunity to recover the provinces ceded to the Turks in 1738, but finally consoled himself with the hope of securing a good part of Poland. Although Marie-Theresa felt that this acquisition would be really useful to her country, she hesitated, because of religious scruples, especially the fear of hell, to take for herself, by force, what she regarded as the property of another. This difference of opinion between mother and son gave rise to several scenes, comical in themselves, but highly embarrassing to the Prime Minister, who kept

insisting that the partition of Poland could no longer be avoided, except by attacking Russia and Prussia simultaneously, and then without the assistance of a single ally, and that such a war would be a greater evil than the partition, which would entail no loss of life. Maria-Theresa consulted casuists, who had at least the good sense to advise her to choose the lesser of two evils; and she surrendered, but much in the manner of that pious woman who, yielding to the adroit seduction of Duke, later Marshal, Richelieu, said to him langorously: *My dear, you are sending me to hell.* The Duke, satisfied with having proved to this lady that she was not as virtuous as she had thought, saved her soul; but Maria-Theresa was not, piously speaking, so fortunate: harassed by her son and Prince Kaunitz, it seemed as if she risked eternal damnation, if she consented to take another's property. As soon as it was seen she had reconciled her mind to the scheme, her minister at Berlin suggested an agreement in writing by which the three Powers agreed to maintain perfect equality in the proposed partition. This agreement was signed on March 4, and sent immediately to Petersburg, where it lead to negotiations between the two imperial Courts, concerning the share of Poland to be alloted to Austria.

Besides committing a wrong by consenting to rob Poland, the Empress-Queen also offended Louis XV

by failing to show him the good faith owed him as her constant ally. She deliberately concealed from him, as long as she could, the engagements she was about to make with Prussia and Russia; and even exacted from Prussia the promise that she would be fully informed of whatever propositions would be made to the country by France. Nobody knows what was the fate of Maria-Theresa in the next world, on account of these various sins; but there is in the official documents available in this world, clear proof that as soon as the Court of Vienna concluded to steal, it manifested such great avidity that Catherine and Frederick experienced much difficulty in restraining it. Prince Lobkowitz, Austrian Ambassador at Petersburg, shortly afterwards signed there the convention which governed the division among the Sovereigns; and the definite treaty among the three partitioning Courts was finally concluded on August 5, 1772. It specifies the districts in Poland alloted to each. In Lithuania, Russia appropriated about three thousand four hundred square leagues of territory. Austria was put in possession of the Palatinate of Belz, Red Russia, and almost the whole of Volhynia, and all that territory which bordered upon Moravia, Hungary, and Transylvania; this aggregated almost two thousand seven hundred square leagues. Frederick's share was Polish Prussia and part of Great Poland. The city of Thorn was for-

mally excepted from this allotment, as was the City of Dantzick which, with its limits sharply reduced, found itself completely surrounded by the Prussian States. The share of Frederick was only about nine hundred square leagues, but since it effected contiguity between the Kingdom of Prussia, Pomerania, and the Marches of Brandenburg, it essentially consolidated the power of that monarch, while the territory invaded by Russia and Austria added comparatively little to their respective strengths.

The treaty of partition, more than the Russian troops, completed the ruin of the Polish Confederation, which melted away, as soon as Catherine, Marie-Theresa and Frederick announced by formal publications that henceforth they would treat as brigands, assassins and incendiaries all Poles who banded together. This upheaval in Poland was effected, it was said, to insult France. Evidently it was against the wishes of that country, which had no opportunity either to take part in the proceedings or to protest ever so faintly against them. It really appeared as if France was not even slightly disposed to avenge the studied affront, which it had swallowed in silence. This left upon the reign of Louis XV an indelible stain, not only in the eyes of all Europe, but in those of the French themselves, whose contempt for their heedless monarch increased as he grew older. What had occurred also intensified the

ill will of the French public towards the Duke of Aiguillon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, specially when it was rumored that Louis XV had remarked humorously: *This would not have happened if Choiseul had been here.* The partisans of the minister sought to relieve him of any blame by stating that Prince Louis de Rohan, afterwards Cardinal Rohan, Ambassador of the French King at the Court of Vienna, who found his pleasure in hunting parties, did not learn about the treaty of partition until everybody else knew of it, and consequently his communications with the French government carried information that came too late. One day in 1779, or 1780, I found this prelate more inclined to talk than was usual with him, and I asked him if these rumors had any foundation. He assured me they had none; that he knew perfectly well what was going on between the Emperor, the Empress-Queen and Prince Kaunitz, and had always kept Aiguillon exactly informed; but that the French Court, fully determined to remain at peace, pretended to be dissatisfied, and meanwhile sought to place the blame for its pusillanimity upon whomever it could; and that his dispatches, still available in the archives of the Department of State, would justify his statements. The Cardinal appeared so sure of his ground that it seemed a useless task for me to verify what he said.

The Powers partitioning Poland colored, in their proclamations, their pretended rights to the provinces they appropriated. This was an empty formality; for their pretensions refuted themselves, or were not supported, except by instruments either worthless or long since abandoned, and such as only armed forces could assert against the just claims of the Poles, whom they compelled to summon a Diet to sanction the partition. Accordingly the three Powers set up a Confederation which the King and nobles were forced to recognize. The Diet selected a delegation or commission, drawn from the Senate and the equestrian Order, which it directed to confer with Baron Stackleberg, Baron Rewiezki, and Sieur Benoit, ministers plenipotentiary of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, upon different plans of treaties by which the provinces already occupied should be formally ceded by the Republic. The treaties were signed at Warsaw on September 18, 1773, and afterwards ratified by the Diet. I do not mention here the contents of these documents and of other official papers which were issued later, as they are all fully explained in *The Abridgement of the History of the Treaties of Peace, by Koch, third volume, from page 288 to page 304.* It suffices to say: First, that the Poles saw themselves forced to admit that the territory appropriated by the Empress of Russia, the House of Austria, and the King of Prussia, was lawfully the property of

the Powers; secondly, that when it came to a question of settling the boundaries of their respective frontiers all the three courts took advantage of their position again, and seized all the territory they could at the expense of the Poles, who thus saw themselves once more deprived of a large extent of useful land; and, thirdly, all the details of the partition were not completed until about 1777.

In the winter of 1777-1778, I went to dine at the residence of Count Aranda, the Spanish Ambassador; and there I found Count Stainville, later Marshal Choiseul, Marquis Castries, afterwards the head of the French Navy, Doctor Tronchin, and several other persons of quality. Count Aranda, busied with a great deal of writing, was still in his dressing gown. He left us, sighing, *Well, I dress up, I suppose.* Castries passed a few pleasantries that I, in my prime, should be wearing a fur-lined coat, and Stainville had his joke about my overshoes, which were called *galoshes.* My answer to them both was that I had less fear of ridicule than I had of a cold, and I asked Doctor Tronchin to tell the gentlemen that the first was easier to cure than the second; and to win him to my side, I called him the God of Medicine. We were all laughing when, without being announced, for the servants were busy with their master, Count Aranda, there clattered into the *salon* a stranger who, saluting us, adroitly found a place

for himself before the fireplace. He stamped his feet vigorously to shake the snow from his shoes and then in a high-pitched voice said, *The weather is very bad today.* It seemed to us that this man was uncultured and that his costume was queer. His coat of coarse brown wool with a yellow lining showed beneath an overcoat of black velvet, worn smooth, with large bradenburgs, loops of jet and silk, like those in fashion forty years before. Castries, in a low voice, asked me, *In Heaven's name, where did such a ridiculous mortal come from?* I answered, *I don't know anything about him, but it looks to me as if his overcoat came out of the ragbag.* Castries observed, *He has all the appearance of a montebank. Yes,* I said, *but he's not one of those fakirs who sell quack medicine and pull teeth on the Pont-Neuf. Why not?* asked Castries. *Because,* I said, *on his neck is a decoration which looks to me like the great Maltese Cross.* Castries said, *It's not the Maltese Cross, and I wager that he is a fakir. Well,* said I, *if you want to be sure about it, pretend you have a toothache and ask him about it. No,* said Castries, *that would be taking too great a risk.* Stainville, who was listening, then said to me, *You are the only one here who knows Aranda well enough to go ask him to come here and clear up the mystery of this Ostrogoth, with whom it may be our misfortune to have to eat.*

I went directly to the room of the Ambassador, whose wig was being powdered. He said to me, *This is a fine idea; why do you prefer the useless spectacle of my toilet to the laughter outside; have they so vanquished you that you have to come to have Spain intervene in your defense? Not at all,* said I, *but I do want your aid in explaining a puzzle to us. And what's the puzzle,* said he. *Well,* I said, *I believe he is an evil Christian, but he is at any rate a person as queer as he is foreign, his manners are so ridiculous they have spoiled our gaiety, and he seems to have made the mistake of taking your house for somebody else's.* Immediately Aranda dried his face and went into the *salon.* The stranger ran to him, crying *Your Excellency will doubtless well understand that having arrived in Paris but yesterday, my first duty should be to pay my respects to you. But, my dear sir,* said Aranda, *I don't know you.* The stranger laughed: *Once upon a time, long ago, your Excellency overwhelmed me with kindness. Where was that?* asked Aranda. *At Warsaw, while you were Ambassador in Poland.* Aranda said, *I have no recollection of it. What,* said the stranger, *you don't recall Benoit? Oh,* cried out Aranda, flinging wide his arms, *you innocent creature, The undersigned Minister of his Majesty, the King of Prussia. You will dine with these gentlemen, who will be charmed to*

become acquainted with the celebrated Benoit, one of the great and immortal partitioners of Poland, who has for so long a period filled the gazettes with his energetic and sublime abstractions for the Polish delegation. Let me go put on my coat, and I will come right back. This greeting, much more comical for us than for Benoit, showed us with whom we had to deal. At first Secretary of the Prussian Legation in Poland, he was known simply as Benoit, but after Frederick the Great had named him as Minister Plenipotentiary for the partition and had decorated him with the Order of St. John of Prussia, he called himself von Benoit, and his numerous communications were all for the purpose of depriving the unhappy Poles more and more of their land holdings.

As we passed into the dining room the Spanish Ambassador said to me, *He is a bit of a rogue, like all the Prussian agents, but he is witty. That may be,* I answered, *but he came into your salon in the same way as the Prussian troops went into Poland.*

Von Benoit, having asked for some little patties which were in front of me, I passed to him four or five plates of them, and when he exclaimed at the great plenty, I said, *You shouldn't complain, sir; I have just made for you a partition in Prussian style.* At first he did not laugh at this pleasantry, and thereupon everybody began to offer him plates

to partition, and everyone in turn asked him to partition a chicken leg or a cutlet. Aranda, having asked von Benoit how many notes he had presented to the delegation, he said that he did not know what the exact number was. I then made the observation that the gazettes had been filled with them from the end of 1772 until 1777, and that there must have been at least two hundred of them, and that these compositions, eloquent as they might have been, had not the merit of diversity, since they all began with the formula, *The undersigned Minister of his Majesty, the King of Prussia,* and were all alike, except as to their dates and the description of the lands to be taken in the name of the Court of Berlin. I said I thought had I been in his place I should have saved the expense of a secretary by having had printed several reams of these notes, leaving blank, of course, the spaces necessary for the dates and the descriptions. This thrifty idea made us all laugh the more, and Benoit, concluding that the best way of putting an end to our laughter was to appear to take part in it, capitulated by speaking of his operations in Poland in much the same manner that a roué in good humor speaks of his wild frolics. That brought about a change in the conversation.

After dinner, the talk came back to Poland, but in a different manner. Von Benoit was not the harm-

less creature that Aranda had gaily pretended he was; he knew his subject and interested us deeply by his stories and his reflections. Among other things, he said with a very great show of reason, that putting aside the unfavorable aspect with which, from a political standpoint, the partition of Poland was regarded in France and in other countries, it was clear that this piece of work, although violent and unjust as it may have been, had been, after all, the salvation of the Poles themselves, because the differences among them and their hatred for one another had gone so far, that if the stronger powers had not compelled them to lay down their arms, they would have ended by ruining and destroying themselves, like ferocious beasts, and that it was necessary to have seen the actual state of affairs in order to have an exact idea of the destruction and the atrocious and outrageous excesses to which the spirit of faction may lead men.

I met von Benoit two or three times later at the Spanish Ambassador's, and I learned from what he told me that upon the fortune which he had made as an agent of the King of Prussia he intended to lead the life of a philosopher in the bosom of his family, which dwelt in Languedoc. That monarch was accustomed to pay his diplomatic agents so poorly that von Benoit had not been able to save anything out of his allowance, but he supplemented it by the pro-

ceeds of a kind of business to which Frederick the Great closed his eyes, except when there were abuses or serious complaints. In Poland there were palatinates or duchies, *starosties,* or manors of the old nobility, *castellanies,* or the command of towns and castles, very often with very considerable amounts of ground-rents, and all at the disposal of the King of Poland. The Poles, always eager for these appointments, would come to von Benoit, who would make his recommendations to Stanislaw-Augustus, the Polish King, in the name of Frederick the Great, who did not know even the name of the applicant. If the Polish King made any objections, the Prussian Minister would threaten him with the anger of Frederick, and then the Polish King would yield. Von Benoit would then receive, if he had not already been paid in advance, a stipulated sum as payment for his services.

TREATIES

Between Russia, Austria, and Prussia relative to partition of Poland, signed at Saint Petersburg July 25-August 5, 1772

TREATY WITH AUSTRIA

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY

THE spirit of faction, the troubles, and the intestine war which has disturbed Poland for so many years, and the lawlessness which spreads daily, with the result that there now exists only the slightest authority of a governmental nature, make it apparent that the dissolution of that State which is imminent, may be a source of danger to the interests of its neighbors, will disturb the harmony now prevailing among them, and will bring about a general war, such as now exists, on account of these conditions, between Her Imperial Majesty, Empress of the Russias, and the Ottoman Porte; and meanwhile the Powers adjoining Poland are charged with the duty of enforcing against that Republic ancient rights and claims, as to which they have not yet been able to secure justice, which rights and claims will be in danger of being lost and defeated, if means are not taken to settle them definitely and exactly, and if

peace and good order are not re-established within that Republic and a settled public policy adopted which will be in conformity with the interests of the adjoining sovereignties.

To secure these aims, Her Imperial Majesty, Empress of all the Russias, has chosen and named as her plenipotentiaries the Honorable Nikita Count Panin, Governor of Her Imperial Highness, Monsignor the Grand Duke of Russia, Acting Privy Counsellor of Her Imperial Majesty, Senator, Acting Chamberlain and Chevalier of Her Orders, and Prince Alexander Galitzin, Her Vice-Chancellor, acting Privy Counsellor and Chevalier of the Orders of Saint Alexander-Newski and of the White-Eagle of Poland, who have delivered the evidences of their full powers to Prince Joseph Lobkowitz, Duke of Sagan, Acting Chamberlain of Her Majesty, the Empress Apostolic Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, Chevalier of Her Military Order, General of the Cavalry of Her Army, and Her minister plenipotentiary, similarly accredited with full powers from Her Court; and after having conferred upon this situation in the Republic of Poland and the means of finally settling the rights and claims of Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, and for her and her descendants, heirs, and successors, all of the aforesaid plenipotentiaries have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

1

Her Imperial Majesty of Russia, for herself, her descendants, heirs, and successors, will enter into possession, in the manner hereinafter agreed upon in the following article, of the remainder of Polish Livonia, of that part of the Palatinate of Polock which is north of the River Dwina, and of the Palatinate of Witepsk, so that the River Dwina will constitute the natural boundary between the two States, almost from the point where the frontier of the Palatinate of Witepsk adjoins that of Polock, and going thence along this frontier to the point where the boundaries of the three Palatinates, that is to say, of Polock, Witepsk and Minsk meet; from which last point the boundary will be extended, by a straight line, to the source of the River Drujac (1) near the place called Ordwa and thence along and down this river to its junction with the River Dneiper; so that the whole Palatinate of Mscislaw, both above and below the last named river, and both extremities of the Palatinate of Minsk, above and below that of Mscislaw, extending to the new border and the River Dneiper, will belong to the Empire of all the Russias; and from the confluence of the River Drujac, the River Dneiper will form the boundary between the two States, except that the City of Kiow shall be permitted, with the district

(1) On some maps this river is named *Turzec*.

which belongs to it, to maintain the boundaries now existing on the other side of that stream.

2

Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias will cause to be occupied by her troops the places and districts, which, according to the preceding article, she intends to restore to her States, and she fixes as the time for taking such possession the first days of September (old style) of the present year, and agrees until then to make no announcement of her attitude or intentions.

3

Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, for herself, her descendants, heirs and successors, formally and in the most solemn manner guarantees Her Majesty the Empress and Apostolic Queen, those parts and districts of Poland of which, by virtue of mutual agreement, her said Majesty takes possession, which consist of all the country indicated by the boundaries next described; the right bank of the Vistula from Silesia to a point beyond Sendomir at the confluence of the River San, thence, along a straight line past Franpol to Zamosc, and thence to Rubieszow and to the River Bug, and below the said river along the correct frontiers of Red Russia, which shall correspond with those of Volhynia and Poldolia, as far as the environs of Zbaras; thence in

a straight line along the River Niester, the length of the small stream which separates a part of Podolia, called Podgorze, and thence the usual boundaries between Pocutie and Moldavia.

4

Then as Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, who has waged for three years war against the Ottoman Empire, solely because of conditions in Poland, has fully apprised Her Majesty, the Empress, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, of the exact conditions under which the former will agree to make peace with the Porte, and whereas in order to insure the acceptance of the new plan for peace, Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias has agreed not to insist upon the cession or even the independence of Valachia and Moldavia, and consequently no longer to insist upon accompanying conditions which were directly opposed to the immediate interests of the States of the House of Austria, therefore Her Imperial and Apostolic Majesty, in conformity with her sentiments of sincere friendship for Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, promises to continue to use without bias, her good offices, for the benefit of both parties belligerent.

5

As it will be necessary to reach a definite arrangement with the Republic of Poland, upon the subject

of the mutual acquisitions as well as in regard to the restoration of order and peace within Poland, Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias binds herself to give her minister at the Court of Warsaw the strictest orders to co-operate in all details with the Minister of Her Majesty, the Empress and Apostolic Queen, there resident, and to aid the negotiations by all convenient means to bring them to a successful conclusion.

6

The present convention will be ratified within six weeks, or sooner if it can be done.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias have hereunto signed their names and affixed their seals.

Done at Saint Petersburg, July 25, 1772.

TREATY WITH PRUSSIA

(The preamble is the same as that of the treaty with Austria. The only change is that instead of the Austrian plenipotentiary being named, Victor Frederick, Count Solms, Privy Counsellor of the legation, acting Chamberlain and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the King of Prussia, is named for that State.)

1

This article is the same as that in the treaty with Austria.

2

The same.

3

Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, for her self, and for her descendants, heirs, and successors, formally guarantees to His Majesty, the King of Prussia, the countries and districts of Poland of which, by virtue of common agreement, His Majesty aforesaid will take possession: these consist of all of Pomerellie, except the City of Dantzick and its territory; all of the districts of Great Poland below the River Netze, then going along this river from the frontier of New-March to the Vistula, near Ferdon and Solitz; so that the Netze will form the boundary of the States of His Majesty the King of Prussia, to

whom this river, for its entire length, shall belong: and so likewise, since His Aforesaid Majesty does not wish to put into effect his other rights and claims to several other districts of Poland adjacent to Silesia and Prussia, to which he is justly entitled, and is willing also to forego his rights to the City of Dantzick and its territory, he will take the remainder of Polish Prussia, namely the Palatinate of Marienburg, the city of Elbing included, with the Bishopric of Warmie and the Palatinate of Culm, excepting from it only the city of Thorn, which city will remain, with all its territory, under the dominion of the Republic of Poland.

4, 5, and 6

(These three articles are all in conformity with those of the treaty with Austria.)

The Private Letters
OF
BARON DE VIOMÉNIL

First Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, December 31, 1771

SIR:

It is my privilege to enclose for you a report on the true condition of the Confederates and of the events which preceded my arrival in this country. Although it is now four months since I began to participate in the deliberations of the Generals it has been almost impossible for me to give you the outlines of the picture.

I assure you, however, that the report could be no more exact; and I shall hereafter, with the utmost regularity, report to you all that happens in regard to the Confederation, which may be of interest to you. The work to be done by me I consider very difficult and disagreeable, and it gives no promise of success; it is only my blind obedience to the King that has induced me to accept this task; if I do not

succeed, Sir, in effecting some good for the Poles, I hope that their esteem and the approval of the King will repay me for all the trouble which I shall take in my attempt to accomplish what is desired. Please accept, with your usual kindness, the assurance of the very deep respect with which I am, etc.

REPORT

Upon the condition of the Confederation of Poland

THE Confederation, in the beginning of the Spring of the year 1771, had a body of cavalry of five thousand horses, composed of the troops of Prince Radziwill, Pulawski, Marshal Lomja, and Miaczinski, Marshal of Belz, (1) which held the duchy of Ocwieczim and parts of the Palatinates of Cracow and Russia, bordering upon Hungary, and the nucleus of a corps of infantry, which they attempted, but with little success, to raise during the Winter.

Zaremba, formerly a colonel, and at present Marshal of Great Poland, held, with a body of four thousand cavalry, the part of that province which is on the left bank of the River Warta, and kept several detachments busy beyond that river in an endeavor to gather food and contributions.

The garrison of Czenstokow was composed of eight hundred infantry, who had compelled the Russians to raise the siege of that place, in December, 1770, after an attack of fifteen days.

(1) He was later known in France by the name of General Miaczinski and was beheaded in 1793, as an accomplice of Dumourier after the latter's defection.

There were still several small bodies of troops of the Confederates, at various places, in the Palatinates of Sendomir, Podlachia, Polock and Mazovia, which were of absolutely no use to the common cause.

The general council of the Republic met at Eperies, in Hungary.

The Russians, who were very weak in the Palatinate of Cracow, could not prevent the Confederates from establishing posts, at the beginning of the campaign, upon the Vistula and the Donayetz or from seizing the whole terrain bounded by these two rivers. The Confederates began by fortifying the Abbey of Tiniec, situated on the Vistula, a league above Cracow; and withdrew from Czenstokow four hundred men and some cannon, both for Tiniec and for other posts they intended to set up; but the Russians combined all their forces, crossed the Donayetz, and pursued the Confederates who abandoned their strongholds to take an advantageous position below the citadel of Landskron, where they were attacked, beaten, and dispersed (1) by the troops of Suwarow (2) and Drewitz; Marshal Belz was made a prisoner and Prince Saphiea was killed in this conflict.

(1) It was Dumourier who imprudently risked this battle.

