



'POLAND'S NEIGHBOURS ARE HER FRIENDS'

A DRAMA OF NON-AGGRESSION IN TWO ACTS

TEXT TAKEN EXCLUSIVELY FROM OFFICIAL POLISH WHITE BOOK PUBLISHED 1940

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR WAS THE
GERMAN INVASION OF POLAND.

TO THIS DELIBERATE ACT OF
AGGRESSION THE PRESENT
SUFFERINGS OF ALL PEACE-
LOVING NATIONS ARE DUE.

BUT GERMAN PROPAGANDA IS
NOW AT PAINS TO OBLITERATE
THE RECOLLECTION OF THE FACT.



P E R S O N S

IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE

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| A. HITLER | Chancellor of German Reich. |
| J. LIPSKI | Polish Ambassador in Berlin 1933-1939. |
| COUNT J. SZEMBEK | Polish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. |
| H. GÖRING | German Field Marshal. |
| E. SMIGLY-RYDZ | Marshal of Poland. |
| J. VON RIBBENTROP | German Foreign Minister from February 1938. |
| J. BECK | Polish Foreign Minister. |
| H. A. VON MOLTKE | German Ambassador in Warsaw. |
| Z. ZAWADOWSKI | Polish Vice-Commissioner in Danzig. |
| M. LITVINOV | Soviet Foreign Commissar till May 1939. |
| M. KRESTINSKI | Former Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs. |
| W. GRZYBOWSKI | Polish Ambassador in Moscow. |
| M. SZARONOV | Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw. |
| M. VOROSHILOV | Soviet Field Marshal. |
| V. MOLOTOV | Soviet Foreign Commissar from May 1939. |



ACT I • THE WEST



ONE OF THE OUTSTANDING POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE NAZI REGIME IN ITS FIRST YEAR OF POWER WAS TO REVERSE THE POLICY OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC AND PLACE GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS ON A FOOTING OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

NOVEMBER 15 HITLER TO M. LIPSKI. "... I take Poland into account as a reality
1 9 3 3 which nothing would be able to change or cause to disappear...."

JANUARY 26 TEXT OF POLISH-GERMAN DECLARATION. The Polish
1 9 3 4 Government and the German Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between State and State.... The two Governments base their action on the fact that the maintenance and guarantee of a lasting peace between their countries is an essential pre-requisite for the general peace of Europe.... Should any disputes arise between them... they will... seek a solution by peaceful means.... In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.... The declaration is valid for a period of ten years....

JANUARY 22 HITLER TO M. LIPSKI. "After eight or nine years undoubtedly quite
1 9 3 5 different relations would exist between the two States, when both nations had come to know each other better and the old prejudices had disappeared...."

JANUARY 31 GÖRING TO COUNT SZEMBEK. "German policy towards Poland, initiated
1 9 3 5 by the Declaration of January 1934, was not planned for a period of ten years but for ever, and there should not be the slightest fear in Poland that on the German side it would not be continued in future."

AUGUST 12 HITLER TO COUNT SZEMBEK. "... In all his policy he was governed by the
1 9 3 6 principle of signing nothing and promising nothing, if he had any doubt whether he could realise it in practice. From the moment, however, when he assumed some obligation or concluded a certain friendship, there was no power on earth which could make him break his pledged word. With respect to Poland, he followed this principle absolutely....

FEBRUARY 16 GÖRING TO MARSHAL SMIGLY-RYDZ. "... The Polish-French
1 9 3 7 Alliance was in no way a menace to the Reich.... They knew that it possessed a strictly defensive character, i.e., that it would come into force only in the event of a German attack on France or Poland. In this regard they were perfectly untroubled, for they had no aggressive intentions whatever in regard either to Poland or to France....

NOVEMBER 19 VON RIBBENTROP TO M. LIPSKI. The Reich desired to maintain
1 9 3 8 the best possible relations with Poland, just as they did with Italy.... In a very friendly tone he stated that it was his desire to hold conversations with Poland, not in the diplomatic manner, but entirely as between friends, frankly and openly....