(2) He successfully directed the Russian and Austrian armies against France, in 1799; he died May 13, 1800.

This engagement caused a complete change in the plan of campaign, and the ruin of the Confederates was hastened by the loss of several ill-planned skirmishes. The cavalry of Prince Radziwill was entirely wiped out, Pulawski was compelled, even after a battle in which the advantage lay with him, to give up his plan to march to Zamosc, and to retreat below Czenstokow, with his forces very much depleted. Zaremba, who had crossed the River Warta and gained several advantages over Branicki (1) was likewise obliged, by the approach of a considerable body of Russian troops, to re-cross that river and assume the defensive, a position in which he still is.

This movement of Zaremba, and especially the fighting that began in Lithuania, made the Russians change their plans and forced them to divide their strength.

These circumstances gave Dumourier an opportunity to strengthen his position at Tiniec, as he had planned, to prepare another at Bobreck, twelve leagues farther up on the Vistula, and to put into shape a post which had been partly established during the preceding winter at Landskron, a place nearly half-way between the Vistula and the frontiers of Hungary.

(1) He was serving the interests of the King of Poland and of the Russians.

What has been said indicates the situation at the time of the arrival of the general officer (1) actually entrusted by the King with the conduct of his matters in Poland. He found the troops depleted, undisciplined, without contacts and without orders. The Confederation had as its sole resource, what was barely enough to keep it alive in this country, a few weakly fortified houses, which were held by feeble garrisons, practically without food; the soldiers were all unpaid, almost naked, undernourished, poorly equipped, and quite ignorant of the art of war.

The Generals met at Eperies, too far away from their troops to be able to establish discipline and to provide for their needs and those of the posts; the generals had neither money nor credit, and were completely at variance, because of a train of circumstances not unforeseen, but extremely unfortunate, which had made the soldiers embittered at the very time when an *esprit de corps* was highly essential.

The first duty of the French general officer was to criticize the Generals' manner of conducting their affairs, and to induce them at once to make their headquarters at Bielitz and at Biala (but eventually they were established at Teschen, as a result of the attitude of the Court of Vienna) to assemble the principal leaders, establish whatever order and discipline were possible among the troops, increase the

(1) Baron Vioménil.

unmounted cavalry garrisons and the number of recruits vitally necessary for garrison service, to regulate and guarantee the pay of the officers and men, provide for their actual needs, provision the posts, and to repair and strengthen the forts. All these things were accomplished before the Russians were even in position to try to hinder.

In these dubious circumstances, one ray of hope, occasioned by the operations of Oginski, who had succeeded in taking possession of Lithuania, was soon extinguished through the defeat and complete dispersion of his troops. This event which compelled him to fall back upon Dantzick, whence he joined the generals at Teschen, who had just confirmed him as Commander-in-Chief in Lithuania, a commission originally held by him, but from the King, also forced Kossakowski to abandon the Great Duchy and to hasten to Great Poland, where he took up cantonments, between the quarters of Zaremba and Pulawski. He had with him fifteen hundred mounted men, what remained of two thousand five hundred whom he had enlisted during April of last year, after he had begun his operations with twenty-five men.

The troops which are actually under the direct orders of the generals comprise one thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry, with two hundred fifty infantry and two hundred cavalry, what is left

of the troops of Prince Radziwill. They are in possession of the Duchy of Ocwieczim and a section of the Palatinate of Cracow, where are situated the three fortresses of the Upper Vistula, all in a good state for defence.

Pulawski has his principal post at Czenstokow, with four hundred infantry; his cavalry, numbering at times as many as twelve hundred, holds in front of this post, a part of the Palatinate of Sendomir and the territory of Wielun. His right is upon the Upper-Stola, by which he is in contact with Bobreck, and his left at Wielun.

Kossakowski, with his fifteen hundred cavalry, all Lithuanians, holds Kempens, Ostrozow, Ostrow, and Odolanow, joining, upon his right, the troops of Pulawski, and upon his left, those of Zaremba. The latter, with twenty-five hundred cavalry and two hundred infantry, recently recruited, holds a small post at Widawa, in advance of the right of his quarters, upon the right bank of the River Warta, another post at Peterkow, upon the left bank, and, at a short distance from Pilcza, he controls Koseian, Frauenstat, Scenzo, Kalicsz and Sieradz, joining, by his right wing, the troops of Kossakowski, on the heights of Widawa, his left resting at Ksiadz, upon the Warta. Thus the troops of the Confederation, which aggregate six thousand two hundred cavalry and eighteen hundred fifty infantry, are in

possession, in both Polands, of a line about one hundred and forty French leagues in length, running from the frontiers of Hungary, at a point near Nowitarg, to a point on the River Warta, a little above Posen. The Russians, opposed to these troops in both provinces, consist of a corps of ten thousand five hundred men, half infantry and half cavalry, and the forces of the King of Poland, numbering nearly five thousand men; in Lithuania there are about three thousand Russians, and an equal number of armed troops of the Confederation.

Volhynia, Ukrania, Podolia, and a part of Polish Prussia, are held by Russian troops, detached from the main army, and commanded by Romanzow.

The troops of the Empress Queen occupy the Starostie of Nowitarg and the thirteen villages belonging to that of Zips.

The King of Prussia ordered four thousand hussars or dragoons to cross the River Niester, under the pretext of seeking remounts in Moldavia; they established posts along this river, which protects the stores of the Russian army and its communications by way of Kiow; the Prussian troops, on the frontiers of Prussian Silesia, are in armed possession of Posen and Thorn, and all the country which lies between these two cities and the sea, as well as the remainder of Polish Prussia.

The Russians, about the fifteenth of last December, assembled a body of five thousand men, commanded by Suwarow, in the environs of Cracow, and appeared to menace simultaneously Czenstokow and the three posts of the Upper Vistula. Since they did not attack at the end of Fall, it is fairly certain that the forces they brought together again after their defeat in Lithuania, and their last victory on the Danube, did not seem to be of sufficient strength to insure the success of this undertaking.

Although the posts at Tiniec and Landskron are of little strength, the two French lieutenant-colonels commanding at these respective places, have established order and discipline so that they feel that if the Russians attempt to secure possession they will fail, except at a great loss of men and money.

If Russian weakness or ignorance prevents them from capturing these posts before Spring, it is a fair assumption that then they will be defended by sizeable garrisons, with little chance of being lost; they will even be useful as points of support for two thousand hussars or dragoons of the Republic and for a body of three thousand infantry, which it is proposed to raise during the Winter, with the aid of a French subsidy, some revenue of the Republic and a voluntary contribution for this purpose, granted by the Palatinate of Cracow, to Walewski, its Marshal. The nobles of Lithuania await only a favor-

able time to take up arms again; Kossakowski, before he left this Grand-Duchy, made provision for supplies and information which he intends to put to use at the beginning of Spring.

Oginski and Prince Sapieha, chief of the Commanders in Lithuania, should do their utmost to get together a small body of troops, between now and the month of May, and be prepared to return to Lithuania and aid Kossakowski.

The fighting in this country, the positions held by Zaremba and Pulawski in Great Poland, and the little army in the process of forming, on the right bank of the Upper Vistula, will keep the Russians so busy at these many different points, that it is apparent that the Confederates will come through this campaign.

In the last analysis, all hopes turn on the continuation of the war between the Turks and the Russians. Although up to the present it has been barren of results, yet it has nevertheless occasioned considerable confusion in the government of Russia, because it absorbs too much money and too many men. It is hard to believe that the Czarina can support this burden much longer, as even her successes make the outcome daily more uncertain. This will involve more means and resources than the Empress will be able to avail herself of, whatever methods she chooses to adopt; and even if the Russians succeed this Winter

in routing and overwhelming the Confederates and capturing all their strongholds, the soundness of their cause, if this war continues, should leave no doubt but that they will find sufficient means to light again the fire which the Czarina may think she has extinguished by her costly operations. Conditions will not permit her to do this again, and will lead her perhaps to abandon an undertaking, the successful outcome of which will never be certain.

MANIFESTO

Of Count Oginski, Commander-in-Chief in Lithuania

September 12, 1771

ALTHOUGH my fellow citizens, who have aided me, have repeatedly had occasion to complain strongly about the oppression, pillage, and calamities by which our fatherland is harrassed, nevertheless it will serve a useful purpose, if I set them forth again in detail, because injustice, violence and the destruction of property continue daily. I do not refer to the fact that the freedom of the Diets is suppressed, that all proceedings tend to injure our faith and our liberties, that the supposed authority behind the law is based upon downright cruelty and mere force of arms, that the nation's leaders have been rudely thrust aside, and that dominion is illegally exercised in regard to our possessions. These matters have already been made public by those who first armed themselves and who by their determination have up to now carried on our battle. It is upon me that rests the duty of setting forth the most recent grievances. Since the ties that bind society are so close that the oppression of one nation affects every other nation, I cannot imagine anything that would

prevent other nations from extending to us the aid we need, as soon as they reflect upon our lot. Nevertheless we get no aid, in spite of our appeals, because trickery and deceit are used against us. The citizens who wish to rid themselves of their oppressors are called rebels; and those who try to defend law and order are called disturbers of the public peace. Surely it is not decent conduct for those whose help is justly sought to regard, as if it were an insolent multitude, an assemblage composed of the most enlightened and most respectable figures among us Poles. The behavior maintained by the soldiers of our Republic clearly proves that the aim of the Russian army is to suppress our liberties. The prosecuted Poles constitute the true Republic, because of their numbers, as well as the justice of their cause. One of the most ancient laws of the State of Poland is that whenever foreign troops enter the country, it is the duty of the Generals to mobilize the Republic's army; but in order that the execution of this law might not prevent unlawful schemes from being carried out, the Generals have been stripped of their powers by means of a complaisant Diet, and so that the ruse might be successful, the Generals have been given certain unnecessary duties to perform with the intended result that their rank means nothing.

LETTER

From Count Oginski, Commander-in-Chief in Lithuania, to one of his friends

September 29, 1771

THE news has doubtlessly brought you word of my troubles; I could not bear them, if misfortune was not the common lot of the honest people of my nation. I have already advised you that the small number of my troops, which did not go above two thousand, the spirit of insubordination prevailing among them, and the reunion of my enemies, all ready to pounce upon me, made me see clearly the danger which menaced me; but once my resolution was made up, there was nothing could discourage me. I have taken the position I should; I tried to cut off all aid which could strengthen Major During, who had withdrawn under the fortress of Mezwiz, and I closely pursued a detachment which came from Knyszin. The march was too hard and too slow for my little body of infantry, and the enemy therefore had a chance to escape, and, during the night, joined Major During. My soldiers, thoroughly exhausted, even neglected this time to set up pickets, despite my orders in writing. There was treason in our ranks, too, and this hastened my disaster. The enemy

surprised the city and the house in which I had my lodgings was the first surrendered. I was awakened by the noise of cannon and musketry, and barely had time to mount my horse in an effort to gather my troops in the public square which I had pointed out to them the preceding evening as the place to assemble. Can you imagine my astonishment when I met my infantry fleeing, unarmed, in one direction, and saw my cavalry trotting off in another? Nevertheless, the resistance of those who were in the city gave me some hope of getting together my scattered soldiers, but my pleading, my oaths, my orders, my yells, my prayers and my commands, were all in vain and useless. Terror had so frightened my men that it was impossible for me to form a single squad. The enemy poured into the city and immediately seized my artillery. When I saw I was alone and about to be surrounded I thought it time to think of my safety and to hide myself in some place where I might receive news of what happened afterwards. I learned, in effect, that my troops had been defeated. When I was sure of this I determined to reach the frontier; but I previously sent commands by two different messengers, to whatever cavalry had not been taken, to join the first Confederation. Since that unhappy moment I have heard nothing; I am in the greatest state of anxiety; and I implore you to give me some light upon the fate of the rest of my

cavalry. Please let me know if they have followed my orders and joined the first Confederation, by going through Podlachia. I have lost all my money, my baggage, and papers; but I shall never lose my determination and courage, nor the keen desire to help my oppressed country. I shall always have these sentiments, wherever I may be, and perhaps some day Providence will vouchsafe to hear and grant my prayers.

SOME EXPLANATIONS are required for an understanding of these last two papers and for the memorandum of Viomènil upon the condition of the Confederation of Poland. Count Oginski had reassembled the army of Lithuania near the city of Minsko. Colonels During and Albizew came too near the Poles, whom they intended only to watch, and were defeated; Albizew and Lieutenant-Colonel Sabatow perished in this battle, after which Oginski entrenched himself behind considerable artillery, near the swamps in the vicinity of Minsko. Colonel Drewitz and Prince Jubatow then hurried into Lithuania to block Oginski. For the same purpose the Russian general Kawskin came there from Smolensko with six regiments and three thousand Cossacks. Oginski met the Russians on September 11, 1771 (1)

(1) Rulhière, Vol. 4, p. 228, of *The History of the Anarchy of Poland*, places this event under the date of September 6th. It is impossible to say which of us is correct.

near Bercza, completely routed a part of their forces, made five hundred prisoners, captured the military chest and the baggage and burned to the ground Minsko, where the enemy had a garrison of four hundred men. The day after his victory, Count Oginski published his proclamation of September 12. Reinforced by some of the prisoners taken from the Russians and by levies of recruits recently made for him, he marched from Pinska to the gates of the city of Niezwitz, whose commander he sent for, but who refused to come. The Lithuanian general then proceeded to Mier and thence to Stolonika, near Slonim. Colonel During, who had only eight hundred men, posted them so cleverly that Oginski thought all the Russian troops were combined, and therefore retraced his steps to the left to attack General Suwarow, who commanded a very weak corps. Instead of attacking as soon as he came up to it, Oginski decided to wait until the next day; but Suwarow took advantage of the night and fell upon the Confederates and put them to rout. The cavalry of Count Oginski took flight; his infantry, numbering about eight hundred, surrendered as prisoners of war; the artillery, the baggage and the military chest, containing fifty thousand ducats, were captured by the enemy, and it was only with extreme difficulty that the General of Lithuania was able to reach the neighborhood of Slonim, where he took the road for

Konigsberg; he arrived there so helpless that he was compelled to borrow money to get to Dantzick. This setback at first made it impossible for the Confederates to continue any opposition in this part of Poland, but later, after the effect of this shock had worn off, they raised levies of new troops on the frontiers of Upper Silesia, augmented them with deserters who enlisted in crowds, and began anew to desolate their own country, but with excellent intentions. As soon as the treaty of partition was signed, they were forced to give up their arms.

Second Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, February 5, 1772

SIR:

Before I sent Choisi (1) to take command at Tiniec, I expressly ordered him to strive his utmost to obtain exact knowledge of conditions in the neighborhood of that city and of the citadel at Cracow and to make every effort to put us in a position to surprise and drive out the Russians in the citadel.

(1) Claude-Gabriel de Choisi entered service as a common soldier, June 16, 1741; through his merits he was named aide-major of the Volunteers of Hainaut, with the rank of captain, January 1, 1757; major April 23, 1763, lieutenant-colonel, August 25, 1767; he went with Baron Vioménil to Poland, obtained the rank of brigadier March 4, 1772, and a place as commander in the Order of St. Louis on October 28, 1774. He was named field-master of the Fourth Regiment of Mounted Chasseurs on January 29, 1779; field-marshal on December 5, 1781; and lieutenant-general on May 20, 1791. He was in command successively at Landau, at Lyon, and at Avignon, against Jourdan *coupe-tête*. He was too much devoted to the King and to the old order to consort with the revolutionists who, early in 1792, removed him from the command of the Seventh Military Division. He was imprisoned during the Terror, and it is thought that he died about 1795 or 1796. The memorable siege which he sustained in the citadel at Cracow in the beginning of 1772 gave him high rank among distinguished military personages. (See translator's note.)

To secure entrance to the citadel, Choisi purchased, towards the end of December, a house which was nearby. During the course of the month he caused to be made a subterranean passage by the former owners who, as an evidence of their good faith, had delivered to him at Tiniec as a hostage, the outstanding man of their family and its relatives. At the same time he was in close contact with the superiors of the Carmelites in the monastery at Cracow, and received from them exact details of what was going on, so that finally he might arrange to enter the city and the citadel at the same time.

Another citizen of the town, who was likewise doomed to die if he misled Choisi in the slightest detail, promised to act as guide for Choisi on his march from Tiniec to Cracow, and to have uncovered for him, an hour in advance of his arrival, a citadel gate which the Russians had walled up, but at which they negligently failed to place any guards or sentinels.

Everything being in readiness for this expedition, which was kept so close a secret that I did not inform even the Marshal-General of the Confederates, Choisi put his project into execution during the night of the first and second of this month. The details of his report, of which I have the honor, Sir, to enclose a copy, will apprize you of what happened. I need only observe to you that the soldiers

are but a feeble garrison of the worst kind and the cause for which they fight is hopeless, and they have just attacked a greater force of Russians in the city of Cracow; and that it was the one hundred and fifty men directed by Saillans, Vioménil (1), Charlot (2), and Després, who took the citadel and held out against all the troops which the Russians had in the city, for more than eight hours, before Choisi who had prudently returned to Tiniec came back again to Cracow with his forces and succeeded in driving the Russians from all the positions which prevented him joining these four officers. During the thirty-two years I have been in the service of the King, I have seen no more vigorous and extraordinary fighting. My little cousin killed three Russian sentinels and a captain before any of his soldiers had entered the citadel.

Saillans accomplished miracles and Charlot did everything which might be expected from a man of the greatest courage; unluckily his left leg was broken by a gun shot. Valcour, Duclos and Dittwar, also distinguished themselves in the attack made by Choisi, to whom I must give my greatest praise: he divined everything, was thoroughly prepared,

(1) The Count of Vioménil, brother of the Baron, and who has served with distinction in the Army of Emigrés. (The translator deems this a mistake; the Vioménil named is the Chevalier, a cousin of the Baron).

(2) Son of the First Commissioner of War.

and carried out his plan surprisingly well. Whatever happens this officer will be forever honored and esteemed among the Poles; to all our countrymen he communicated his burning zeal. They accomplished such wonders that I am sure Marquis de Monteynard (1) will not refuse me the favors which I intend to ask him for them, as soon as I receive the exact details of this action, and the grade of brigadier for Choisi, whom the Poles have voluntarily made Generalissimo, so enthusiastic are they over his great skill and his success.

I must, however, say, Sir, that I am not as confident as he is that he will capture the city of Cracow; I know that it is still securely held by eight hundred Russians, that aid may easily reach it from every side, and that the chief officers of the garrison know that they may be executed for having permitted so essential a citadel to be taken from them. They will, therefore, do everything to recapture it, and to deprive Choisi of all contact with Tiniec. We are so weak that we cannot set up any opposition to this. It is barely possible, however, that with the stores and supplies that he has just seized he will be able to make a show of resistance with the result that he may hold them for us until next Spring.

If the Russians, on the other hand, through weakness or ignorance of our actual condition, become

(1) Minister of War.

tired of war and abandon Cracow, I will suggest to the conference of Generals that they order Pulawski and Kossakowski to come to Cracow as quickly as possible with their soldiers. I shall then be able in our behalf to join there all the forces under the command of the General. I would then barricade all the streets, place my troops in position to defend the city and by these means compel the Russians to send in large bodies of troops to attack us. I do not know whether they will have the means or the desire, but I do know very well that in case they do put such a plan into full operation, they will come to have a very high respect for the Poles and the little body of Frenchmen with them. I expect, Sir, that the capture of the citadel of Cracow will bring about a Winter campaign, in which most of the Russians now in Poland will participate, and every day there will be constant fighting in that vicinity. If I could be sure that Choisi has found plenty of meat in the citadel I would assure you he will hold out for a long time.

The Generals have given all the orders desired by me in regard to this matter.

I am, etc.

Copy of the Letter
of
CHOISI TO BARON VIOMÉNIL

In the citadel of Cracow, February 2, 1772, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

I AM in possession of the citadel of Cracow, but do not think, Sir, that any praise is due me; it is to Chevalier Vioménil and to Saillans and Després to whom all the honor belongs. I did nothing, except drive the garrison out of the city from the bridge, and from the faubourg of which it had taken possession, to prevent my junction with that detachment of mine which I believed was lost irrevocably at the very moment it was taking possesssion of the citadel, a feat beyond my imagination, and all after a series of unbelievable adventures the details of which you can only understand by following me into the labyrinth of this whole day, which for nine hours was the hardest of my life, but this very moment most satisfactory. I found in the citadel ninety-nine prisoners, a major and a commandant. What was done on this occasion by Vioménil, Saillans, Després and Charlot, who was unfortunately wounded in both legs, is inconceivable; the conduct and cour-

age of these four officers has never been equalled; they are above all praise.

The adventure which brought me here began at three o'clock in the morning and has ended this very moment.

Having put you at rest, as to my situation and that of the troops entrusted to me, I beg you to listen to the actual details of my misfortunes, and tell me if there ever was a situation harder than mine, up to the moment of this writing.

The difficulties in which I found myself on the first day of this month, made it prudent, and even necessary, for me to abandon my plan to attack the city. I therefore decided to attack the citadel only, with my troops divided into two detachments. So I left Tiniec this morning at one o'clock, as I have already notified you through Ménonville, at the head of six hundred men with whom by means of a bateau bridge I crossed the Vistula to the foot of the fortress. I led them noiselessly to the wall of Cracow, which encloses the garden of the Carmelites. The man on whom I relied himself posted the different guides, which I had kept at Tiniec for a long time back for the express purpose of leading the detachments which would have to operate separately in my attacks. The cleverest guides had been assigned to the troops which were to enter the citadel through a hole where, I had been told, four men could pass

at one time. I took my own place at the head of the troops with which I hoped to enter the citadel by a subterranean gate, which should have been opened, I suppose, at least an hour before I arrived. According to information which I had received as planned, these different objects had been carried out, and we accordingly separated to obey our respective orders. After I had followed my chief guide for a considerable time through byroads which he had not mentioned to me, I found myself at the foot of the walls of the citadel. You can judge, Sir, of my astonishment and my embarrassment, when I discovered I had been accompanied by only a few men, and that I could not catch the slightest sound of movement on the part of my second detachment. I remained for more than an hour in this hard situation and then the officers and soldiers who were supposed to follow me, but who had lost their way, joined me again, and there came up, too, most of those who were supposed to get into the citadel by the little opening. It was now half past four o'clock.

I immediately ordered my man to lead me to the subterranean door which he had assured me would be open. I found it still walled up. When I asked him how he intended to open it, he told me that this seemed impossible, since he had neither tools nor masons. This answer made my heart sink and I almost fainted. It was then a case of having my

four hundred men go through the hole which had been made for entering the citadel, and I had just learned that only one man could pass through at a time, and only with great difficulty. It was now after five o'clock, and it would take three hours to get in by this method. I therefore concluded the only thing I could do was to retreat, in bitter sorrow, with a loss of six officers and one hundred eighty men, who had failed to join me, although I sent out men in all directions to look for them.

I had scarcely gone a mile and a half, however, when I heard repeated volleys of musketry and reports of cannon. I surmised that they were all killed, or at least taken prisoners, and I accordingly continued on my return, so as not to risk the loss of Tiniec, which I had left but weakly guarded. As I marched I still heard the shooting from the city and the citadel, and finally, more dead than alive, I reached Tiniec. I immediately despatched a well disposed Polish officer in the greatest haste to go as near Cracow as he could, and ascertain the fate of my one hundred and fifty men, for a detachment of thirty had rejoined me. He reported back that the French were in possession of the citadel, and were still holding it against attack. Immediately I set out again and reached the citadel, with four hundred men, all of us determined to get into it or die in the attempt. Thanks be to God, I am here. You will be eager to

know how our men succeeded in getting in. It was through twenty miracles, and after exploits of unheard courage. They had been lost for three hours, and then at dawn rushed upon the citadel. After having broken through the palisades, smashed doors and windows, and raised hell, to find the hole, by which they got in, one by one, they beat down all opposition and were in turn attacked. They were still fighting off the enemy, when I arrived back from Tiniec. This is all the news I give you now, for I am very tired and busy. In my attack Duclos, Valcour, Dittwar, and nearly all the others distinguished themselves. I hope tomorrow, Sir, to be master of the city.

CHOISI

P. S. I found in the citadel large stores of everything. Without exaggeration, it is worth two millions. There is enough to feed one thousand horses, all Winter, and plenty of flour, wheat and munitions.

Després thinks there is enough green cloth for all the chasseurs. I examined the different places, where our men were attacked by all the troops from the city. I do not understand how they held out for nine hours. I came only in the nick of time. They killed one hundred twenty Russians and cap-

tured ninety-one prisoners; they lost none, but Charlot and Major Wonsowiez and four soldiers were wounded. It is a relief to find myself here, but I shall be more contented if you approve of my conduct.

Third Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, February 10, 1772

SIR:

Walewski, Marshal and Commander in the Palatinate of Cracow, having learned through Choisi at Bielitz, on February 1, at two o'clock in the afternoon that the attack upon Cracow would take place the following night, immediately sent orders to his several bodies of cavalry stationed in the neighborhood of Biala, to hasten to Tiniec, twenty leagues from that place, as fast as possible. He arrived there in person on February 2, at five o'clock in the morning with Piwiniecki, a member of the Council of Culm. Both of them with their cavalry protected the infantry of Choisi when he concluded to march back to Cracow to aid and to join the officers of his detachment which had taken possession of the citadel. This object having been accomplished with great skill and intelligence, Walewski arranged his cavalry so that it would be in a position to oppose the first re-inforcements which would naturally be sent to the Russians any moment from their posts nearest Cracow. He put one hundred and fifty dragoons of the squadron of Pomerania on the only road by

which the Russian cavalry could leave the city, which they attempted to do with three squadrons but they were charged at exactly the right time and so vigorously and effectively by Gordon and Kolaskowski, who commanded the squadron of Pomerania, that they were forced to return to the city, after suffering a considerable loss. Thereupon Walewski hurried with Scheglinski to the citadel to consult Choisi upon plans for attacking the city, before it could be relieved. They agreed that they would make the attack the next day and that to assure its success there should be sent into the citadel the same night one hundred fifty dragoons and for the attack upon the city there should be brought in two hundred fifty infantry from Landskron whom Dzierbicki, Marshal of Lenicia, had already promised to have at Tiniec on the morning of the third, as Walewski had apparently requested. This infantry arrived in good order, with two pieces of cannon and some cavalry, at Tiniec, on February 3rd, at four o'clock in the afternoon. Walewski had returned there to meet it, and it left again at six under the direction of the Marshals of Cracow and of Lenicia, to effect the attack agreed upon, with Choisi; but Walewski ascertained, while on his march, that the Russians had already been re-enforced at Cracow and held the adjacent territory in complete control, and that a considerable number

of infantry had been placed to support two cannon and a hundred men in position at the head of the bridge of the old Vistula, which combination would prevent all communication between the Confederates and the citadel. He concluded then, that it would be impossible to capture the city or to increase the strength of Choisi in the citadel, by getting into it the larger part of the infantry which Dzierbicki had brought from Landskron. He therefore ordered Galibert, who commanded this infantry, to attack the Russians who held the bridge and to attempt to get into the citadel. This officer, accompanied by Colonel La Serre, and Lieutenant-Colonel and Cravatte-Major Tukulka, put himself at the head of his chasseurs and the janizaries of Prince Radziwill, and marched up to the Russians without firing a shot. His soldiers at first gave way under the brunt of the firing that greeted them, but their officers kept them together and they succeeded in driving the enemy from the bridge and the territory near it. They got into the citadel with one cannon, after having lost Lisiecki, lieutenant of chasseurs, and forty soldiers. Too much praise cannot be given Galibert: his attack was brilliant, swift and as successful as could be desired.

Kellermann and Skilski, in command, under the orders of the marshals, of the cavalry of the Confederates which supported the attack by Galibert, also contributed a great deal to this success. Choisi

took advantage of the moment when Galibert joined him to make it known to Walewski and Dzierbicki that at daybreak on the 5th he would attempt a sortie against the city. These marshals went back to Tiniec during the night of the 3rd so that their cavalry might rest there. They brought back with them a cannon of the infantry of Landskron, the horses of which were killed in Galibert's attack.

They came back again to Cracow on the night of the 4th and 5th, at the head of all their cavalry, to aid in the sortie which Choisi had planned, but having learned that Suwarow had arrived in Cracow in the afternoon of the 4th at the head of a large body of infantry; that Branicki was expected there with uhlans; that Choisi had found in the citadel whatever was most essential for its defense; that a detachment of fifty infantry commanded by Dittwar and Blondeau which Choisi had sent to make part of the garrison at Tiniec had arrived there after having again forced a passage at the bridge; and that Choisi had already attempted to make a sortie, but having found more resistance than he thought he would meet, he had withdrawn again into the citadel after having lost several soldiers or dragoons. All these conditions led the marshals to conclude to retire to Tiniec at seven o'clock in the morning; they reached that place in good order with slight losses, although they were considerably harrassed by the cossacks

and uhlans of Branicki who seemed to come up out of the ground. Kellermann directed this retreat with great skill.

As the garrisons at Tiniec, Landskron and Bobreck had been very much weakened by withdrawals for the attack upon the citadel at Cracow, and in order to hold it above all other considerations, the marshals sent their cavalry to these different posts so as to defend them, with the aid of the small bodies of infantry, which had remained in them. The generals sent lieutenant-colonel Duhoux to command at Tiniec, Elliott at Landskron and Marion at Bobreck. If these officers are attacked they will give a good account of themselves; I can, Sir, answer to you for that.

What happened at Cracow the morning the citadel was taken and the several skirmishes, which thereupon ensued, gave our French and the Poles many contacts. The latter now have confidence in us, and do more quickly what I ask them to do; but in spite of this I sadly perceive that they have not sufficient resources to enable us, as I hoped, to make the most out of the capture of the citadel of Cracow. This has been a great loss for the Russians, for it will prevent them, though this is only my hope, from carrying out most of their plans for the coming campaign, and it may be, for the Confederation, an inestimable source of strength. If communication be-

tween Tiniec and Choisi could be re-established for only eight days, there could be withdrawn from the citadel of Cracow arms, clothing and munitions of war sufficient to provision twice all the Polish strongholds and to provide arms and clothing for more than six thousand soldiers or dragoons of the Confederates.

Naturally Branicki will continue to renew his attempts to retake his citadel, but I know Choisi and his brave companions well enough to be sure that he will make Branicki pay very dearly for everything he attempts.

Gliezinski, Korytowski, Chrzanowski, Morawski, and Kulesza of the division of Pomerania, and of the troops of Prince Radziwill, showed great courage in all the fighting which has just taken place in the neighborhood of Cracow, and that it has been successful is due mainly to the determination and the zeal of Walewski, Dzierbicki and Piwiniecki to carry on everywhere with the greatest distinction.

Officers Killed

Captain Milkowski
Lieutenant Lisiecki

Officers Wounded

Colonel Gordon of Pomerania
Major Wousowiecz
Sub-Lieutenant Charlot

The Confederates lost only sixty-six men in the different attacks while the Russians lost almost five hundred. All reports are agreed in regard to this.

I am, etc.

Fourth Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, February 22, 1772

SIR:

I had the honor of advising you by my last dispatch that Branicki and Suwarow arrived at Cracow on the 4th and 5th of this month with five thousand men; they did not lose one moment in surrounding the citadel on every side; they took possession of Wieliczka by force with cannon, and on the 7th built a bridge over the Vistula for their communications from Wieliczka to the territory adjacent to Zwirziniec.

On the 9th Choisi burned several houses below the citadel near the Grodska gate, which would have hindered him in defending the citadel.

During the night of the 12th and 13th, the Russians set up a furious fusillade from midnight until two o'clock in the morning, on the bridge which they held, in the hope that Choisi would think that they had been attacked by the troops from Tiniec, and thus induce him to come out to aid in this supposed attack, and thus expose himself to the sharp-shooters in several houses in which they had put loop-holes and concealed numerous bodies of infantry about

one hundred fifty yards from the main roadway to the citadel. Choisi did not even bother sending out pickets to see what was going on at the bridge, but since he experienced on February 13th great inconvenience by reason of the shooting from these fortified houses, which lasted all morning, he resolved to have two hundred men attack these houses. The sortie was made at eleven o'clock, and the men succeeded in driving all the Russians out of the houses they held, after an attack which lasted almost three hours, and during which the enemy had nearly two hundred men killed, wounded, burned or captured. Choisi had at first refrained from burning these houses, out of regard for the inhabitants of Cracow, although he might have done so as soon as he had taken possession of the citadel, but he was compelled in the end to burn them all. Luckily their loss meant little or nothing; only fifteen Confederates were killed or wounded in this fighting, which was lively enough while it lasted.

From the 13th to the 16th the enemy remained quiet and was contented to enlarge its strongholds, to build barricades in the streets as a protection against the firing from the citadel, and to make loopholes in all the houses which face the citadel.

On the 19th at three o'clock in the morning the enemy again tried to fool Choisi by making it appear that there was another attempt to attack the

bridge which they held. After considerable shooting there, accompanied by frightful yelling, they fled in disorder as far as the Royal brewery which is about three hundred yards from the citadel. Here they re-formed and marched back to the bridge, and then appeared to retreat from it a second time, but Choisi, convinced that this was only a new ruse to induce him to make a sortie, was satisfied to have a trustworthy Polish officer climb to the tower of the palace from which he could see the Grodska gate. This officer reported back that a Russian colonel of infantry and at least five hundred men were waiting for the opportunity of getting in behind any troops which might come out of the citadel and thus deprive them of any chance of getting back in again. Choisi did not disturb his garrison, and did not waste a pinch of powder while this comedy went on. Branicki and Suwarow were both astonished at his great indifference in this situation, which might have had, as they thought, serious consequences.

From the 8th to the 19th, the Russians directed against the citadel a continual fire of musketry and of cannon, from seven o'clock in the evening to the next morning. Choisi did nothing, and not one of his men was injured. He and the other officers and soldiers under his command have determined to hold the citadel of Cracow until the last bit of hope is gone. His own courage and sobriety, the patience

and the good spirits of his garrison, make me hope that the Russians will have to make many futile attempts before they get back this important stronghold.

The Confederates, during the last five days, have gathered many recruits; these are being sent to Tiniec and to Landskron, where the Poles expect to whip them into shape to make it possible for them to take an active part in the next campaign.

Pulawski, Kossakowski and Zaremba should, by this time, have begun the movements which I asked them to make and which they were ordered to make by the Generals. These movements are designed only to make Warsaw worry, and to compel the Russians to keep in motion everywhere; if they are carried out with the wisdom I prescribed for them, they will run into no peril; their troops will be always fresh, while the Russians on the contrary, will be compelled, because of the constant rains in the country, to proceed in a very uncertain manner and must necessarily be greatly hampered.

I am, etc.

P. S. As Schwartz distinguished himself in the fight at Radom where by his coolness he saved most of Marshal Pulawski's cavalry, I have just included him for a commission as lieutenant-colonel, upon the list of favors, which I am asking today of Marquis

Monteynard, for several officers who followed me to Poland. If you will be kind enough to let this minister know that you are interested in the advancement of this officer, and think well of him, I am sure that my request, in regard to him, will be granted.

Fifth Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, March 3, 1772

SIR:

I have just learned through Duhoux, commander at Tiniec, that the Russians vigorously attacked the citadel at Cracow on the 27th of last month at two o'clock in the morning, and withdrew about six o'clock, after sustaining a very considerable loss; on the 29th, at the same hour, they made another attempt, even more vigorous than the first, which lasted until nine o'clock but they had no better luck. Suwarow, in both these engagements, compelled to precede his troops a large number of Polish peasants and citizens of Cracow whom he commanded to carry ladders to be placed against the walls of the citadel. Those who disobeyed him were shot. Choisi moved by the cries and the fate of these unfortunate victims of such atrocious cruelty, saw from his position on the top of the wall a chance to save some of these Poles before he could be seriously threatened by the Russians, and succeeded in getting about a hundred of them into the citadel. They still bless him; and their preservation adds to his fame in a manner that is very satisfactory to all who love their

fellow-man. In each of these two attacks the Russians employed five hundred infantry, and all reports from Cracow agree that they had fifty officers killed or wounded, and more than a thousand soldiers.

As all communication with Choisi ended on the 24th of last month, I can tell you nothing about his losses or his present situation. His conduct and that of the rank and file of his garrison are more to be admired because for a month all they have had to live on has been their courage, bread and soup. I am quite heartbroken because I have not been able to aid them in some way, especially in view of their extraordinary auspicious beginning; if I had then had a hundred thousand crowns, I should have been able to use them very advantageously in the interest of the Confederation, and very usefully, I think, in the preservation of the credit of His Majesty in Poland. At any rate, we shall do our best to the very last moment, but, despite our success, do not be surprised, Sir, if it goes for nothing before the 15th of next month; for the Russians are pouring into Cracow from all sides, and if they capture the citadel, the Confederation will then be at the end of its rope.

Pulawski and Kossakowski, who left Czenstokow on the 20th to cut the line of communication of the Russians between Warsaw and Cracow, and especially to make them worry in regard to Warsaw, as-

certained that Lapuchin and Drewitz had made such very wise dispositions that even with vastly superior troops they could not be beaten. Accordingly these Polish leaders decided to return to Czenstokow, and to detach Zieberg with seven hundred Lithuanian cavalry, to cross the Vistula at Bobreck, and take positions on the borders of Hungary, before Dukla, at such points as would give the Russians some concern for their supplies in the Palatinates of Russia and Lublin, and to compel them to send there some of the troops now at Cracow.

Mozoviecki, ordered by Zaremba to observe, with three hundred horsemen, the movements of Lapuchin, followed him too closely; a skirmish ensued and Mozoviecki, after a considerable loss, was obliged to withdraw.

I am, etc.

Sixth Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, March 12, 1772

SIR:

Yesterday evening there came to me at last a letter from Choisi, a copy of which I have the honor of enclosing; you will see by it that he was not attacked on the 27th of last month, as I previously advised you, pursuant to reports which had come to me from Tiniec. For the past eight days whatever news comes in here from Cracow is to the effect that the Russians there sustained a great loss on the 29th of February. Colonel Heysmann was killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Absolowitz seriously wounded. Choisi's own losses in officers make me very much afraid of the outcome for him and his garrison, if the Russians make a second vigorous attack.

If the Lithuanians, commanded by Zieberg, at present marching past Landskron towards the environs of Dukla, had been in any condition to fight, I would have taken command of them, and tomorrow risked, with the aid of Sapieha, Oginski and Walewski, an attack against the whole body of Russian cavalry which now prevents relief to the citadel of Cracow from the right bank of the Vistula. Dur-

ing such a battle, I would have had an opportunity to get a hundred cattle into the citadel as well as whatever else was necessary for the preservation of Choisi's sick and wounded; but as the Lithuanians have scarcely any military equipment and are mounted upon poor nags, this plan had to be given up, although it was sanctioned by all the Generals and heartily approved by Sapieha, Oginski, Walewski, and the other Polish military leaders, all of whom are very zealous and seem willing to risk their lives. At this very moment Prince Sapieha is at the head of his Lithuanians, whom he joined near Landskron the moment I suggested they combine with the cavalry of Walewski in an attempt to attack the Russians. They will proceed on their march towards the Hungarian frontier, and for my part, I will use every means possible, either by trick or the use of money, to get some beeves and medicines into the citadel of Cracow. They are most essentially necessary for the wounded and sick.

The Prussians, in Great Poland, continue to hem in Zaremba gradually, without yet attacking him; Lapuchin, on the other hand, has been so menacing Zaremba for the last six days with a force of fifteen hundred infantry and cavalry, that I shall not be surprised to learn any moment that a lively battle is being fought. At Cracow no Prussians have appeared, as I had been mistakenly informed.

Count Oginski intends to employ a very large sum, the proceeds of a loan in Holland, in meeting the expenses of a body of three or four thousand men, whom he has already begun to raise. He carries himself very wisely here, and displays great moderation.

Prince Radziwill has just bought four hundred horses as remounts for his hussars and dragoons; moreover, at his own expense, he has equipped anew all his troops, and will provide for the newly raised companies of infantry; Prince Sapieha exhibits similar zeal and is freely spending his money in an endeavor to make matters better in Lithuania again.

Schwartz has just advised me that Pulawski and Kassakowski, after futile efforts upon all sides to break the communications of the Russians and to effect a diversion which would help the Confederates, put their troops on the 2nd of this month, into the quarters which they had occupied, near Czenstokow, before this last movement. He also tells me that Drewitz with fourteen hundred cavalry, on the 5th stationed himself before Czenstokow and remained there in battle array the whole day, at less than a mile distant from the post; that in the evening he proceeded along the road from Czenstokow to Bobreck, and that on the same day, Lapuchin, with a body of infantry, cannon, and many horsemen, was along the River Warta, eight leagues from

Czenstokow. Zaremba, who had re-assembled his troops at Zduni, as early as the 28th of last month, was compelled to march to Sieradz, with all of them, and it now appears certain, Sir, that he will have to fight almost incessantly in the neighborhood of Czenstokow or upon the banks of the River Warta.

I am, etc.

COPY

of a Letter from Choisi to Baron Vioménil

In the citadel of Cracow, February 29, 1772

THIS interesting letter will reach you, my dear Sir, when it pleases God; for although I have written you regularly everyday for the past eight days, I have not succeeded in getting one of my letters to you. This morning all the Russian troops attacked me, at every corner of the citadel, at the same time. The affair began at a quarter after three and did not end until half past six. There was never an attack so brusque, so relentless and so bold; to everyone of my gates they fastened a petard, and at every window was a ladder, for all of three hours, in spite of the furious fire I poured upon them; they opened the embrasures where my cannon were, to get in three at a time; two guns, always in action, could not prevent them from leaping up from below to climb into the tower; all the other attacks were just as vigorous and threatening. The two gates of the Seminary were smashed, but Chevalier Vioménil kept the attackers out; the gate that is used for sorties was guarded by Lalain; it could not be forced, so courageous and obstinate were its defenders; at last, Sir, at a quarter after six the enemy retired

in the greatest disorder, leaving behind their ladders, axes, poles, pikes and iron bars; they carried away their dead, as is their custom; they were unable, however, to remove those who were under the city gate, where I counted forty in the space of seventy-five square feet; I am convinced that we killed at least four hundred men. All who died in the attack upon the Seminary were thrown into the Vistula. The retreat was so precipitate at this point that the Russians crossed the river by swimming. This morning I saw come out of the brewery at least sixty carts filled with their wounded, who were taken to the city, and it was not in this place that they suffered worst. If our French officers showed great courage in taking the citadel, they displayed a hundred times as much in defending it. Those whose positions enabled them to show their courage most were Valcour, Després, Vioménil, Hery, Lalain, and LaSerre; but the glory they gained today should not take away from that of the other Polish and French officers who all helped, by their courage and ability, to hold the citadel; I should mention to you in particular, Chranowski, Kokanowski, and Boissimène, who made themselves very useful in front of the citadel, where Galibert commanded. My two French cannoniers are of a very scarce breed; in such a rank, one would not expect to find such extraordinary men; they both displayed the greatest ac-

tivity, as well as foresight and determination which seemed supernatural. If these men are not made officers in their corps, they will be an excellent acquisition for the regiment that gets them.

As you know, Sir, for twenty-eight days I have been hoping and praying that the enemy would attempt what would make this the happiest day of my life, had I not lost the brave Duclos. His loss is irreparable, but it is not our only misfortune; Valcour, Després, LaSerre, Hery and Lalain are wounded. All of them deserve the favors of the King. LaSerre who has always been useful to me here, let alone what he did today, deserves the Cross of St. Louis and wishes to be replaced. I ask you to obtain for him these two favors, which were never more deserved; he has been assigned as captain with the *Regiment de Bigorre.* I also lost Klesincki, an officer of the Pomeranian division. My loss in common soldiers is not at all in proportion to my loss of officers; for I lost but forty-nine men, killed and wounded; one of my cannoniers received three gun wounds, of which, I fondly hope, he will not die. Not an officer is mortally wounded. Charlot and Gordon are getting on well. We keep on wishing for the time that must bring you and us together, because we are all certain of your support and esteem. The brave Galibert keeps well.

CHOISI

P.S. The enemy maintained a frightful fire during the night of the 27th; at Tiniec they must have thought that I had been attacked; as I knew before three o'clock that their only purpose was to induce me to waste powder, we did not discharge a gun.

I do not tell you what we need, because you cannot help remedy that situation; but our faces will be long indeed, if matters do not mend within eight days. I shall have to kill all our horses; our soldiers beg us to do this. All the time we have been here, we have not had beef, butter, or lard; dry bread, *cacha,* and courage, Sir, is all the officers and men have had to nourish them. Many of my men are sick; our wounded are getting on pretty well. Suwarow refused me the medicines for which I asked him, through Saillant. In Cracow it is loudly proclaimed that I shall be attacked again within the next two days; despite this threat, despite our needs and the loss I have had in officers, you can count on me, Sir, not to spare anything in preventing the Russians from regaining this citadel which has already cost them enough trouble and blood, and the retention of which means so much for the Confederation.

Seventh Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, March 18, 1772

SIR:

Prince Sapieha succeeded in gathering at Tiniec, in the morning of the 12th, four hundred Lithuanians, commanded by Zieberg, and two hundred and fifty dragoons from Walewski; these two leaders, to ascertain the strength of the enemy, and to be able to judge whether it would be easy or difficult to put into execution the final plans of the Generals in regard to the one hundred cattle they were trying to get into the citadel of Cracow, sent, on the 13th, various detachments along both banks of the Vistula, towards the nearest posts of the enemy; that under Walewski himself on the right bank was driven back to Tiniec by a very much larger body of the enemy, but retired in good order. Three enemy officers and several uhlans were killed or wounded, and Walewski lost fifteen dragoons.

The division of Zieberg, after having crossed the Vistula at Tiniec, went along the left bank of that river in the direction of Cracow: here likewise the enemy was found in very superior numbers; and it pursued the Poles very vigorously; several Bosniacs

of this detachment missed the ford, and were drowned, or cut to pieces at the river's edge.

Branicki and Suwarow were in command of the Russians and Poles who repulsed the troops which Walewski and Zieberg used for this reconnoitering.

According to the news I have just received from Berlin, the King of Prussia intends to send a new corps of troops into Great Poland, and has recently sent d'Amhalt, in whom he has the greatest confidence, to take command of them and the troops already there, which up to the present have been under the orders of Beling. It seems to me that we shall very soon know what is going to happen.

Zaremba, Pulawski and Kossakowski lack everything necessary for the subsistence of their troops in Great Poland, and to get them in shape to carry on the next campaign. Because they are quite alarmed by these recent developments in Prussia and by the way in which the Russians have closed in upon them since the beginning of this month, the Generals today sent to the different leaders orders to combine their forces immediately, and to make concerted attacks successively against Lapuchin and Drewitz, who are marking time in Great Poland, then to leave Czenstokow to be cared for by its own troops, to cross the Vistula at Bobreck, and to go to Zamosc with all their forces so that they may wage war again in the Palatinates of Belz and Lublin, where there

are abundant supplies, and where they will perhaps be in a position to worry the enemy. All this cannot be accomplished without great risks and chances for the troops of the Confederation; but in its present desperate plight the Confederation understands how necessary it is that a vigorous show of determination be evidenced by those best able to display it.

Count Oginski has already sent Commeki to Amsterdam to see if he can borrow fifty thousand ducats, to be used immediately in raising troops which he intends to gather.

If what is now being done here in behalf of the Confederation could have been done three months sooner, and if the Court of Vienna had been more favorably disposed towards the Confederation, we should have now found ourselves to some extent in a position to aid, with less disadvantage, the very brilliant and fortunate attack upon the citadel of Cracow, but, as matters really are, it is easy to see that the efforts of a few individuals will never be enough to regain ground now lost beyond all hope of recovery.

I am, etc.

Eighth Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, March 31, 1772

SIR:

Lebenfeld, an officer in the service of the Confederation, seeing the anxiety of Choisi because he could get no word to me, and received none from me, volunteered to get out of the citadel with a letter for me and bring back to Choisi my answer. He stole out the night of the 24th, killed with his sword a Russian sentinel, and reached Tiniec after several adventures which he came through safely, by reason of his courage as much as by his skill and good luck. The day before yesterday he delivered to me the letter in which Choisi informs me that his sick number two hundred, he has no medicines, and his soldiers who are living only on bread, are beginning to murmur. There are desertions every day, in spite of the precaution and the watchfulness of the officers, but what gives him most worry, is that he has absolutely no flints. I am doing what I can to supply him with these as well as medicines, but I am afraid I shall not be successful. Moreover, I have sent Lebenfeld back to the citadel with a letter for Choisi signed by the Generals, to inform him

that they will approve and sanction whatever he does, whether it is to hold out in the citadel, or, forced by circumstances, to surrender to the power of the Russians, upon decent terms, or to do something else which may again add to his fame.

If, through his courage and perseverance he is able to hold the citadel until the 20th of next month, we shall then have almost a thousand well equipped men at Tiniec, seven hundred at Landskron, and three hundred at Bobreck; these small strongholds will then be in good condition to withstand the efforts of the Russians, and I think I can assure you that the French in command of them will in their turn merit some praise and distinction.

If the Russians attack the citadel in force a second time, all the officers feel sure they will repulse them again. Most of those who were wounded during the attack made on February 29th are well again and able to perform their duties. I expect more wonderful things on the part of this brave body of men.

Zieberg and Prince Martin Lubomirski, in the environs of Tarnow, have combined forces with some fairly large contingents of Pulawski, which are commanded by Radwicki and Suack. Kossakowski should leave Biala today to join them again, and to wage war, once more in the Palatinate of Lublin. If Pulawski and Zaremba carry out the orders of the Generals they will not delay in taking the same

steps. The latter, according to news I have just received, fought several days ago against Lapuchin, in the neighborhood of Peterkow, without any advantage being gained by either. I expect any moment the report Duprat is ordered to make to me as to the movements of Zaremba, to whose troops I had sent him.

I am, etc.

Ninth Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, April 8, 1772

SIR:

Schwartz and Duprat, whom I had sent to Great Poland to give me account of all the movements of Pulawski and Zaremba in respect to the orders given them by the Generals, which orders are included in the instructions, a copy of which I enclose for you, have this moment returned. They inform me that these two leaders met at Czenstokow on the 19th of last month, and by the 23rd had effected a combination of all their troops in the neighborhood of Wielun. They planned to march by different routes against Lapuchin and to attack him, but Zaremba, twenty-four hours after he and Pulawski separated, was informed that the plan was not practicable, because the roads were in very bad condition, and he therefore suggested to Pulawski that he should not move any of his troops. He had returned himself to Sokolniki and was with his family; he left the best part of his cavalry at Widawa and in its vicinity; on the 21st he left Sokolniki with Duprat, to go to Widawa, which he left again on the 22nd at dawn, at

the head of nine hundred hussars, cossacks, and dragoons, with whom, after riding fourteen leagues, he arrived the same day, at nightfall, at a point less than a mile from Peterkow. Lapuchin, who held that city with sixteen hundred men, had not received the slightest bit of information of Zaremba's approach. Duprat noticed an air of hesitancy in Zaremba, who seemed quite disinclined to take advantage of the march he had stolen upon Lapuchin, and suggested to him that he have a hundred cossacks and dragoons dismount who could march upon the city of Peterkow and its suburbs under the command of Duprat, while Zaremba could guard with his cavalry all the ways of escape. Zaremba, however, did not approve of this plan, and decided to withdraw the same evening to the hamlet of Rosprza, which he owns. He ordered his troops to bivouac there until the next morning, when he sent his agent to Peterkow to inform Lapuchin that he was very near him. The Russian commander, very much surprised at this news, and much more so by the politeness of Zaremba, got his troops together and marched to the hills near Milcow, where he came upon the outposts of the Confederates. He immediately ordered an attack. Zaremba parried this successfully by the use of all his cavalry, and there followed a warm battle which lasted three-quarters of an hour. Five hundred men were killed, wounded and captured, without any

marked advantage to either side. Several volleys of cannon, fired under the direction of Lapuchin, finally led the combatants to separate; they remained on the field until nightfall and then each side withdrew. Lapuchin returned to Peterkow, and Zaremba, after having recrossed the River Warta, sent his troops back to Great Poland, where they were dispersed. On the 30th he returned to Sokolniki, whence he advised me that the reason he did not take advantage of having completely surprised Lapuchin was that he was afraid to burn the City of Peterkow.

A detachment of five hundred horsemen, under the orders of Pulawski, in an independent attack upon Peterkow, were met and surprised on the 22nd by Drewitz, who beat and routed them after having suffered a substantial loss.

Mazowiecki, who came into the vicinity of Peterkow on the 27th with four hundred dragoons, was similarly beaten and put to flight by Lapuchin.

The result of these engagements, Sir, is that in order to be free, in every regard, of the orders given by the Generals, Zaremba deliberately failed to avail himself of the opportunity to demolish the forces of Lapuchin; he should have attacked then or fallen upon Drewitz, a very easy task; had he crossed the Vistula at Bobreck he would have entered Ocwieczim covered with glory and given us the advantage,

as seems evident, of getting into the citadel the 2nd or 3rd of this month, everything needed to place Choisi in a position to hold out for a much longer time. His extraordinary conduct can be ascribed only to a clear lack of devotion to the republican cause; it should now be expected that any moment he will make peace for himself or that he will permit all his troops to be taken little by little by the Prussians, who have already indicated to him, as you may gather from the copy of the letter of General Czettritz, which I enclose with this despatch, that they will not delay attacking all his quarters between Silesia and the River Warta, if he does not abandon them of his own accord. In either case it is clear to me that he must lose all his troops and as a consequence the Confederation will be wholly destroyed. Pulawski will, as a matter of course, be shut up in Czenstokow; Kossakowski will not be able to hold out alone anywhere in Zamosc, and I doubt very much that he will even be able to get there. Once the citadel of Cracow is retaken, Tiniec, Landskron and Bobreck will be immediately attacked; and no matter how skillful and courageous the officers in command of these posts may be, what defense can we expect to be made by a crowd of recruits who have been hurriedly gathered, who lack weapons, and who will be attacked by vastly superior numbers? That, Sir, is a true picture of the real condition

of the Confederation. If Zaremba had been more obedient and a better citizen, with a love of fame, he could have brought honor to the arms of his faction and have made it, so to speak, keep the fires burning. The attitude he has just assumed has destroyed every hope, and completely discouraged the nation. I have nothing to say which by any show of reason might remove the impressions to which his conduct gives rise.

Branicki left Cracow at the head of five hundred cavalry during the night of the 3rd and 4th, to operate between Tiniec and Biala, and in this region he seized all the public revenues.

The Russians are fortifying the convent at Bilani, opposite Tiniec, and the citadel and monastery at Wischnicza, which are on the line of communication between Cracow and Tarnow; they have posted three hundred infantry at the latter place, and already they have provisioned it for four months.

Piwiniecki, who has this moment arrived from Great Poland, informs me that on the 2nd and 3rd of this month the Prussians attacked the troops of Zaremba, who held the small cities of Frauenstadt, Lezno and Szduni. And now, Sir, the decisive moment is upon us. Evidently the Prussian troops will soon have their right wing at Cracow, and their left at Dantzick. I am telling you that it is with the greatest impatience I await the action of the House

of Austria in regard to these very extraordinary events.

Choisi still holds out in his citadel, to the great surprise of the ten thousand Russians who surround him and of everybody else along this boundary of Poland.

I am, etc.

COPY

of the Instructions Which the Generals Sent to Marshals Pulawski, Kossakowski and Zaremba

March 18, 1772

THE troops of the Republic, who hold Great Poland, will no longer be able to remain there because Lapuchin, with a body of two thousand Russians, now holds Peterkow and the most important thoroughfare of the Upper Warta, and Drewitz, with one thousand five hundred men, has his base at Pilica, and cannot be prevented from sending large detachments to the gates of Czenstokow. Moreover, we have been unable to contend successfully against the movements of the troops which the King of Prussia has sent into the Palatinate of Posen, who are continually raising money and supplies necessary for their pay and their subsistence. We cannot contend, with any degree of success, against the King of Prussia, and we are in momentary fear that our troops in the Palatinate of Posen will be completely destroyed without being able to show the slightest resistance. In order to prevent this and with the desire of making the Russians experience some of the difficulties with which our troops are threatened, we now issue orders to Zaremba, Pulawski and Kos-

sakowski to combine all their forces immediately and as secretly as possible in the vicinity of Wielun, and to attempt to take by surprise several points along the Warta, and then march as quickly as possible, and in a body, to Peterkow. If they succeed in surprising Lapuchin, he should be made to suffer the natural consequences of his plight. If he is in an advantageous position to give battle, he must be forced out of it, by at least six hundred cavalry breaking his communication between Rawa and Warsaw. As soon as he starts to move, his corps should be narrowly watched and followed so closely that immediate advantage may be taken of any opportunity to attack him at the proper moment. All forces should be combined and nothing neglected in order to destroy his corps completely, or at least compel it to return to Warsaw. Three thousand men of the best troops of the Confederates, commanded by skilled and courageous leaders, give promise of success.

If Lapuchin is beaten and driven beyond the River Rawa, these three leaders should not lose an instant in returning to Czenstokow. If, as they progress, they ascertain through the detachments which Pulawski will have sent out towards the sources of the River Pilzea as soon as he effects his junction with Zaremba, that Drewitz has taken steps to follow them, in their first movements, and that he is

approaching them, they should not then hesitate to come up to him and fight him, with all their forces, if he concludes to give battle.

If, on the contrary, he withdraws toward Cracow, they need only have him followed and watched by a heavy detachment, and they should return to Czenstokow with all their forces. They will stay there one whole day in order that the troops may rest, plan their further progress, and make the necessary preparations in regard to it, and the same time give Pulawski an opportunity to issue his final orders in regard to the retention of this city, which will be left to its own resources, under a skilled and determined officer to be selected by Pulawski. When these different objects have been attained, Zaremba, Pulawski and Kossakowski will march in the direction of Bobreck, with all their troops, and should so plan the first days of their march that they will be able to cross the Vistula before noon of the following day. The detachment sent out to watch the movements of Drewitz, two days before, will likewise serve to cover the left flank of the march of this cavalry when its leaves Czenstokow. This detachment will itself proceed, as far as it is able to do so, along the high lands between Lelow and Wlodowice as far as the sources of the River Stola, whence it will keep open and guard most carefully all the roads from Cracow. On the day

when the leaders cross the Vistula, battle formation shall be preserved until noon on the heights of Lipowice. As soon as it is positively known that no troops or supplies remain on the left bank of the river, the army will cross at the ford of Bobreck, and then march to Ocwieczim, with Zaremba, Pulawski and Kossakowski, to whom the Generals will send further orders.

If this last movement is executed in good order and quickly it is probable that Suwarow and Branicki will not have time to send a corps of cavalry of any considerable size to aid Drewitz attack with superior numbers Pulawski, Zaremba and Kossakowski while they are on their march from Czenstokow to Bobreck, or at the time they are crossing the Vistula.

COPY

of the Letter of Czettritz, Lieutenant-General in the Service of the King of Prussia, to Sierazewski, Regimentary of Great Poland

Hemstadt, March 22, 1772

I HAVE had the honor of receiving the letter you were kind enough to send me on the 16th of the present month. In order to satisfy you, Sir, it is necessary for me to tell you that it was pursuant to the orders of the King, my master, that I gave commands in the vicinities of Szduni, Koblin, etc., that the forage you mention be gathered. His Majesty has concluded to advance his troops as far as the River Warta, and has accordingly directed me to inform the Confederates that it will be best for them to withdraw their troops from the cities and vicinities of Frauenstadt, Lissa, Rawitz, Szduni, etc. It is the wish of the King, my master (of which I beg you to advise Marshal Zaremba so, as I hope, to avoid any serious consequences for which the Confederation will be to blame) that there be no delay in the evacuation of this territory.

I have the honor to be, etc.

Signed CZETTRITZ

Tenth Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, April 19, 1772

SIR:

The Generals learned yesterday, through a despatch from Prince Jablonowski, whom they had entrusted with their matters at Vienna, that their Imperial Majesties had just contracted a treaty of alliance with the Russians and the King of Prussia, the result of which will be the partition of several palatinates of Poland by these three Powers. Apparently the Confederates will be completely disregarded in this matter. Count Pac, with full power from the Generals, will leave, nevertheless, this afternoon to go to Vienna, where Prince Jablonowski hopes that he may be given an audience by Prince Kaunitz in behalf of the Republican party. I will not make a single private observation to you upon this very extraordinary event, and I only hope that it is in keeping with the intentions of the King and it may contribute to the glory of his reign.

Zaremba has just advised the Generals that he should no longer be regarded as commander of any troops of the Confederation, and that he has returned to their regimentary the commission en-

trusted to him. Count Potocki intended to send into Great Poland tomorrow Marshal Belz to replace Zaremba there, but it is very probable that the Prussians will capture or scatter the few cavalry of the Confederates in that territory before Belz can take command of it. Pulawski appears to have concluded to remain in Czenstokow and defend it, if possible.

For the last eight days the Russians have poured a terrible fire of musketry upon the citadel of Cracow. Choisi was still defending it yesterday morning with the courage that has easily made him the center of admiration here.

Eleventh Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, April 22, 1772

SIR:

As the Russians have hemmed in the citadel of Cracow and are in complete control of all communications between Tiniec and Biala, I have not had any word from Choisi since the beginning of this month. It has been difficult for me to get any news even from Tiniec and Landskron, and all our emissaries came back regularly to report that they have been unable to pass Ocwieczim, where there are six hundred Russians, with artillery. If I were to give credence, however, to all the reports which come from the neighborhood of Cracow, and particularly what has been stated by the Austrian commander who is at Bielitz, who gets trustworthy reports of what occurs in Cracow, the Russians attacked the citadel again last Friday, in full force and were repulsed with a greater loss than they suffered in their attempt of February 29th. Everybody here says that they lost 1,500 men, and that they were unable to get further than half way to the breach which they had made in the great wall of the citadel by pounding away with their cannon for

twelve days. Choisi and his brave companions, Sir, have taken care of themselves extraordinarily well, and I dare say in a manner never before equaled. It is horrible to realize that in the end (and the moment cannot be far off) they will have to yield to superior numbers and that no one is at all certain what fate is in store for them.

I will not dwell upon the recent happenings here, because you are doubtlessly better informed about them, and from sources unavailable to me. From my point of view I simply see that day by day the King of Prussia sends more troops into Poland and that the Austrians are at this moment coming in themselves. An officer whom I had sent to Olmütz to have some weapons made there, tells me today that from that town there goes out an incessant stream of artillery towards Bielitz, and that several regiments of their Imperial Majesties which are in Moravia are about to move in the same direction. Sarnacki, *chargé des affaires* of the Confederation at Eperies has just sent word to the Generals, by means of a courier, that Count Esterhazi is likewise proceeding, at the head of ten thousand Austrians, towards the Hungarian frontier on his way to Poland. My position daily becomes more extraordinary and embarrassing, and I assure you, Sir, that I would worry a great deal less if I could be assured that what occurs here is in full accord with the

intentions of the King, and that it will contribute to the glory and prosperity of his reign. Major Mikelson reached Biala yesterday with a detachment of three hundred cavalry. His Cossacks killed several Austrians of the garrison at Bielitz. Upon receipt of a private letter to the effect that he would not be punished, he went to Bielitz where he was hospitably received by the Austrian commandant, with whom he spent two hours. A thing like this, and the motives behind the departure of Count Pac for Vienna, about which I have previously written, give the Polish Confederates no hope to believe that they will succeed in the cause they have undertaken to defend.

I am, etc.

Twelfth Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL

Teschen, April 29, 1772

I HAVE the honor to enclose herewith a letter I have just received from Choisi and the articles of capitulation which he has just signed, only because he lacked the very necessities of life. I do not know what will be the ultimate fate of this brave garrison, but whatever may be the place it is imprisoned, it will undoubtedly be treated respectfully and humanely. I will send to Choisi the money necessary for him to settle what he owes; but otherwise I shall give no orders. A man of his worth needs neither advice nor precepts as to making the best of things; if he be taken even to Siberia I am sure, Sir, he will make himself loved and respected, and his example will be followed, as the occasion demands, by all the French officers who have so worthily shared his dangers and labors. I will do nothing in regard to them, as the Duke of Aigullon (1) has not informed me of the wishes of the King.

If the Russians immediately attack Tiniec and Landskron, I hope that Duhoux and Elliot distin-

(1) Minister of Foreign Affairs.

guish themselves. These posts are absolutely worthless to everybody, and they can be easily taken by assault; but as they are defended by ten or twelve very resolute French officers and some Poles who are rather willing to fight, I shall not be surprised if the Russians again pay dearly for any advantage they gain.

Duhoux, in command at Tiniec, learned, at ten o'clock in the evening of the 22nd, that seven hundred horsemen, one hundred infantry, and two cannon of the Russians, led by Mickelson, who had controlled for eight days the lines of communication from Tiniec and Landskron to Biala, had just arrived at Scawina, and would pass the night there; despite the weakness of his garrison, this officer immediately decided to order to that town Nostrowski, a Polish Captain, with Lieutenants Clopieki, Kilezewski, Selawinski and Ligonois, and about seventy-five infantry, supported by an officer with forty dragoons. They were to proceed without the slightest noise, and to attack, with bayonets fixed and without shooting, all the Russian posts located on the main road of this village, and then to proceed to the lodgings of the commander and chief officers, capture them and their cannon, and to bring them to Tiniec without losing a minute. This order was carried out with courage and skill; an officer of the guard and more than eighty Russians were killed

on the spot; a major, believed to have been Mickelson and three other officers were very seriously wounded, more than eighty horses were captured, and a large number of horses wounded. A convoy of forage was brought into Tiniec, and the two cannon would have arrived there, too, if Kilizewski, who commanded the little troop escorting them had not been dangerously wounded in a second charge made by two squadrons of cuirassiers who had combined in an effort to recapture their artillery. The detachment of Duhoux returned to Tiniec with considerable money; its entire loss was about twenty men, killed or captured.

This exploit was planned and carried out in less than three hours. If Duhoux had been in a position to attack in greater force, this little body of Russians, who were taken by surprise, would have been completely wiped out. As it was, they lost more than one hundred and fifty men and many more horses.

A Polish officer who comes from Eperies has just told the Generals that Rondnicki surprised and overcame at Jaroslow a body of two hundred Russian cavalry who were on their way towards Leopold; he killed one hundred of them and captured eighty, and set free a like number of Confederates, including Malzan and Donnezac, who were being taken to Polona; if this news is correct I shall be

very glad to see again these two officers who will be very useful to me.

It will be Piwiniecki, one of the Councilors of Kulm, and not Marshal Belz, who will assume command of the troops of Zaremba, in Great Poland. The Generals were informed today that Marshal Zaremba had withdrawn to Pitchina, in Prussian Silesia.

Esterhazi has undoubtedly come into Poland by way of Hungary; here it is publicly stated that Haddick will be in command of all the Austrian troops who are to hold that realm, from Lemberg as far as Cracow.

I am, etc.

COPY

of the Letter of Choisi to Baron Vioménil

In the citadel of Cracow, April 25, 1772

I ENCLOSE, Sir, a copy of the capitulation my situation has compelled me to sign. I owe all the officers their perquisites for three whole months and the soldiers nearly two-thirds of their pay for that period; these items, added to what I have borrowed from several private parties, reaches a total of about three thousand ducats. I do not know the place where I shall be imprisoned; but when you find out, I beg you to send me the money necessary to settle the debts I have contracted and which I look upon as solemn engagements.

I have the honor to be, with the most respectful attachment, etc.

CHOISI

Concessions granted to Choisi, by His Excellency, Major General Suwarow, in the service of Her Majesty, the Empress of all the Russias.

1

Within seventy-two hours from the day this is signed, the garrison of the citadel of Cracow will surrender as prisoners of war and march out of the

citadel unarmed, in companies of one hundred each, at the side of the Brewery, that is to say, next Sunday, April 26, exactly at noon.

2

Until the expiration of the time above designated neither side will fire, not even as a sign of retreat; and no work or restoration of any kind is to be undertaken within the citadel.

3

If the garrison begins hostilities anew before the time designated, the present agreement will be void.

4

No officer or soldier need answer as to his former service, the officers may retain their equipment and the common soldiers their effects.

5

All the property within the citadel which belongs to the Republic, to His Majesty the King, and to the Churches, and the citizens, including military equipment and everything else, shall remain without interference, under the care of commissioners to be appointed.

6

In the interim of the next three days, his Excellency Major-General Suwarow will keep his commissioners in the citadel, from which no person shall depart.

7

There will be furnished to the officers, on their journey, carts for their equipment, and horses for those who have none.

8

All the stores, of every nature, will be delivered up in good faith, as proposed in the first instance by his Excellency Major-General Suwarow, when the garrison evacuates, in the condition in which they then happen to be, without any questions being raised as to supplying what has been used or spoiled.

9

All surgeons, agents, employees, sutlers, and valets, of whom Choisi will furnish a true and correct list before he departs, will be at liberty to accompany the prisoners, or to go where it seems best to them, without fear or molestation provided, however, the foregoing list is true and correct.

10

Officers may retain and take away their horses, according to their rank.

11

The sick and wounded who cannot be moved will be humanely treated.

12

On Sunday, April 26, 1772, the day the garrison is to evacuate and surrender at noon, the main gate

of the citadel, or that of the Seminary, will be opened at half past eleven o'clock and control thereof delivered to the troops of Her Majesty, the Empress of all the Russias.

13

All these several agreements are to be carried out faithfully, after they are signed.
Done at Cracow, April 23, 1772.

ALEX. SUWAROW

JOURNAL

OF THE SIEGE OF THE CITADEL OF CRACOW

by Galibert, a French Officer in the Service of the Polish Confederacy from February 2 to April 22, 1772

From the 2nd to the 9th of February, 1772

CHOISI, a French lieutenant-colonel, the commander of the fortress of Tiniec, a league from Cracow, and situated on the Vistula, where he had eight hundred men under him, was ordered by Baron Viomênil, commander-in-chief of the Confederated troops, to establish a contact with the Poles so that he might get into the city and the citadel of Cracow, by the gates, and by openings made under the direction of some of the Confederates.

Accordingly, on the night of February 1 - February 2, 1772, Choisi left Tiniec with five hundred men. Before dawn he arrived at the indicated points, but found everything closed, and as he had neither cannon nor petard by which he could force or get over the walls, he decided to return to Tiniec, where he arrived at eight o'clock in the morning, without having been seen by the enemy. In order to be successful and carry all positions at once, he had found it necessary to divide his five

hundred men into five companies, of which two were for attack; one commanded by Vioménil, a French captain (a cousin of the Baron) was to proceed against the citadel, and the other, commanded by Saillant, another French captain, was to attack the gate of the city nearest the citadel. Captain Vioménil, having found a hole to enter by, which was nothing but a sewer ditch two feet high and about a foot wide, got his detachment through. He had first cut the throats of five Russian sentinels. Then, although the citadel was guarded by one hundred and twenty men, of whom eighty were Russian grenadiers, he captured it with the loss of only one of his officers and two soldiers, who were killed by the only three shots fired by the enemy.

Saillant, having met the same obstacles as Choisi, was unable to get into the town, and was much chagrined at his misfortune, for he thought that his comrades had succeeded in their respective tasks. Hearing the three shots from the citadel he determined to enter it at any cost. After having gone around its walls twice, he came upon the opening by which Captain Vioménil's men had entered, and although uncertain whether they had won or lost, he entered and found his comrade, Captain Vioménil, with forty-five of his men, busy putting into irons ninety-eight Russians. The Frenchmen had scarcely congratulated themselves on their good

luck when they heard the reports of two cannon and the noise of axes on the entrance gate. They hurried there and found that the enemy had already breached one of the towers. It was almost daylight. Their soldiers, who up to this point had fired but three shots, were so frightened at seeing the Russians make so deliberate an onslaught that if it had not been for the courage of Saillant, who held his ground with a dozen of his men, the citadel and the two French companies would have been captured by the enemy, who poured in three hundred shots and used the bayonet freely. The enemy finally abandoned their attack, leaving on the ground forty-five men. The Confederates lost nine killed and wounded. The enemy charged twice again, but with no more success than at first, and with almost the same loss. The French, having discovered a cannon, the only one in the place, used it ceaselessly, more as a signal that help was needed rather than in the hope of harming the enemy.

Finally, towards noon, this repeated firing was heard at Tiniec, and led Choisi to believe that the one hundred men, whom he had regarded as lost, had succeeded in their mission. He was convinced of this on receiving reports from peasants who told him that they had seen, on the walls of the citadel, men in surplices (these men in surplices were in white shifts like those worn by the rest of the de-

tachment when it had left Tiniec, that they might know one another in the dark). Choisi thereupon hurried back again from Tiniec to Cracow, taking with him some artillery and one hundred horses, against any danger to his little troop. He arrived at the citadel after having repelled several detachments of the enemy which opposed his march.

So, finally, the citadel was taken and held by five hundred men and one hundred hussars, or cossacks, with two cannon. In the magazine were found half a ton of powder, much lead but not a flint, eight hundred sacks of rye, one hundred cheeses, one thousand sacks of oats, a large quantity of hay, twenty bolts of different cloths, two hundred tents for soldiers, and fifty wagons, but not an ounce of flour or beef of any kind.

Choisi wrote on the night of the 2nd of February to Baron Vioménil, asking for a reinforcement of three hundred men, so that he might try to master the country surrounding Cracow and Wielicza, a league distant, where the salt mines, the treasure of Poland, were.

On receiving this letter General Vioménil ordered me to go to Tiniec with three hundred men from my garrison, two cannon, and as large a body of cavalry as could be gathered, and to wait at Tiniec for further orders. Accordingly I left at three o'clock in the morning of February

3rd; and I arrived at the place appointed the same day, at two o'clock in the afternoon, and waited there until eight o'clock in the evening, when I started for Cracow, where, according to my latest instructions, I should arrive no later than four o'clock the next morning. Two Marshals of the Confederation, at the head of four hundred horsemen, joined my detachment and advised me to proceed cautiously, since they had learned that the enemy had made its dispositions in order to hinder my attempt to reach the citadel at Cracow. I accordingly arranged my men in fighting order, pursuant to what these gentlemen were able to tell me about the enemy and its position. After having passed the Vistula, under the cannon at Tiniec, we marched without any hindrance, until we reached a point about a fourth of a league from the city, where I made a new disposition of my men, with the idea in mind of forcing the enemy at different points, where, according to what had been told me, I should find them. As my instructions were to get into the citadel at any cost, I ordered, no matter what the risk, that not a single shot either gun or cannon, should be fired, and that the bayonet alone should be used. I left at one o'clock in the morning and everything was dark. According to my information, I should find the enemy upon two bridges, and I should have to fight

my way through. I was much pleased to cross the first bridge, without seeing or hearing anything, and this made my men feel more secure as they approached the second. The enemy, without a word, let us reach a point about twenty feet from this bridge, and suddenly, just as the captain of my grenadiers and I came up to see how the land lay, there came a blast of mitraille from two cannon, and the next instant the head of my column received the full effect of a volley from two hundred muskets. My men, surprised by this attack, were more confused than I thought they would be, and carried out only half my orders; they began to shoot and wheeled to the right; and it was only with great effort and repeated commands that I kept them together. At the second volley from the enemy, my men again became confused, but as my officers were all well in advance and marching together, the enemy mistook them for the whole body of my troops, retired to the shelter of the city walls, and directed against us the fire of twenty cannon. At this, I cried out that these were our men (and I really thought so) coming to our rescue. On this good news, my whole column marched straight ahead towards the enemy, where I should not have been, if I had not made the mistake of thinking I was approaching the citadel. Imagine my surprise when the light of daybreak showed me that

I was in the rear of the citadel, in the oven, as it were, of the fire from the two towers of the city. And a warm fire it was. Seeing my mistake, furious against my guides who had both deserted me at the first firing, and embittered against Choisi, who should have sent out a force to aid me, I got into the citadel at six o'clock in the morning with two hundred and seven men and one cannon. I could not ascertain exactly how many men I lost, for I had only time to carry in twenty wounded and seven dead of the ninety-three men and an officer whom I have missed. I was compelled to carry in my arms the cannon I saved; I had the other thrown into a ditch, from which it was rescued an hour later by cavalry, which, while the conflict lasted, thought (like the two Polish Marshals) it no concern of theirs to help me, although that had been our arrangement. The reason I had to carry the cannon in, I suppose, was that the cavalry having only heard (but not having felt the effects) of our engagement with the enemy, concluded that in order not to lose everything, they should save the horses for the cannon; but nevertheless, I could not get a horse to draw these, and I was actually obliged to give ten ducats to nine cannoniers who carried in one of them, which makes the third cannon that we now have in our citadel for our defense.

I was scarcely in the place, more harassed and dizzier than I have ever been before in my life, when I had to take my place at the head of a division of four hundred men to get into the city and thence to Wieliczka, if it were possible. Choisi, counting upon my arrival, had everything ready for this new expedition. At the head were twenty grenadiers; after them came one hundred cavalry; I marched with my division, supported by the remainder of the troops in case of necessity; but the cavalry, not used to sharp fighting, after having been under the fire of three cannon and three hundred men, concealed in the houses, firing from the doors and windows, not only came to a sudden halt, but concluded so quickly to get back into the citadel, that it reversed my column and me, and despite what we could do, carried us along with them. Once back in the citadel, there was nothing more to be said.

This unfortunate expedition cost us seventeen horses which were killed, a wounded commander of cavalry, a captain taken prisoner, and forty-three infantry killed or wounded. The whole action took less than six minutes. So here I am in the citadel with a hundred and forty men and ninety-seven horses, counting those of the cavalry and those for the carriages that belong to the cavalry officers, who alone have them; and from the commander down

to the last lieutenant, we have no domestics or other servants except those who happened to be with us. We have these provisions: the wheat which I have mentioned, five milk cows, eleven pigs, about two hundred pounds of bacon, sixty head of fowl, but not an ounce of drugs nor a single remedy for the sick or wounded: a terrible situation. We estimate the enemy to number eighteen hundred infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, all well supplied.

After having repaired the weakest places and made the rule that half of the garrison would always be on guard, and that they would not undress except during the day, we commenced by providing ourselves with hand mills, and regulating our supplies as closely as possible. After February 7th we were unable to communicate with a living soul. By a happy chance the enemy had refused to exchange prisoners with us, and I say this was happy, because we had found among our prisoners workmen of all kinds, who made for us nearly everything we needed. Otherwise we should have had to surrender very soon, since we had much wheat but no flour, and many cannon but no ammunition.

All the soldiers of the garrison were rationed after February 5th to one and a half pounds of bread and a pound of *cacha.* The bread is made from pure rye and its bran, and the *cacha* from

crushed barley, boiled with water and salt. We had more than we wanted of this last relish. Each officer was limited to a half pound of cow meat, or to one fourth of bacon, if they preferred the latter. The chickens are kept for the sick, to whom bread is given, however, when they can eat it. The wounded and sick soldiers are allowed six ounces of cow meat, and the whole garrison given hay to sleep on.

In the citadel, which is surrounded by a plain wall thirty feet high, is the King's palace, of which nothing remains but the bare walls, and the roofs. There is a beautiful church where the Kings are enthroned and some of them are buried. It is filled with costly articles. There is also a seminary of Lazaristes, a small parish, and three houses of secular priests, whose duty is to conduct divine services in the church for the ecclesiastics, including the bishop, all of whom live in the town.

There were thirty private houses which we destroyed to obtain wood for fuel. There were several stone houses, but now all in ruins. In them the Courts of Justice were held. We found in these houses two hundred men and women of the town, whom we employed with the prisoners, at turning the wheat mills.

The citadel is situated on a hill which rises above the Vistula, between the city and the faubourg of Casimir, which both lie in the low plain.

The city is of the size of Agen, and is surrounded by a strong wall, flanked by towers. There are about sixteen to twenty thousand people in it. The faubourg of Casimir is served by the same defenses, and contains about four thousand inhabitants.. About one-fifth in both places are Jews, who carry on most of the business. There is a very ordinary bridge of boats. During the past four years there were two thousand houses burned in the different other faubourgs, among which were some that were pretentious. There are a number of monks and nuns, much exterior devotion, but little that is sincere. The priests and the monks drink Hungarian and Bordeaux wines.

The principal commerce of Cracow is in grain; there are only Jews and Catholics. The women are not very beautiful, but the men are extremely well set up and strong. All the nobles live in the country, where expenses are slight, in order to economize for the main and departmental Assemblies, where they shine and live extravagantly. The entire nation is extremely poor and unhappy, and wedded to extravagance. The soil is very good, and the climate very healthful, although a trifle cold. Fresh fish is in abundance. Beef is of good quality and game is plentiful. The only work done in the fields is sowing, and this only every three years. The pasturage is good and the horses are excellent. As

there are no inns except among the Jews, the traveling nobility puts up at the houses of friends without any ceremony. They carry their own beds in preference to sleeping on straw.

February 8th

We are absolutely hemmed in by the enemy, and the woman who brought us news of our people ran so many risks that she is unwilling to endanger her life again. We now have only the cistern water. I am sick indeed, more so than anybody else; everybody pays tribute to Nature; for colic there are absolutely no remedies. I have taken baths which have done me some good.

As a detailed statement of our maneuvers and those of the enemy would be very tiresome, I confine myself to reporting the principal facts which from this day helped little by little to seal us up almost hermetically, in our cage, and kept us from showing ourselves at the windows. Happily the enemy have no big cannon or otherwise we should soon have breaches in our walls, which are seven to eight feet thick without any earth surrounding them. The deplorable state of eighty-five wounded men, without any remedies led our Commander to ask Suwarow (the Russian Commander), for medicine for the officers at least. He refused to give us any, and instead sent us a dozen pounds of tobacco,

and proposed that the wounded officers be paroled, on condition that they would not serve anew against Russia and the King of Poland. The terrible condition of Charlot's only son, whose leg was broken, led to a decision to profit by this offer. Except for one hundred shot of cannon and two thousand gun shots, exchanged every day without any effect, nothing interesting has happened up to date.

February 9th

After a detailed search we found a few sides of bacon and some millet in the burying vault in the Church, and several bottles of Hungarian wines in the shrines of the Saints, where, of course, it had not spoiled. Preparations were made for defense continuously.

From the 10th to the 20th of February

The enemy established a bridge of communication over the Vistula. We burned one hundred and twenty houses in order to defend the approaches to the citadel. We lost about twenty men.

There was firing on both sides. The enemy is making parallels and approaches to the wall, and we made three sallies in the night. We tried unsuccessfully to make beer, but we had success in making whiskey from grain. We had thirteen deserters, who escaped by ropes from the windows.

Two soldiers of the enemy announced themselves as deserters, and said that they had some secret to communicate to the Commander. An officer presented himself and told them that he was the Commander; at this these villains shot at him and ran away. The enemy gave us two surprises at night. We have had nine more deserters, and the preparations made by the enemy indicate an assault. We have dug entrenchments and have neglected nothing that will strengthen our forces. We have had absolutely no word from our people.

February 29th

The enemy made a general assault. All of their cavalry dismounted and took position in the houses which we had not been able to burn. They poured in a hellish fire. Eighteen hundred of their infantry marched against different places. The attack commenced at two o'clock in the morning, while it was still quite dark. One of their columns of eight hundred men, the greatest part grenadiers, attempted to force the gate with a petard, with no result.

They chopped a hole large enough for four men to pass through together, but the trenches which we had made, as well as the batteries, where we had cannon twelve feet from the ground floor, gave us the advantage of riddling them with musket

and bayonet. The enemy lost three hundred men and withdrew at six o'clock in the morning, after a hot contest. While this was in progress, one thousand men in two columns attacked and tried to force two false gates, but our entrenchments gave us the same advantage that we had at the main gate. They left one hundred men on the ground, and carried away as many more, whom they threw into the river. Moreover, our cannon at the gate and our fire and bayonets, and our cavalry which we had posted on the ramparts, have done them unbelievable damage. The latter severely damaged them with stones when they attempted to put their ladders against the wall. Of these they left forty-two.

This affair must have cost them more than six hundred men. We lost a major, a captain, two lieutenants, and sixty-eight soldiers. It is estimated that we fired three hundred and eighty-eight cannon shots and thirty thousand gun shots. The enemy fired more, especially with the cannon.

From the 2nd of March to the 8th of March

We had fifteen deserters. We repaired the damage made by the breaches in the wall, and have increased our defenses, even to fortifying the church, and in the bell tower we have put guards. We have taken all the candles, tallow, and oil to light

up the posts during the night, both in the churches and in the private houses. We hear much shooting outside; the enemy made two general sallies against us, which kept us under arms all night. We burned thirty more houses near the citadel and the enemy as many more on their side. From Landskron, signals were given us, which we could not understand. Beginning with the 7th, the officers and the soldiers in actual service were given a pot of whiskey.

From the 8th to the 15th of March

We sent a janizary with news of us in the hope that he would bring us back news of our people, for we know not what has become of them.

The enemy made three sallies against us. These kept us busy. We had thirteen deserters, and many sick. Our wounded are almost dead. We had neither meat nor remedies to aid them. Some of our people, to the number of about four hundred cavalry, appeared on the hill. The enemy, to the number of several thousand, went out against them with cannon, and we heard much shooting. That is all we know. The enemy work more than ever at their parallels and this makes us think they fear help is coming to us, and this gives us great hope and joy. The enemy has begun to use thirteen pound balls against us.

We sent an officer to our people and we saw a signal that he reached them, but we know no more. The attack of the enemy is incessant night and day. They keep firing grenades and bombs, and we are ever on the alert, as we have no cannon or casemates, nor anything else of service. Once in a while we see our people on the two banks of the river and that is all. The wounded and sick officers are paying high prices for the tower rooks and sparrows to make their soup.

From the 15th to the 22nd of March

We had six deserters, many sick died, and horses were killed and given to eat, that is, three ounces to each soldier, and five to each officer. We found it very good. Nearly everybody suffered from dysentery, which came to pass.

The Generals, through the Commander of the city, have written to the Commander of the citadel. They ask us not to put to use any papers from the archives of the citadel or the Chancery offices, on which are recorded the titles and the properties of the greater part of the Poles. Our answer was sent back without any delay, by the same channel; it was that as as soon as we had used up all the title-deeds and papers, we would have recourse to the missals and to the parchment in the church to make cartridges, large and small. The enemy sallied against us

twice. The garrison is overrun with vermin. No one has a second shirt, but, happier than the others I have two, one is a woman's and the other is made from the curtain which covered the statue of Saint Casimir, as to which the chief priest has given me absolution. I have only a few lice, but good appetite and good health, thanks to two flasks of Tokay wine which I stole from a priest.

We discovered a conspiracy of forty soldiers who were about to desert and deliver up the citadel. Several were put to death and the others into irons.

From the 22nd of March to the 1st of April

Much powder is burned on both sides night and day. In place of *cacha* we are now given *barch. Barch* is made with crushed oats fermented with water. We are able to make ten hogsheads from a bag of oats. It is a trifle bitter, and the soldiers make soup of it, adding horse meat and bread.

We succeeded in getting off news of our condition by a soldier of whose fate we know nothing. The enemy made another sally against us; much powder was burned. We had nine deserters. The Commander gave us a lovely meal; after several plates of horse meat, he served us a warm patty, composed of a stewed cat, seven rooks and eighty sparrows. The enemy raised several batteries and

redoubts and strengthened all their works on both banks of the Vistula.

For services rendered by me as Commander at Landskron, I was given two pounds of good honey and three bunches of garlic, out of which I made several succulent meals.

From the 1st to the 8th of April

Fourteen deserters. Sparrows are selling for twenty cents each, the rooks as high as eighty cents. Much powder is burned. Many of the denizens died for lack of food. Some of them work ceaselessly at the hand mills. At midnight fourteen rockets were sent up at Tiniec, accompanied by a cannonade. We were not able to guess what this meant. We heard much cannonading in the direction of Landskron.

The enemy work harder than ever in finishing their trenches. They have made two hundred trenches in the town and have fortified all the houses. We are tired and worn out, but still have courage and good health, good appetite, but slight hopes. Soldiers and officers smoke hay and make snuff out of burned rye. This is the one trouble I am spared.

From the 8th to the 15th of April

We are without news of our people. Sixty-one days have now passed and we know nothing about

the existence today of any beings in the world except the Russians, who will not let us forget theirs. They unmasked yesterday morning at six o'clock a battery of four thirteen pounders, which so surprised us that they almost served us a bad turn. In order to conceal themselves at the foot of our walls, they had placed their battery on an old ruin. After having fired one hundred volleys or so, the ground gave way under them. This gave us not only pleasure, but an opportunity to repair the breach they had just made in the wall, against which we would have had no defense but bayonets. We were also able to dig trenches which would give them additional trouble. Of the three cannon which we had, they have broken the best. It was a great loss to us.

We attempted in vain to send through a captain with news of our situation, but the enemy observed us so closely that it was impossible for him to get through, even by the river, on which they have now established guards. The enemy have burned near us a stack of hay of sixty-thousand hundredweight, and every day have set fire to some corner of the citadel. We have had fourteen deserters, and we have discovered and punished a party of Russian prisoners, who had murdered their guard and tried to escape.

The garrison at Landskron signaled to us with five rockets, which we saw, but we were unable to

understand their significance. The Prior of the Seminary where I sleep had a horse killed as a *Passover Lamb* for the seminarians, who are all included in the number of our workers, and who are on the same rations. We have given them a holiday of five days this week, which is Holy Week, for their offices, which they perform without candles.

From the 15th to the 22nd of April

The enemy brought out a battery to breach the walls and so overcome us. They fired, from the 14th to the 17th, at least five hundred cannon shots, and the breach of the tower is advanced. LaSerre, a French colonel in the service of the Confederacy, was dangerously wounded, and many soldiers were killed or wounded. All of our first wounded died for lack of remedies and bouillon. The misery increases; the whole garrison goes barefoot, as there are no shoes. I have made for myself, out of horsehide, a pair of slippers which I wear without any stockings, for the best possible reason. Happily there has never been so beautiful a spring as this; it is weeks earlier than usual. We are without a single bit of news of our friends. It appears inconceivable to us, but it must be that they can do nothing. We officers have many reasons to fear the impatience of our soldiers, since terrible evils do

not lead to the Marshal's baton, nor even to sufficient bread to exist, in case of mutilation. The enemy have made a second breach in the wall. We spent all night at bivouac. We are most miserable, and desertions increase; two Russian officers have deserted us, and I think that we are right in suspecting that our Polish officers helped them escape, for the Poles are to be feared as much as our enemy, who have made their second breach in the walls of the church, above the ashes of the Kings of Poland. The church, which is one of the finest, is on the point of being destroyed; and all its treasures, which consist of the shrines of the Saints, sacred vessels, and all the implements for the coronation of the Kings, will probably be stolen. I feel well; within twenty-four hours there ought to be something new.

April 22nd at 3 o'clock in the afternoon

Two large breaches in the wall, and the failure of our supply of flints, and the increase in the heavy artillery which has come to the enemy, compel us to capitulate. We are made prisoners of war, and keep all our equipment, and we shall be conducted to Léopol (or Lemberg) until further orders.

FINIS

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

Lauzun Choisy Count Viomenil St. Simon Fersen Damas Chastellux Baron Viomenil De Barras De Grasse Rochambeau
Laval-Montmorency Custine

THE FRENCH COMMANDERS AT THE SURRENDER OF CORNWALLIS

COURTESY OF THE GALLERY OF FINE ARTS, YALE UNIVERSITY

From the Painting by John Trumbull

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

THE autograph letter of Baron Vioménil written at Versailles, March 5, 1782, and reproduced, transcribed and set over into English near the end of this volume, led me to a study of his career, and, as an aid to that study, I have translated the present volume, which deals mainly with the first Partition of Poland, from a French viewpoint. I pretend, of course, to no authority upon the subject of the partition of Poland, nor to any skill as a translator or writer. I have thought, however, that the publication of my translation with all its faults may later save time and labor for others of an inquiring mind. I hope I have made no blunders or serious mistakes.

In view of the several harsh criticisms of Dumourier, in the text, I think it important to point out that Lord Acton, in his *Lectures on the French Revolution* (p. 224), pictures Dumourier as praiseworthy. Dumourier, in his *Memoirs,* describes Baron Vioménil (1772) as a brilliant soldier, with a rising star. The sketch of Dumourier (*supra,* pp. 11-45) is evidently the work of a partisan.

Lord Acton (p. 237) concludes that although seven thousand nobles had been expected to appear at the Tuileries at the supreme moment of August 10, 1792 (when Vioménil was mortally wounded), in defense of Louis XVI, scarcely one hundred and twenty appeared.

Philip Sagnac's *La Revolution du 10 Août, 1792 (La Chute de la Royauté)* (Paris, 1909) is an excellent minutely critical study of its subject, and should be trans-

lated into English. Of the activities of Vioménil on this fateful day in the history of France, I hope later to render a full account.

As I expect also to publish considerable material about Vioménil, bearing mainly upon his service in the American Revolution, I now confine myself to a few comments upon the text and upon Vioménil, Choisi and others, named in the text, who were participants in the American Revolution.

Teschen, where Vioménil wrote, is a town in Silesia, once an appanage of Lorraine.

On page 47 of the text it appears that Vioménil died in February, 1793, after the execution of Louis XVI (on January 21st, 1793) and in other works other dates are given.

It is clear, however, that he died on October 31, 1792, *rue Coq Heron No. 65,* and was buried the next day. For this information, I am indebted to the inquiring mind and rare scholarship of Mr. Warrington Dawson, whose deep study of many phases of the French participation in the American Revolution has incidentally earned him an accolade, justly bestowed by General John J. Pershing, in his speech at the Sesqui-Centennial celebration of the siege of Yorktown. Through the kindness of Mr. Dawson, the present Marquis de Montmort, who is descended from Baron Vioménil's only daughter (who married the Marquis de Montmort, an aide-de-camp of the Baron in America), has sent to me the gist *de l'acte de décès du baron de Vioménil.* I think I cannot imagine the pains Mr. Dawson has taken for me, and I hope that when the results of all the historical investigations which have

recently engaged him are permanently formulated (1), he will feel that I have not been a hindrance. Space does not permit me to give the details of the particular investigation by him which has been so helpful to me, but I cannot refrain from quoting the words of the aged, infirm Marquis de Montmort to Mr. Dawson: *Voici, Monsieur, cette affaire, interessante du fait, de la recherche couronée de succes qu'elle a occasionné.*

Baron Vioménil was an idol of the French army which arrived at Newport early in July, 1780. As second in command, he naturally enjoyed the confidence of Rochambeau, who selected him to direct the French expedition to the Maryland waters in March, 1781, in an attempt to help the Americans capture the traitor Arnold. A British fleet, however, engaged the French squadron, thus prevented it from entering Chesapeake Bay, and thus rendered the expedition practically futile.

In the early summer of 1781, under Rochambeau, Baron Vioménil directed the movement of the French army from Newport, Rhode Island, to Philipsburg, near the present town of Greenburg, in Westchester County, New York. The itinerary follows: By boats from Newport to Providence, and thence on foot to Waterman, Plainfield, Windham, Bolton, East Hartford, Farmington, Baron's Tavern, Breakneck, Newton, Ridgebury, North Castle, to Philipsburg. The average day's march was fifteen miles.

In July and early August of 1781, the French and Americans in Westchester County maneuvered about the

(1) See Dawson's *Les Français Morts pour l'Indépendance Américaine de Septembre, 1781 à Août, 1782, and La Reconstruction Historique de Williamsburg* (l'Oeuvre Latine, Paris, 1931).

country north of Manhattan Island, with no apparent results. On August 14, 1781, Washington and Rochambeau reached their decision to go to Virginia and contend with Cornwallis; for it was then certain that De Grasse, with a powerful French fleet, would strive for the mastery of the middle Atlantic waters. The French marched north from what is now Greenburg to Verplanck's Point, the eastern terminus of the ancient King's Ferry (about thirty-six miles, as the crow flies, from the Battery on Manhattan Island), and crossed by boats to Stony Point, on the west bank of the Hudson River. Thence by way of West Haverstraw they marched southwest to Suffern, in New York, just north of the division line between that State and New Jersey. From Suffern they went along the east bank of the Ramapo River through Pompton Plains and Parsippany to Whippany, New Jersey. Here Rochambeau left the army in command of Vioménil and rode ahead to meet Washington (who had ridden south by the Jersey roads farther east) at Princeton, whence the two allied chiefs galloped to Philadelphia. Under Vioménil, the French marched from Whippany to Bullion's Tavern (now Liberty Corner) and thence probably through the heart of the Watchung Mountains by way of Martinsville to the present day Millstone, formerly Somerset Court House, on the west bank of the Millstone River. In its early stages the allied movement was an apparent threat upon New York City or Staten Island. Princeton, Trenton, The Red Lion Tavern, and Philadelphia, were next passed (there was a joyful parade in the last city), and while Washington and Rochambeau rode furiously ahead from Chester, at the rate of sixty miles a day, the main body of the French, under Vioménil,

marching fifteen miles daily, passed through Chester, Newport (in Delaware) and the Head of Elk (now Elkton) to the Susquehanna Ferry, opposite what is now Havre de Grace. Boats were obtained with great difficulty, and on September 10, 1781, the French army was on the south bank of the river. Three days later Vioménil reached Baltimore, where a halt was made, until it could be determined whether vessels would be available or the long overland journey regretfully undertaken. Through De Grasse, boats were furnished, which were sent to Annapolis, a three days' march from Baltimore. The voyage of one hundred seventy-eight miles down Chesapeake Bay to Jamestown took four days; and on September 28th, 1781, the French encamped before Yorktown, and, with the Americans, began to set the stage for the final act of the siege and capture of Cornwallis.

With a small American contingent, twenty-four year old Lafayette, highly praised by Washington and Rochambeau, had for five months played hide and seek with the British forces; but he resolutely restrained De Grasse from attacking Cornwallis until France and America were at hand in full strength.

Baron Vioménil was a chief figure in the victory, for during the siege he, his brother, Chastellux, and Saint-Simon, in turn, directed, in the field, the French operations, and on October 14, 1781, he effected the critical attack upon two important British redoubts, the capture of which hastened the surrender of Cornwallis and led to peace.

In February, 1782, Vioménil, both for family reasons and the better care of his leg, upon which a horse had stepped in the preceding Summer, sailed from Virginia

to France. He returned to America in the early Fall of 1782, with a large consignment of gold, which would have been captured by the British, except for his courage and determination.

The French army, after its winter stay in Virginia, was then marching north. Rochambeau, at Crompond, New York, again gave over the command to Vioménil, whom he directed to lead the troops to Boston, which they reached in the last days of November, 1782, while Rochambeau was thankfully preparing for his early departure from Baltimore for France. During the last days of December, Vioménil embarked the French army at Boston, where he was the center of attraction at a town meeting at which the Massachusetts patriots addressed to him the formal thanks of their fellow-citizens. The soldiers under Vioménil sailed to the Carribbean, and after long suffering and buffeting reached France in June, 1783. For most of them it had been an absence of three years. With other French commanders, Vioménil became a member of the Order of Cincinnati.

There is a letter from Washington to Vioménil, dated at Newburgh, on June 11, 1783, revealing the Virginian *du mot juste: You have contributed,* he writes to the Baron, *Largely to the Establishment of this rising Empire and to yourself have secured a lasting Fund of Glory.*

* * * *

Choisi, the leading active French soldier in the Polish adventure, related in the preceding pages, obtained all his promotions by valor, and was a rare example of a common soldier who rose to high command. He resigned

as *mestre-de-camp* in order to come to America. He did not accompany the general body of troops, but left France on June 25, 1780, and arrived at Newport on September 30, 1780, on the *Gentille,* with nine other officers, after having touched at Cape Français (now Haitien), Santo Domingo. With him were the brothers Berthier. There is no glimpse of him in the French diaries until June, 1781. According to Balch, the field artillery followed Rochambeau's army by land from Newport to Annapolis, while the siege artillery was held at Newport, under Choisi, who was in command of five hundred French soldiers and a thousand American militia. The squadron of DeBarras also remained.

On August 14, 1781, at Dobb's Ferry, New York, Washington and Rochambeau concluded to march south to co-operate with DeGrasse, and Rochambeau, on August 19th, advised DeBarras of the necessity for an early junction with DeGrasse. On August 21st, Choisi embarked his men and artillery upon the ten vessels comprising the squadron of DeBarras. To guard the hospital at Providence he left one hundred men, under Desprez, a fifty-year old major of the Deux-Ponts regiment, who was probably his valiant officer, Després, of Cracow (*supra,* pp. 131, 138, 164-5). On August 24, 1781, about three o'clock in the afternoon, at the halting place of the French army, three miles south of Stony Point, New York, Rochambeau received word from Choisi that he had embarked. Only the chiefs knew his destination. The subordinate officers were left wondering, for another week, as to the real objective of the allied French and Americans.

DeBarras, the senior of DeGrasse in service, and therefore free to follow his own judgment, yielded command with but little grace, but, yet, to his honor, placed himself under the orders of DeGrasse. To reach the Virginia waters from Newport, without interference from the British navy, he sailed from Providence about three hundred miles east into the open sea, then due south about the same distance, and then with all speed, westerly into Albemarle Bay, whence he sent out a cutter which returned with the glad news that DeGrasse had defeated Hood and Graves, and was in undisputed control of the sea, the essential factor for victory against England. Choisi was thus enabled to land his five hundred men, the siege guns, and stores, early in October, upon the north bank of the James River at Trubell Landing, about five miles from Williamsburg, in sight of the encampment of the French troops (among them the Gâtinois regiment) which DeGrasse had brought from the West Indies. Their commander was St. Simon.

Rochambeau upon his arrival from the north sent Choisi to DeGrasse, who, after considerable argument, consented to let him have eight hundred marines for shore service. *Tell me what I am expected to accomplish,* Choisi writes to Rochambeau from DeGrasse's flag-ship on September 29, 1781, *and I will do the impossible to carry out your orders.* Rochambeau gave him command on the Gloucester side of the York; under him were French marines, Lauzun and his eight hundred horsemen, and Weedon, with one thousand American militia. The latter, a pacific figure, who had been gently eased out of his command by Rochambeau and Washington, through their selection of Choisi, an older officer, was frightened by the latter's audacity and bravery.

On October 8th, Rochambeau, in great good humor, wrote Choisi that he must harry Tarleton's corps, *whose one hundred horses, judged by those we saw lying dead in the roads, are like those described in the Apocalypse,* and he adds, *My dear Choisi, you are a warrior; . . . hem him in.* His postscript (it was ten days before Cornwallis surrendered) indicates the veteran of fifteen sieges: *We shall be in the trenches soon, and I think this is not going to be a long drawn out affair.* Choisi, in an impetuous charge, which he made with the legion of Lauzun, had broken up Tarleton's cavalry on October 3rd, and, on October 10th, quickly repelled with shells and artillery a detachment of British who had embarked on flat boats at Yorktown in an attempt to turn his position west of Gloucester. He was ready to carry Gloucester by assault, when he received word that the articles of surrender had been signed by Cornwallis.

In February, 1782, Choisi was sent South, with Lauzun's legion, to reinforce General Greene, before Charleston, but at Washington's suggestion he was halted at Charlotte Court House, eighty miles southwest of Richmond, as it was indicated that the British would (as they did) eventually evacuate South Carolina and Georgia.

Choisi accompanied Rochambeau upon his return to France. They sailed on the *Emeraude* from Annapolis on January 11, 1783. It cleared the Capes (Henry and Charles) on January 14, 1783. Others aboard were Chastellux, Béville, Damas and the entire staff and aides, except de Fersen, who had sailed from Boston with the French troops under Baron Vioménil.

Choisi was appointed *maréchal-de-camp* and promised the governorship of a fortified place. He became a member of the Cincinnati. Lauzun, invariably keen to write down a fellow's weakness, describes him thus: *He was very brave and feared nothing; but had a quick and violent temper.*

* * * *

In the spring of 1934 *L'Excelsior* of Paris published a series of scholarly articles by Count Bondy. A faded writing in his possession indicates Choisy, the son of a lawyer, was born at Moulins, Allier (Central France), on January 28, 1723. Like Rochambeau and Baron Vioménil, he was a young soldier at Fontenoy in 1745. For the Polish scene Count Bondy relies mainly upon the original of the foregoing work, but he cites other compilations. He indicates Choisy wrote a narrative of the siege of Cracow, now lost or destroyed. Some of the Count's articles are devoted (with a light touch) to Suwarow, the Russian commander (*supra, passim*); others trace the correspondence of Choisy and influential French courtiers and clerics, friends of Baron Vioménil. Count Bondy comes to no definite conclusion as to the time and place of Choisy's death. Captain Philippe Tiersonnier, of Moulins, writes me, however, that if Choisy was born there January 28, 1723, and baptized the next day in the Church of *St. Pierre les Menestraux,* destroyed during the French Revolution, he did not return to Moulins in his declining days. It appears from the investigations of M. Henry Faure, *docteur ès lettres,* reported in the (rare) Bulletin for January 29, 1903, of the *Réunion des Officiers de Resérve et de l'Armée Territoriale de la Region (Moulins),* that Choisy was still alive on March 27, 1793,

in retirement at Montfermeil, now in the department of Seine et Oise, near Paris. It was the opinion of M. Faure that Choisy died at Montfermeil.

In the American Revolution, besides Baron Vioménil and Major Després, Choisi must have met these other companions of his adventure in Poland:

(1) Ménonville (*supra* p. 135), a descendant of an English family that took refuge in France during the troubles caused by the establishment of the Church of England. Ménonville accompanied Vioménil upon the expedition to the Chesapeake in March, 1781, in the effort to capture Arnold, and his skilful management helped bring about the surrender at Yorktown. He became a lieutenant-general in 1782.

(2) Count, afterwards Marquis, Vioménil, a brother of the Baron, and likewise an army idol. He died, a peer of France, in 1827, in his ninety-third year, after a long and distinguished career in peace and war. The Prince of Condé regarded him as his right arm. He was M. Du Houx, the commandant at Tiniec (*supra* p. 193). He came to America as a major-general with Rochambeau's troops and evidently sailed with them from Boston in December, 1782. He should not be confused with his cousin, the Baron's *petit parent* (*supra* p. 131), who was not, as there stated, the Count, but

(3) Antoine Louis du Houx, Chevalier de Vioménil, who, as a prisoner of war, was sent, after Choisi's surrender at Cracow, to Russia, whence he returned to France, after eighteen months, in October, 1773. He served as first aid-de-camp of the Baron, in America. There is a slight indication that in 1786 his mind was affected, but this is not clear.

Upon the American scene several Poles appeared, but I am unable to state that any of them had seen service in co-operation with the French in Poland, though it is apparent that Pulawski (p. 13 *et passim supra*) is Casimir Pulaski (1748-1779), who fell at Savannah. His memory is revered by Americans of every extraction.

Tadeusz Kosciusko (1746-1817) is not named in the text, unless by way of an unrecognizable variant. He was a leader for Polish freedom in 1786-1794, after his return from America, where he had displayed engineering ability, particularly at West Point, the fortifications of which he planned. A monument there fitly marks his memory.

* * * *

It should, moreover, be noted that few Frenchmen participated more actively in the colonial history of America than Bougainville, the friend of Belcour, *supra,* page 49. If DeGrasse had released a larger contingent of his marines for shore service at Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, their commander, from the viewpoint of Rochambeau, was to have been Bougainville, who was Choisi's senior in service.

In Balch's *The French in America* Bougainville is sketched thus:

Louis-Antoine Count de Bougainville, born at Paris the 11th of November, 1729, died the 30th of August, 1811. Son of a notary of Paris, he studied in that city and first intended to follow the law, although joining the Black Musketeers. At the age of twenty-five he was intimate with Alembert and Clairaut, and published his *Traité de Calcul Intégral.* In 1753 he started as aid-major in the

provincial battalion of Picardie, and Cheverst, who commanded the camp of Sarrelouis, chose him as aide-de-camp. He went to London in 1754, was made member of the Royal Society, and returned with the Duke de Mirepois for the war of 1755. As aide-de-camp, with the brevet of lieutenant of dragoons, he joined his former general, who was commanding a camp of maneuvers at Metz. Captain in 1756, he was attached as aide-de-camp to the Marquis de Montcalm, who was leaving for Canada. His activity in this campaign won him the rank of quartermaster (1) of the principal corps in that army. He was wounded on the 5th of July, 1758, at Ticonderoga, while victoriously defending the fort against Abercrombie. Bougainville returned to Paris, sent by Montcalm to ask for succor. He obtained only four hundred recruits and some ammunition. Still Louis the Fifteenth appointed him colonel in waiting of the regiment of Rouergue and chevalier of Saint-Louis, despite his short service. He rejoined his general in 1759. He covered the retreat to Quebec, and after Montcalm had been killed on the 15th of September, 1759, Bougainville kept up the fight for a year, and then surrendered. Canada was lost to France. Bougainville returned to France in 1761.

Bougainville served in Germany in 1762. Then, in 1763, he obtained permission to change his title of colonel for that of naval captain. He had built at Saint Malo the *Aigle,* of twenty guns, and the *Sphinx,* of twelve guns, and sailed on the 15th of September with families from Acadia, and landed in the Malouin Islands on the 3rd of February, 1764. He founded there a colony which he had

(1) *Maréchal des logis.*

to give up the following year to Spain. He returned by the Pacific, making discoveries, from 1767 to 1769.

When war broke out in 1778 he commanded the *Bien Aimé* under the orders of Lamotte Piquet. In 1779 he was appointed fleet commander, and took command of the *Languedoc* as flag captain to Count d'Estaing. The same year he was made *maréchal-de-camp* and participated in various combats fought in the Antilles against Hood. At Grenada, against Lord Byron, he commanded the *Guerrier,* whose maneuvers were excellent.

At the action of Chesapeake Bay, on the 5th of September, 1781, Bougainville commanded, on the *Auguste,* the vanguard of the fleet of Count de Grasse. The English ship *Terrible* was taken, and Washington and Rochambeau considered that the victory was due to Bougainville (1).

The following year he participated in the capture of Saint Christopher. The 25th and 26th of January, 1782, he fought in the vanguard against Admiral Hood. On the 12th of April at the fatal action of the Saints, with his ship, the *Auguste,* he covered the *Northumberland,* which was in danger, and remained until he had rallied

(1) Good action of Bougainville at the battle in Chesapeake Bay. Seven vessels against fourteen.

"When General Washington and General Rochambeau came to compliment him (de Grasse) on the battle, de Grasse told them that the compliments were due to me as having commanded the vanguard and personally fought the *Terrible.*"

Extract from a letter of Bougainville to de Vaudreuil, shown to me (Balch) by M. Pierre Margry, the learned archivist of the Ministry of Marine, to whom I (Balch) owe much useful information.

eight ships, which he brought back first to Saint Eustatius, then to Cape Français (1). In 1783 he received the decoration of the Cincinnati and was made member of the Academy of Science, Vice Admiral in 1790, senator under the Empire, and grand officer of the Legion of Honor.

(1) See the report of the council of war who judged his conduct in this battle.

Letter
of BARON VIOMÉNIL
ON THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN

A Versailles, le 5 mars 1782 (par duplicata)

Je viens d'arriver en France, Monsieur Le Marquis, et je me suis empressé comme vous imaginez bien de demander au ministre ce qui avait été fait pour vous, et pour messieurs les officiers du Rgt. de Gatinois. Vous avez été fait brigadier ainsi que M. de l'Estrade, et toutes les autres grâces que vous avez demandées ont eté accordées, aux commissions de lieutenants colonels et de major près, sur lesquelles M. de Ségur ne s'est laissé entamer par qui que ce soit. M. de Sireuil était mort avant mon départ de Williamsburg. Nous l'avons tous regretté. Il a été accordé des pensions à MM. ses frères, à sa considération. M. de Sillègues et le plus grand nombre de vos blessés étaient presque guéris. MM. de Carrére et de Foucault n'ont pas été oubliés pour des grâces. Le dernier a eu l'assurance d'une majorité, indépendamment de la croix de St-Louis. Com[me] je sais qu'on vous a adressé l'état des grâces a[ccordées]



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A LETTER FROM BARON DE VIOMÉNIL
TO MARQUIS DE ROSTAING
COLONEL OF THE GÂTINOIS REGIMENT



à votre régiment par triplicata, je me dispense de vous l'envoyer. Si j'avais eu plus d'influence vous eussiez été encore plus content. Je n'ay du moins laissé ignorer à qui que ce soit la distinction avec laquelle votre régiment avait servi au siège d'York, et particulièrement à l'attaque à la redoute. Le bon exemple donné par les chefs n'a pas été oublié. Ma profession de foy à cet égard, Monsieur Le Marquis, doit vous répondre de l'intérêt que je prends à tout ce qui le compose. Faites, je vous prie, que Messieurs de Gatinois recoivent avec bonté mes homages et mes voeux, et croyez que ceux que je fais particulièrement pour vous seront aussi durables que les sentiments de fidèle attachement avec lequel j'ay l'honneur d'être, Monsieur Le Marquis, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur.

VIOMÉNIL

At Versailles, March 5, 1782 (in duplicate)

I have just arrived in France, Monsieur le Marquis (1), and I have hurried as you may well imagine to ask at the ministry what has been done for you and for the officers of the Regiment of Gatinois. You have been made brigadier and so has M. de L'Estrade (2), and all the others favors which you have asked for have been granted, as far as the commissions of lieutenant-colonels and major-aids as to which M. de Ségur (3) does not usually permit himself to be approached by everybody. M. de Sireuil (4) had died before my departure from Williamsburg (5). We all regretted him. There were granted pensions to his brothers, out of respect for him. M. de Sillègues (6) and the greater number of your wounded were almost recovered. MM. de Carrére (7) and de Foucault (8) have not been forgotten as to favors. The latter has had the promise of a majorate, independently of the cross of St. Louis. As I know that there has been sent to you, in triplicate, the list of the favors granted to your regiment, I dispense with sending them to you myself. If I had had more influence, you would be still more content. At any rate, I have not permitted anybody to remain uninformed of the distinction with which your regiment served at the siege of York, and particularly in the attack on the redoubt. The good example given by the leaders has not been forgotten. My profession of faith in this regard, Monsieur le Marquis, must respond, for you, with the interest which I take in everything that goes to make it up. I beg that you have the officers of the Gatinois (9) receive with kindness my homage and my best wishes and you will believe that those which I express particularly for you will be as lasting as the sentiments of faithful attachment with which I have the honor to be, Monsieur le Marquis, your very humble and very obedient servant.

VIOMÉNIL

Notes Upon This Letter of Vioménil

(1) Colonel Marquis Juste-Antoine-Henri-Marie Germain de Rostaing (1740-1826). He commanded the Gâtinois Regiment at the siege of Yorktown, and directed, under Baron Vioménil, the rear guard of the column which, in the evening of October 14, 1781, attacked the larger English redoubt. For his gallantry, he was made brigadier on December 5, 1781. He was not deferential (Balch, *The French in America,* Vol. 2, p. 219). He commanded the Gâtinois Regiment from 1778 to 1783, when he was succeeded by Count Donatien de Rochambeau, the son of the French General, Count Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur Rochambeau (1725-1807), who commanded the French army in its co-operation with Washington in the American Revolution. Rostaing was born and died at Montbuson, Auvergne.

(2) Claude de l'Estrade, lieutenant-colonel of the Gâtinois Regiment. He was born at Le Puy-en-Velay, Haute-Loire, April 5, 1730. For his gallantry at the siege of Yorktown, he was made brigadier, on December 5, 1781.

(3) The French Minister of War, Marquis Philippe Henri de Ségur (1724-1801).

(4) Captain of Chasseurs, Jean de Sireuil (1742-1781). He was wounded at Savannah on October 9, 1779, in the brilliant attack upon the English intrenchments by the Dillon (Irish) and the Gâtinois Regiments. At Yorktown, in the attack upon the larger English redoubt, he was mortally wounded in the side by a charge of grape shot. He died in the French hospital at Williamsburg on December 20, 1781.

(5) After the victory at Yorktown, part of the French army encamped at Williamsburg. Baron Vioménil departed for France

on February 2, 1782. He sailed on the *Hermione*. He returned to America in September, 1782, and commanded the French troops when they sailed from Boston on December 24, 1782, for the Antilles.

(6) Jean François de Sillégues, a young sub-lieutenant of Chasseurs of the Gâtinois Regiment. A musket ball lodged in his thigh at the very moment he helped Colonel Count William Deux Ponts, commander of the Deux Ponts Regiment, mount the larger English redoubt.

(7) Captain-en-second Carrére de Loubére. He was born in 1750. His company were grenadiers of the Gâtinois Regiment.

(8) Captain-en-second Jean Simon David de Foucault. He was born in 1741. He served with de Sireuil at Savannah in the attack upon the English intrenchments, and like de Sireuil, was wounded there. His company were chasseurs of the Gâtinois Regiment.

(9) The Gâtinois Regiment was one of three regiments transported from the West Indies by De Grasse for the Yorktown campaign. *Royal Auvergne,* the ancient title of the regiment, was restored to it, in recognition of its gallantry in the attack upon the redoubt. Lafayette was born in Auvergne, but, at Yorktown, was an American, not a French, officer; and, in Trumbull's famous painting he is among the American generals. The excellent historic sense of the artist is manifested by the important places he gives De Grasse, Lauzun and Choisi who were not present at the actual surrender.

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For the statements in my foregoing notes, reliance has been put upon French biographical dictionaries, and letters, memoirs and diaries of the leading French participants in the American Revolution. An authoritative list of works relating to the French-American alliance, compiled by A. P. C. Griffin, of the Library of Congress, will be found at pp. 607-645 of *Rochambeau,* by De B. Randolph Keim, Government Printing Office, 1907, printed as Senate Document No. 537, 59th Congress, 1st Session. I express thanks to Mr. Charles McCombs and Miss Dorothy Miller, of the New York Public Library, for

assistance in the preparation of the following practical supplemental list, which may be useful to other students:

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I should here add a personal note. When I began my study of Baron Vioménil, there was apparently in the United States no accessible copy of the book which I have translated, as none of the great public libraries seemed to have it, although it has developed there is a copy at Harvard. But I came to have my own copy; and for it I thankfully record here my deep obligation to Mr. Frederick T. Kellers, of Montclair, formerly of Jersey City, a dear, constant friend and inquiring soul, a lover of the things of the mind, who combed Paris and Warsaw, in his interestingly successful search for this book, out of sheer love for a knowledge of the beginnings of our common country for which his industrious parents, come from the *Vaterland* three generations back, gave life to an interesting family of twelve boys and girls who, with their descendants, by dint of daily labor and wholesome simplicity of life, have all helped make come true the dreams of the fathers of this Republic.

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Miss Margaret Murphy, my young, careful amanuensis, deserves larger recompense than she has had, for painstaking efforts, but *res angusta officinae perstat.* The proof reading was *en famille.*

I mark here the memory of James Owen (1877-1932), an engineer of Westchester County, New York, who, after considerable study and search in 1931, came upon the weather-worn stones of the ovens, used by Rochambeau's army while encamped near the present Hartsdale, in July and August, 1781. The tiny countryside cape, which is the site of the ovens, by my amateur reckoning, based upon official surveys, is at a point 73° 49′ 42″ West of Greenwich, and 41° 00′ 33″ North of the equator. About one thousand yards to the north is the monumented Odell house, which Rochambeau made his headquarters.

My final word is of full-bodied sincere thanks to a noted contemporary student of the life and times of Lafayette, Mr. Walter P. Gardner of Jersey City, whose well ordered collection of written and printed mementos of the chief actors in the French-American alliance includes the letter of Vioménil to Rostaing (printed in this volume) and many other documents of high import. Our mutual interest in the American Revolution has been to us a never failing source of happiness. I sound here my appreciation of his many favors. Not only has he

* The late Brand Whitlock, in a private letter.

permitted me to use his *memorabilia* as my own, but he has frequently planned expeditions along the line of the French march to Yorktown, and thus helped recreate events of the past, first adequately pictured for me by Professor Edward Channing (1856-1931) who gave bent to me, a twig, at Harvard in 1900-1901.

JOHN FRANCIS GOUGH

Jersey City

CONTENTS

PAGE

Publishers' Notice ix
Advertisement xi
A Short Account of the Three Chief Agents sent by France to the Confederation of Poland 1
Chevalier Taulès 3
General Dumourier 11
Baron Vioménil 45
Memoir of Chevalier Thesby de Belcour, Colonel in the service of the Confederates of Poland, upon the campaign he made with them in 1769..... 49
Reminiscences of Count * * * concerning the First Partition of Poland, in 1772..... 65
Treaties between Russia, Austria and Prussia relative to the Partition of Poland, signed at Saint Petersburg July 25 - August 5, 1772..... 101
Treaty with Austria 101
Treaty with Prussia 107
The Private Letters of Baron Vioménil..... 109
First letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, December 31, 1771 109
Report upon the condition of the Confederation of Poland 111
Manifesto of Count Oginski, Commander-in-Chief in Lithuania, September 12, 1771..... 121
Letter of Count Oginski, Commander-in-Chief in Lithuania to one of his friends, September 29, 1771 123
Explanation of the three preceding documents 125
Second letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, February 5, 1772 129
Copy of the letter of Choisi to Baron Vioménil, from the citadel of Cracow, February 2, 1772, at four o'clock in the afternoon 134

PAGE

Third letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, February 10, 1772 141
Fourth letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, February 22, 1772 149
Fifth letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, March 3, 1772 155
Sixth letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, March 12, 1772 159
Copy of a letter from Choisi to Baron Vioménil, from the citadel of Cracow, February 29, 1772 163
Seventh letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, March 18, 1772 167
Eighth letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, March 31, 1772 171
Ninth letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, April 8, 1772 175
Copy of the Instructions which the Generals sent to Marshals Pulawski, Kossakowski and Zaremba, March 18, 1772 181
Copy of the letter of Czettritz, Lieutenant-General in the service of the King of Prussia, to Sierazewski, Regimentary of Great Poland, from Hemstadt, March 22, 1772 185
Tenth letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, April 19, 1772 187
Eleventh letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, April 22, 1772 189
Twelfth letter of Baron Vioménil, from Teschen, April 29, 1772 193
Copy of the letter of Choisi to Baron Vioménil, from the citadel of Cracow, April 25, 1772... 197
Concessions granted to Choisi by his Excellency Major-General Suwarow, in the service of the Empress of all the Russias, at Cracow, April 23, 1772 197

PAGE

Journal of the siege of the citadel of Cracow, by Galibert, a French officer in the service of the Polish Confederacy, from February 2 to April 22, 1772..... 201

END OF ORIGINAL

Additions by the Translator

Portrait of Baron Vioménil .....Frontispiece
Dedication vii
Detail of French Commanders at the Surrender of Cornwallis 224
Translator's Note 225
General Dumourier 225
Baron Vioménil 225
General Choisi 230
Major Després 235
Count Ménonville 235
Marquis Vioménil 235
Chevalier Vioménil 235
Casimir Pulawski 236
Tadeus Kosciuscko 236
Count Bougainville 236
A letter of Baron Vioménil, from Versailles, March 5, 1782, to Marquis Rostaing, on the siege of Yorktown
Transcription 240
Fac-simile 241
Translation 242
Notes upon this letter of Vioménil 243
References 245
Acknowledgments 259

INDEX

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ABERCROMBIE, General, 237
ABSOLOWITZ, Lieutenant-Colonel, 159
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, 239
ACADIA, 237
ACTON, Lord, 225
AGEN, 211
AIGLE, 237
AIGUILLON, Duke, 16, 24-26, 44, 45, 92, 192
ALBEMARLE BAY, 232
ALBIZEW, Colonel, 125
ALEMBERT, 236
AMBLETEUSE, 17
AMERICAN WAR, 18
AMHALT, General, 168
AMSTERDAM, 169
ANHALT-ZERBST, Father of Catherine the Great, 75
ANNAPOLIS, 229, 231, 233
ANTILLES, 238
ARANDA, Spanish Minister, 94-99
ARNOLD, Benedict, 227, 235
ARGENTAE, Madame, 3
ARTOIS, Count, 4
ASOF, 76, 78
AUGUST III, King, Elector of Saxony, 68
AUGUST 10, 1792, 31, 47
AUGUSTE, 238
AUSTRIA, 20, 28, 68, 70-72, 179
AUSTRIANS, 32, 39, 55, 190, 191, 196
AUVERGNE, 244
AUVERGNE REGIMENT, 243, 244

BALCH, Thomas W., 231, 236, 238, 243
BALTA, 70
BALTIMORE, 229, 230
BARON'S TAVERN, Connecticut, 227
BARRAS, de, Admiral, 231, 232
BARRERE, Deputy, 26
BATAVIA, 37
BATTERY, New York City, 228
BEAUTEVILLE, Chevalier, 3
BELCOUR, Chevalier, 5, 49-63, 236
BELGIUM, 25, 32, 35-37
BELGRADE, Peace of, 1738, 77
BELING, General, 168
BELZ, Marshal, 90, 112, 168, 188, 196
BENOIT, Prussian Agent, 93-100
BERCZA, 126
BERLIN, xiii, 168
BERNE, 3
BERTHIER, Brothers, 231
BEUVRON, Duke, 24
BEVILLE, 233
BIALA, 51, 55, 57, 114, 141, 172, 179, 189, 191, 194
BIELITZ, 114, 141, 189-191
BIEN AIME. 238
BIGORRE, Regiment, 165
BILANI, 179
BIRZINSKI, 54
BLACK MUSKETEERS, 236
BLACK SEA, 76, 78
BLONDEAU, 144
BOBRECK, twelve miles above Tiniec, 113, 116, 145, 157, 161, 168, 172, 177, 178, 183, 184
BOHEMIA, 75
BOISSIMENE, 164
BOLTON, Connecticut, 227
BONDY, Count, 234
BONIFACIO, 12
BORDEAUX, 25
BOSNIACS, 167
BOSTON, 230, 233, 235

BOUGAINVILLE, Count, 49, 236-238
BOURBON, House of, 43
BRABANT, Duke, 37
BRANDENBURG, 91
BRANICKI, General, 144-146, 149-151, 168, 179, 184
BREAKNECK, Connecticut, 227
BRISSOT, Deputy, 27
BROGLIE, Marshal, 46
BRUNSWICK, Duke, 33, 34
BRUSSELLS, 38, 40
BUG RIVER, 104
BULLION'S TAVERN, N. J., 228
BYRON, Lord, 238

CAEN, 16, 24
CAMBRAI, 1
CANADA, 237
CAPE CHARLES, 233
CAPE FRANÇAIS, 231, 239
CAPE HENRY, 233
CARMELITES, 130, 135
CARRERE, Captain, 240, 242, 244
CARRIBEAN SEA, 230
CARTEROMACO, 11
CASAN, 63
CASIMIR, 210, 211
CASTRIES, Marquis, 94-95
CATHERINE II, Empress of Russia, 1, 66-78, 90-93, 119, 120
CATHOLICS, 68, 69, 211
CAUCASUS MOUNTAINS, 76
CHAM OF CRIMEA, 76
CHAMPAGNE, 33, 36
CHARLESTON, 233
CHARLOT, 131, 134, 146, 165, 213
CHARLOTTE COURT HOUSE, N. C., 233
CHARTRES, Duke, 36
CHASTELLUX, Marquis, 229, 233
CHAUVELIN, Marquis, 45
CHERBOURG, 18, 21, 25
CHESAPEAKE BAY, 227, 229, 238
CHESTER, 228, 229
CHEVERST, General, 237
CHOCZIM, Khottin, 70
CHOISEUL, Duke, 1-7, 10-13, 45, 47, 68, 69, 84, 92
CHOISEUL-STAINVILLE, Count, Marshal, 94-95
CHOISI, General, 127-157, 159, 160, 163-166, 171, 172, 178, 180, 188-190, 192-221, 230-236
CHRZANOWSKI, 146, 164
CHYPRE, 9
CINCINNATI, Order of, 230, 234, 239
CLAIRAUT, 236
CLAVIERE, Minister of Finance, 28, 30, 31
CLOPIEKI, Lieutenant, 194
COLBERT, 28, 29
COLLEGE OF LOUIS-LE-GRAND, 27
COMMECKI, 169
COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 42
CONDE, Prince, 45, 235
CONFEDERACY, Polish, 13, 15, 44, 201, 202
CONFEDERATES, Polish, 46, 53-58, 69, 70, 75, 109-114, 120, 127, 130, 143-147, 151, 152, 169, 176, 182, 185, 187, 188, 191, 195
CONFEDERATION OF 1772, 93
CONFEDERATION OF BAR, 14
CONFEDERATION OF CRACOW, 49
CONFEDERATION OF GABALTHOU, 50
CONFEDERATION OF POLAND, 1, 11, 13, 111
CONFEDERATION, Polish, XII, 2, 4, 5, 51, 91, 109, 117, 124, 125, 156, 161, 166, 171, 178, 179, 205
CONSTANTINOPLE, 8
CORNWALLIS, Lord, 229, 233
CORSICA, 12
COSSACKS, 56, 59, 60, 61, 125, 191
COURLAND, 60
CRACOW, Krakow, 51-53, 58, 111, 112, 116, 118, 129-167, 178-179, 183, 188, 189, 196, 197, 201, 204, 205, 211, 235
CRIMEA, 77
CROMPOND, N. Y., 230
CROSS OF ST. LOUIS, 240, 242
CULM, Kulm, 107, 141, 196
CZANIASKI, 57
CZARINA, 119-120
CZENSTOCHOWO, Czestochowa, Czenstochau, Chenstokhovo, 55, 111-113, 116, 118, 156, 157, 161, 162, 168, 175, 178, 181-184, 188
CZERNI, Marshal, 57
CZETTRITZ, General, 178, 185

DAMAS, 233
DANISH STATES, 40
DANTON, 36
DANTZICK, Danzig, 88, 91, 107, 115, 127, 179
DANUBE RIVER, 72, 77, 87, 118
DAUPHIN, the son of Louis XVI, 47
DAUPHINY, 45
DAWSON, Warrington, 226-7
DE GRASSE, Count, 228-232, 236, 238, 244
DENMARK, 20, 21
DEPRES, (Deprez), Major, 131, 134, 138, 164, 165, 231, 235
DEUX PONTS, Count William, 244
DEUX PONTS REGIMENT, 231, 244
DGEZZAR-PACHA, 8
DIET, Polish, 93, 121, 122
DILLON, General Arthur, 31
DILLON IRISH REGIMENT, 243
DITTWAR, 131, 138, 144
DNEIPER RIVER, 103
DNEISTER RIVER, 87, 105, 117
DOBB'S FERRY, N. Y., 231
DONAYETZ RIVER, 112
DONNEZAC RIVER, 195
DREWITZ, Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel, 55, 56, 60-62, 112, 125, 157, 161, 168, 177, 181-184
DRUJAC RIVER, 103
DUCLOS, 131, 138, 165
DU HOUX
1. Charles Antoine, see Baron Vioménil
2. Joseph Hyacinthe, see Marquis Vioménil, also Viscount and Count. He was the Baron's only brother, and became a peer of France
3. Antoine Louis, see Chevalier Vioménil
DUKLA, 157
DU LUC, 5, 6
DUMOURIER, Dumouriez, General, 3, 11-45, 111-113, 225
DUPRAT, 173, 175, 176
DURING, Major, 123, 125, 126
DUTCH, 20
DWINA RIVER, 103
DZARZANOSKI, Marshal, 51, 52
DZIERBICKI, Marshal, 142, 143, 146
EAST HARTFORD, Connecticut, 227
EGYPT, 9
ELBING, 107
ELLIOT, Colonel, 145
EMERAUDE, 233
ENGLAND, 19, 46, 67, 71, 74
ENGLISH, 8, 9, 20, 21
ENGLISH CHANNEL, 17, 18
ENGLISH REDOUBT, 243, 244
EPERIES, Eperjes, 50, 112, 114, 190, 195
ESCARS REGIMENT, 11
ESTAING, Count d', 238
ESTERHAZI, Count, 190, 196
ESTRADE, Brigadier, 240, 242, 243
ETERNO, Count, 21

FARMINGTON, 227
FAURE, 234, 235
FAVER, 16
FERDON, 107
FERSON, Count, 233
FEUILLANTS, 31
FONTENOY, 234
FORTIGUERRA, 11
FOUCAULT, 240, 242-244
FRAMPOL, Franpol, 104
FRANCE, 2-4, 68
FRANCE, Court of, 14, 92
FRAUENSTAT, 116, 179, 185
FREDERICK THE GREAT, XII, XIII, 20, 65, 67, 68, 70-75, 79-83, 87, 90, 91, 93, 96-100, 117, 168, 181, 185, 187, 190
FRENCH, 55
FRENCH MONEY, 14, 15
FRENCH REVOLUTION, XIII

GABALTHOU, 50
GALIBERT, 143, 144, 164, 165, 201-222
GALITZIN, Prince, 102
GATINOIS REGIMENT, 232, 240-244
GENERALS, the, Polish Council of War, 57, 109, 114, 122, 133, 152, 167, 168, 171, 172, 175, 177, 181, 184, 187, 190, 195, 196, 217
GENEVA, 3, 5-7
GENOESE, 12
GENSONNE, 27
GENTILLE, 231

GEORGIA, 233
GERMANY, 35, 237
GERMANS, 56
GILLES-LE-GRAND, 36
GIRONDISTS, 27
GLIEZINSKI, 146
GLOUCESTER, Va., 232, 233, 236
GOGUELAS, Chevalier, 47
GORDON, Colonel, 142, 146, 165
GORSAS, 25
GOUFFIER, 22
GRAND DUCHY, 115, 119
GRAND EMIR, 8
GRAND SEIGNEUR, 8
GRAND VIZIER, 74
GRASSE, Count de, 228-232, 236, 238, 244
GRAVE, Chevalier, 28
GRAVES, Admiral, 232
GREAT DUCHY, 115, 119
GREAT POLAND, 90, 107, 111, 115, 119, 160, 168, 175, 177, 179, 181, 188, 196
GREEK RELIGION, 68
GREEKS, 76, 78
GREENBURG, N. Y., 227, 228
GREENE, General, 233
GRENADA, 238
GRENVILLE, 6
GRIMM, Agent for Catherine II and Prince Henry of Prussia, 66
GRODSKA GATE, 151
GUERNSEY, 19
GUERRIER, 238

HADDICK, General, 196
HAMBURG, 16
HARCOURT, Duke, 18, 24
HARTFORD, Connecticut, 227
HAUTE-LOIRE, 243
HAVERSTRAW, West, N. Y., 228
HAVRE DE GRACE, Md., 229
HAYE, LA, 37
HEAD OF ELK, Md., 229
HEMSTADT, 185
HENIN, 3
HENRY, Prince of Prussia, brother of Frederick the Great, XII, XIII, 65, 66, 75-83, 88-90
HERTZBERG, Count, XII, 67
HERY, 164, 165
HEYSMANN, Colonel, 159
HOLLAND, 37, 161
HOOD, Admiral, 232, 238
HOUGUE, La, 18
HOUZE, Baron, 21
HUBERTSBOROUGH, Peace of, 67
HUDSON RIVER, 228
HUNGARY, 15, 90, 111, 113, 157, 160, 190, 196

ITINERARY of Rochambeau's Army from Newport, R. I., to Yorktown, Va., 227-232

JABLONOWSKI, Prince, 187
JACOBINS, 25, 26, 31, 35
JAMES RIVER, 232
JAMESTOWN, 229
JAROSLOW, 195
JEMAPPES, 35, 36
JERSEY, 19
JEWS, 211, 212
JOSEPH II, Emperor of Germany, and King of Austria, 20, 71-73, 88, 92, 93
JUBATOW, Lieutenant-Colonel, 125

KABARDA, 76, 78
KABARDAS, 78
KALICSZ, 116
KAUNITZ, Prince, 72, 83-85, 88, 89, 92, 187
KAWSKIN, General, 125
KELLERMAN, General, 34, 143, 145
KEMPENS, 116
KILEZEWSKI, 194, 195
KING OF POLAND, see Poniatowski
KING'S FERRY, N. Y., 228
KIOW, 63, 103, 117
KLESINCKI, 165
KNYSZIN, 123
KOBLIN, 185
KOKANOWSKI, 164
KOLASKOWSKI, 142
KONIGSBERG, 127
KORYTOWSKI, 146
KOSEIAN, 116
KOSCIUSKO, Tadeusz, General, 236
KOSSAKOWSKI, Commander, 115, 116, 119, 133, 152, 156, 161, 168, 172, 178, 181, 183, 184
KULESZA, 146
KULM, Culm, 107, 141, 196

LAFAYETTE, Marquis, 25, 30, 32, 229, 244
LALAIN, 163-165
LAMOTTE PIQUET, 238
LANDSKRON, 13, 55, 112, 113, 118, 142-145, 152, 159, 160, 172, 178, 189, 192, 194, 219, 220
LANGUEDOC, 238
LAPUCHIN, 157, 160, 161, 168, 173, 175-177, 181, 182
LARNACA, 9
LA SERRE, 143, 164, 165
LAUZUN, Duke, 232-234, 244
LEBENFELD, 171
LEGION OF HONOR, 239
LELOW, 183
LEMBERG, Léopol, 195, 196, 222
LENICIA, 142
LEOPOL(D), Lemberg, 195, 196, 222
LESSART, 27
LEZNO, 179
LIBERTY CORNER, N. J., 228
LIGONOIS, 194
LILLE, 17
LIMOUSIN, 45
LIPOWICE, 184
LISIECKI, 143, 146
LISSA, 185
LITHUANIA, 115-118, 161
LITHUANIANS, 159, 160, 167
LIVONIA, 103
LOBKOWITZ, Minister, 90, 102
LOMJA, 111
LONDON, 237
LORRAINE, 45
LOUBERE, Carrére de, 244
LOUIS XIV, 65
LOUIS XV, 1, 3, 10, 16, 68, 84, 89, 91, 92, 109, 110, 155, 237
LOUIS XVI, 16, 26-32, 36, 37, 46, 47, 226
LOUVOIS, 28, 29
LOW COUNTRIES, 25, 28, 35, 39, 77
LUBLIN, 157, 168, 172
LUBOMIRSKI, Prince, 49, 50, 54, 172
LUCKNER, General, 30-32
LUXEMBOURG, 77
LUXEMBOURG, Marshal, 38
LYS, LA, 17

MABLI, Abbé, 65
MADAME, Sister of the Dauphin and Daughter of Louis XVI, 47
MAESTRICHT, 37, 38
MALOUIN ISLANDS, 237
MALZAN, 195
MANHATTAN ISLAND, N. Y., 228
MAN IN THE IRON MASK, 10
MARAT, 36
MARBEUF, 13
MARGRY, 238
MARIA THERESA, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia and Empress of Germany, 71, 72, 74, 77, 88-92, 105, 117
MARIE ANTOINETTE, 26, 29
MARIENBURG, 107
MARION, 145
MARTINSVILLE, N. J., 228
MARYLAND, 227
MAZOVIA, 112
MAZOWIECKI, 177
MENONVILLE, Count, 135, 235
METZ, 237
MEUSE DISTRICT, 32
MEZWIZ, 123
MIACZINSKI, General 111
MIER, 126
MIKELSON, Major, 191, 194, 195
MILCOW, 176
MILKOWSKI, Captain, 146
MILLSTONE, N. J., 228
MILLSTONE RIVER, 228
MINGRELIA, 76
MINSK, 103, 125, 126
MIRABEAU, 25
MIRANDA, General, 37
MIREPOIS, Count, 237
MOLDAVIA, 4, 70, 72, 76, 77, 79, 87, 105, 117
MOLIERE, 42
MONS, 28
MONTBAREY, Prince, 18
MONTBUSON, 243
MONTCALM, General, 237
MONTEYNARD, Marquis, 16, 132, 153
MONTFERMEIL, 233-235
MONTMEDI, 47
MONTMORIN, 21, 22
MONTMORT, Marquis, 226
MORANOWSKI, Palatine, 75
MORAVIA, 75, 90, 190
MORAWSKI, 146
MORBILOW, 63
MOSELLE DISTRICT, 33
MOULINS, 234
MOZOVIECKI, 157
MSCISLAW, 103
MUY, Count, 17

NANTES, 25
NANTES, Edict, 65
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 27
NATIONAL CONVENTION, 34, 39
NATIONAL HIGH COURT, 27
NECKER, 28
NEER-WINDEN, 38
NEISS, 71, 73
NEISTER RIVER, 87, 105, 117
NETZE RIVER, 107
NEUSTADT, 72, 73
NEWBURGH, N. Y., 230
NEW-MARCH, 107
NEWPORT, Delaware, 229
NEWPORT, Rhode Island, 227, 231, 232
NEWTON, Connecticut, 227
NEW YORK CITY, 228
NIESTER RIVER, 87, 105, 117
NIEZWITZ, 126
NIKITA, Count, 102
NIMEGUE, 37
NORMANDY, 17, 24
NORMANS, 24
NORTH CASTLE, N. Y., 227
NORTHUMBERLAND, 238
NOSTROWSKI, 194
NOVITARG, Nowitarg, 15, 117

OBRESKOW, Minister, 76, 78, 87
OCWIECZIM, 111, 116, 177, 184, 189
ODANANOW, 116
ODEM, Captain, 60, 61
OGINSKI, Count, 56, 115, 119, 121-127, 159, 160, 161, 169
OISI, Chevalier, 17
OLMUTZ, 190
ORLEANS, 27
ORLEANS, Duke, 31, 36, 41
ORLEANS, Mademoiselle, 37
OSTROW, 116
OSTROZOW, 116

PAC, Count, 187, 191
PACHA-DGEZZAR, 8
PACIFIC OCEAN, 238
PALESTINE, 7
PANIN, Count, 102
PAOLI, 12
PARIS, 49
PARSIPPANY, N. J., 228
PAUL I, Emperor of Russia, 42
PERSHING, General John J., 226
PETERKOW, Petrokow, 58, 116, 173, 176, 177, 181, 182
PETERSBURG, Court of XIII, 71, 74, 75, 85-87
PHILADELPHIA, 228
PHILIPSBURG, N. Y., 227
PICARDIE, 237
PILCZA, 116
PILICA, 181
PILZEA RIVER, 182
PINSKA, 126
PIRCH, Baron, 17
PITCHINA, 196
PIWINIECKI, 142, 146, 179, 196
PLAINFIELD, Connecticut, 227
PLUTARCH, 42
POCUTIE, 105
PODGORZE, 105
PODLACHIA, 112, 125
PODOLIA, 4, 70, 104, 105, 117
POLAND, 4, 20-22, 45
POLES, 2, 4, 52-63, 68, 69
POLISH, BISHOPS, 69
POLISH LEADERS, 15
POLISH PRUSSIA, 107, 117
POLISH REPUBLIC, 75, 105, 108, 112, 122
POLISH SENATORS, 69
POLOCK, 103, 112
POLONA, 195
POMERANIA, 146, 165
POMERANIANS, 141, 142
POMEREILLIE, 107
POMPTON PLAINS, N. J., 228
PONIATOWSKI, Stanislaw-Augustus, King of Poland, 2, 68, 69, 75, 100, 115, 117, 213
PONT-DE-L'ARCHE, 17
PORTE, 9, 70, 76, 77
PORTE, LA, Superisor, 26
PORTUGAL, 12
POSEN, Poznan, 117, 181
POTOCKI, Count, 51, 188
PRALIN, Duke, 4
PRINCETON, N. J., 228
PROTESTANTS, 68, 69
PROVIDENCE, R. I., 227, 231, 232
PRUSSIA, 17, 20, 91, 107, 168
PRUSSIAN ARCHIVES, XII, XIII
PRUSSIANS, 32, 117, 179, 188
PRUSSIA SILESIA, 117, 196
PRUSSIAN STATES, 91
PULAWSKI, Pulaski, Casimir, Count, 13, 54, 56, 111, 116, 119, 133, 152, 156, 161, 168, 172, 175, 177, 178, 181-184, 188, 236
PUY-EN-VELAY, 243

QUEBEC, 237

RADOM, 152
RADWICKI, 172
RADZIWILL, Prince, 56, 111, 112, 116, 143, 161
RAMAPO RIVER, 228
RAWA, 182
RAWA RIVER, 182
RAWITZ, 185
RED LION INN, Pa., 228
RED RUSSIA, 90, 104
REGIMENTS
  AUVERGNE, 243, 244
  BIGORRE, 165
  BLACK MUSKETEERS, 236
  DAUPHINY, 45
  DEUX PONTS, 231, 244
  DILLON, Irish, 243
  ESCARS, 11
  GATINOIS, 232, 240-244
  HAINAUT, 129
  LIMOUSIN, 45
  MOUNTED CHAUSSEURS, 125
  ROYAL AUVERGNE, 243, 244
REWIEZCKI, Baron, 93
RHINE RIVER, 35
RICHARDET, 11
RICHELIEU, Cardinal, 29
RICHELIEU, Marshal, 89
RICHMOND, 233
RIDGEBURY, Connecticut, 227
RIVERS
  BUG, 104
  DANUBE, 72, 77, 87, 118
  DNIEPER, 103
  DONAYETZ, 112
  DONNEZAC, 195
  DRUJAC, 103
  DWINA, 103
  HUDSON, 228
  JAMES, 232
  MILLSTONE, 228
  NETZE, 107
  NIESTER, 87, 105, 117
  PILZEA, 182
  RAMAPO, 228
  RAWA, 228
  RHINE, 35
  SAN, 104
  STOLA, 116, 183
  SUSQUEHANNA, 229
  TURZEC, 103
  VISTULA, 104, 107, 112, 113, 116, 118, 119, 135, 143, 149, 157, 159, 163, 167, 168, 177, 183, 184, 201, 205, 210, 213
  WARTA, 111, 113, 116, 117, 161, 162, 177, 178, 181, 182, 185
  YORK, 232
ROBESPIERRE, 35
ROCHAMBEAU, Count, Commander-in-chief of French forces in America, 46, 227-236, 238, 243
ROCHAMBEAU, Viscount, son of preceding, 243
ROCHELLE, LA, 46
ROHAN, Cardinal, 92
ROLLAND, Minister, 28, 30, 31
ROMANZOW, 117
ROMILLI, 17
RONDNICKI, 194
ROSIERE, General, 17
ROSPRZA, 176
ROSTAING, Marquis, 240-243
ROUERGUE, 237
ROUMANIA, 4
ROYAL AUVERGNE REGIMENT, 244
ROYAL SOCIETY, 237
ROYANA, 58
RUBIESZOW, 104
RUHR DISTRICT, 38
RULHIERE, Member of the French Academy, XI-XV, 2, 3, 13, 14, 65, 66, 125
RUSSIA, 2, 4, 20, 56, 67, 69
RUSSIA PALATINATE, 110, 157
RUSSIAN COURT, 82, 85-87
RUSSIAN-PRUSSIAN AGREEMENT, April, 23, 1767, 68
RUSSIANS, 11, 14, 15, 52-62, 111-143, 149-153, 157-161, 163, 168, 172, 179-181, 187-189, 194, 195, 202, 203, 220
RUSSIAN TROOPS, 70-72
RUSSIAN-TURKISH WAR, 70-72

SABATOW, Lieutenant-Colonel, 125
SAGAN, Duke, 102
SAGNAC, Philip, 225
SAILLANS, Saillant, 131, 134, 166, 202, 203
SAINT CHRISTOPHER, 238
SAINT EUSTATIUS, 239
SAINT-FOIX, 4
SAINT LOUIS, Order, 237
SAINT MALO, 237
SAINT-PRIEST, Count, 19-24
SAINTS, The, 238
SAINT-SIMON, Marquis, 229, 232

SAN RIVER, 104
SAPIEHA, Prince, 112, 119, 159-161, 167
SARNACKI, 190
SARRELOUIS, 237
SAVANNAH, 235, 243, 244
SAXONY, 21, 75
SAXONY, House of, 68
SCAPIN-HEROS, 36
SCAWINA, 194
SCENZO, 116
SCHLEGLINSKI, 142
SCHWARTZ, 152, 161, 175
SEDAN, 32
SEGUE, 16
SEGUR, Marquis, 240, 242, 243
SELAWINSKI, 194
SENDOMIR, 104, 112, 116
SERVAN, Minister, 28-33
SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1, 75
SEYDE, 7
SIBERIA, 63, 192
SIERADZ, 116, 162
SIERAZEWSKI, Regimentary, 185
SILESIA, 104, 107, 178
SILLEGUES, 240, 242, 244
SIREUIL, 240-244
SKILSKI, 143
SLONIM, 126
SOKOLNIKI, 175, 177
SOLEUR, 3
SOLMS, Count, 82, 106
SOMERSET, COURT HOUSE, N. J., 228
SONG OF THE CHEMISES, 25
SOUTH CAROLINA, 233
SPAIN, 12, 238
SPHINX, 237
STACKLEBERG, Baron, 93
STADTHOLDER, 37
STAINVILLE, Count (Marshal Choiseul), 94-95
STANISLAW-AUGUSTUS PONIATOWSKI, King of Poland, 2, 68, 69, 75, 100, 115, 117, 213
STATEN ISLAND, N. Y., 228
STOLA RIVER, 116, 183
STOLONIKA, 126
STONY POINT, N. Y., 228, 231
SUACK, 172
SUFFERN, N. Y., 228
SULLY, 28, 29
SURAROW, General, 112, 118, 126, 144, 149, 151, 155, 166, 168, 184, 197-200, 212, 234
SUSQUEHANNA FERRY, Md., 229
SUSQUEHANNA RIVER, 229
STETTIN, 75
SWEDEN, 16, 20, 21
SWIETEN, Baron, 83, 89
SWITZERLAND, 3, 7, 40
SYRIA, 7, 9
SZDUNI, Zduni, 162, 179, 185

TARLETON, Colonel, 233
TARNOW, 172, 179
TAULES, XV, 3-15
TERRIBLE, 238
TESCHEN, 103, 114, 115, 127, 141, 149, 155, 159, 167, 171, 175, 187, 193, 226
THERMOSIS, 28, 29
THORN, Torun, 88, 90, 108, 117
TICONDEROGA, 237
TIERSONNIER, Philip, Captain, 234
TINIEC, 55, 112, 113, 118, 129, 130, 132, 135, 137, 141, 142, 144-146, 149, 152, 155, 159, 166, 167, 171, 172, 178, 179, 189, 192, 194, 195, 201-205, 235
TOBOLSK, 63
TOURIZEL, Madame, 47
TOURNAI, 28
TRANSYLVANIA, 90
TREATIES:
  BELGRADE, (1738), 77
  HUBERTS BOROUGH (1763), 67
  POLISH PARTITION (1771-1772), XIII, 101-108
  RUSSIAN-PRUSSIAN AGREEMENT (1767), 68
  WARSAW (1773), 93
TREATY, Russia-Prussia (1763), 67
TRENTON, N. J., 228
TRONCHIN, Doctor, 94
TRUBELL LANDING, Va., 232
TRUMBULL, John, 244
TUILERIES, 47, 225
TUKULKA, 143
TURKEY, 2, 7-9, 68, 74
TURKISH-RUSSIAN WAR, 70-72
TURKS, 14, 20, 22, 70-72, 76-78, 119
TURZEC RIVER, 103

UDEN, Captain, 60, 61
UKRANIA, 117
UNITED PROVINCES, 38
UNITED STATES, 46
UPPER SILESIA, 127
UPPER STOLA RIVER, 116
UPPER VISTULA RIVER, 116, 118, 119
UPPER WARTA RIVER, 181

VALACHIA, 72, 76-79, 87, 105, 131, 138
VALCOUR, 164, 165
VALENCIENNES, 35, 39
VALMI, 34
VARENNES, 47
VAUDREUIL, Admiral, 238
VAUX, Count, Marshal, 45
VENICE, Ambassador of, 47
VERPLANCK'S POINT, N. Y., 228
VERSAILLES, Court of, 4, 5, 225, 240, 242
VERTEUIL, General, 25
VESSELS:
  AIGLE, 237
  AUGUSTE, 238
  BIEN AIME, 238
  EMERAUDE, 231, 233
  GENTILLE, 230, 231
  GUERRIER, 238
  HERMIONE, 238
  LANGUEDOC, 238
  NORTHUMBERLAND, 238
  SPHINX, 237
  TERRIBLE, 238
VIENNA, 49, 50, 187, 191
VIENNA, Court of, XIII, 67-93, 114, 169
VIOMENIL, Baron, IX-XV, 16, 45-47, 114, 131-222, 225-230, 233-235, 240-244
VIOMENIL, Chevalier and Captain 131, 134, 163, 164, 202, 235
VIOMENIL, Colonel, Count, Marquis and Peer of France, 131, 144, 155, 193, 194, 195, 229, 235
VIRBRAYE, Count, 21
VIRGINIA, 229, 230
VISTULA RIVER, 104, 107, 112, 113, 116, 118, 119, 135, 143, 149, 157, 159, 163, 167, 168, 177, 183, 184, 201, 205, 210, 213
VOLHYNIA, 90, 104, 117
VOLTAIRE, 3, 4, 6, 7

WADOWICZ, 53
WALEWSKI, 118, 141, 142, 146, 159, 160, 161, 167, 168
WARMIE, 107
WARSAW, 62, 68, 96, 152, 156, 182
WARSAW, Court of, 106
WARSAW, Treaty of, (September 18, 1773), 93
WARTA RIVER, 111, 113, 116, 117, 161, 162, 177, 178, 181, 182, 185
WASHINGTON, George, 228-233, 238
WATCHUNG MOUNTAINS, N. J., 228
WATERMAN, Rhode Island, 227
WEEDON, General, 232
WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N. Y., 227, 228
WEST INDIES, 244
WEST POINT, N. Y., 236
WHIPPANY, N. J., 228
WIDAWA, 116, 175
WIELICZKA, Wielicksa, 149, 204, 208
WIELUN, 116, 175, 182
WIGHT, Isle of, 19
WILLIAMSBURG, Va., 227, 232, 240-244
WINDHAM, Connecticut, 227
WISCHNICZA, 179
WITEPSK, 103
WLODICE, 183
WOLBURCHE-WULBURG, 62
WONSOWIEZ, Wousowiecz, Major, 139, 146

YORK RIVER, 232
YORKTOWN, York, 226, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240-244

ZAMOSC, 104, 113, 168, 178
ZAREMBA, Marshal, 111, 113, 115, 116, 119, 152, 157, 160, 162, 168, 172-185, 187, 188, 196
ZATOR, 57
ZBARAS, 104
ZDUNI, Szduni, 162, 179
ZIEBERG, Commander, 157, 159, 167, 168, 172
ZIPS, 79, 83, 117
ZURICH, 3
ZWIRZINIEC, 149

POLAND 1772

COURLAND
LIBAU
RIGA
SAMOGITIA
KLAIPEDA
MEMEL
TILSIT
KONIGSBERG
BRANDENBURG
DANZIG
STAROGARD
ELBING
MARIENBURG
HEILSBERG
WARMIA
POLISH PRUSSIA
KONITZ
FERDEN
CHELMNO
THORN
TORUN
BYDGOSZCZ
BROMBERG
POMERANIA
GREAT POLAND
KUJAWIA
BERLIN
BOBROWNIKA
BIELSK
PLOCK
POZNAN
POSEN
WARTA R.
KOSCIAN
ODER R.
KSIAZ
TUREK
LECYCA
WARSZAWA
WARSAW
MAZOVIA
PODLASIA
LESZNO
LISSA
KALISZ
LODZ
ORAWA
KOBLINO
ZDUNI
OSTROW
SIERADZ
ODOLANOW
OZDUNSKA-WOLA
WIDAWA
KEPNO
WIELUN
PETERKOW
BELZATYNOW
KOSPRAZ
RADOM
LUBIN
DRESDEN
NEUMARK
BRESLAU
SILESIA
RADOMSKO
CZESTOCHOWA
KIELCE
KYELTSI
LITTLE POLAND
SANDOMIR
NEISSE
PRAGUE
NEUSTADT
MILCOW
RATIBOR
PILICA
KRAKOW
CRACOW
VISTULA R.
FRAMPOL
BIELITZ
OSWIECIM
TARNOW
RZESZOW
JAROSLAW
CIESZYN
TESCHEN
BIALA
OLMUTZ
NOWY SACZ
NOWY TARG
DUKLA
PRZEMYSL
BIRCZA
SAN R.
EPERIES
CZIPS
ZIPS
KOSICE
KASCHAU
ROZNAVA
Carpathian Mountains
DANUBE R.
VIENNA
THEISSE R.
HUNGARY
AUSTRIA
RUSSIA
RUBIESZOW
ZAMOSC
BEL
LWOW
LEMBERG
LEOPOL
KOWEL
VOLHYNIA
LUCK
KIEV
UKRAINE
BOBRKA
TARNPOL
BOH R.
BAR
ROV
KAMANETS PODOLSKI
PODOLIA
DNIESTER R.
KHOTIN
CHOCZIM
PRUTH R.
KISHINEV
POCUTIE
MOLDAVIA
WITEBSK
KAUNAS
KOVNO
SMOLENSK
WILNO
VILNA
LITHUANIA
MINSK
MOHILEF
TULA
WHITE RUSSIA
KIEL
NOWOGRODEK
NIEMENCZ
MIER
SLONIM
STOWICZE
STOLINKA
BLACK RUSSIA
BREST LITOVSK
PINSK
GORODYNA
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