JANUARY 25 VON RIBBENTROP'S SPEECH AT WARSAW. "... I am honoured
1 9 2 9 and pleased by the fact that I can now stay in your beautiful capital as a

guest of the Polish Government. The Polish Government have given me and my wife a reception which once more testifies to the proverbial Polish hospitality.

"... The continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing Agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. . . .

"Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations. . . ."

THE CASTLE, WARSAW, AFTER GERMAN VISIT



JANUARY 30
1939

HITLER'S REICHSTAG SPEECH. "... During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."

FROM THE GERMAN STANDPOINT, ONE OF THE GREAT ADVANTAGES OF THE UNDERSTANDING WITH POLAND WAS THAT SHE FORMED A BARRIER AGAINST THE SWORN ENEMY OF THE NAZI REGIME—SOVIET RUSSIA.

NOVEMBER 15
1933

HITLER TO M. LIPSKI. "... Any war would only result in bringing Communism to Europe. ... Poland is an outpost (*Vorposten*) against Asia. The destruction of Poland would be a misfortune for the States which would consequently become neighbours of Asia. The other States should realise Poland's role as an outpost. ..."

JANUARY 22
1935

HITLER TO M. LIPSKI. ... According to the information of his military authorities and Intelligence Service, Russia had made great progress with her military preparations. The moment might come when both our countries would be compelled to defend ourselves against aggression from the East. The policy of former German Governments, and in particular of the Reichswehr, which had aimed at uniting with Russia against Poland, was the greatest of political mistakes. ...

JANUARY 31
1935

GÖRING TO COUNT SZEMBEEK. ... Theoretically one could imagine a new partition of Poland by means of German-Russian collaboration. Practically, however, it would be impossible to attain that end, partly because of the strength and dynamic power of Poland, partly because partitioning would create a common German-Russian frontier, and this would be highly dangerous to Germany. That is why a strong Poland was needed by Germany to form a common barrier against Russia. ...

FEBRUARY 10
1935

COUNT SZEMBEEK'S NOTE ON GÖRING'S VISIT. He was very outspoken in his conversations. ... Especially while talking to generals he outlined far-reaching plans, almost suggesting an Anti-Russian Alliance and a joint attack on Russia. ...

FEBRUARY 23
1938

GÖRING TO MARSHAL SMIGLY-RYDZ. These two States formed a "bulwark" against Bolshevism. In Germany they perfectly realised that if Poland were defeated in a conflict between Poland and the Soviets, then in a sense the automatic result of this fact would be the swift Bolshevisation of Germany.

JANUARY 5
1939

HITLER TO M. BECK. ... The community of interests between Germany and Poland, so far as Russia was concerned, was complete. ... A strong Poland was an absolute necessity for Germany. Every Polish division engaged against Russia was a corresponding saving of a German division. ...

FEBRUARY 6
1939

VON MOLTKE TO COUNT SZEMBEEK. M. von Ribbentrop completely understood why Poland could not join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Poland's reserved attitude to this question was quite understandable. ...

VON RIBBENTROP TO M. LIPSKI. . . . By defeating Russia in the World War, Germany had been a contributory factor in the emergence of the Polish State. Obviously they could not forget the shedding of Polish blood, which they held in high honour. . . .

MARCH 21
1939

Obviously an understanding between us would have to include explicit anti-Soviet tendencies. Germany could never collaborate with the Soviets, and a Polish-Soviet understanding would inevitably lead to Bolshevism in Poland. . . .

AFTER THE GERMAN-SOVIET PACT



THE DANZIG QUESTION

MAY 23 1935 HITLER TO M. LIPSKI. . . . In his Eastern policy the Chancellor took up the position that a *rapprochement* with Poland was more advantageous to Germany than uneasy relations with Russia. Russia is Asia, he said. Germany was faced with the problem of finding areas for economic expansion or space for its population. Poland had not and could not provide either. There was criticism of his attitude in regard to the question of the "Corridor," against which he maintained that in face of the greater problems the "Corridor" was of no importance whatever.

How could the Reich be prejudiced, provided good Polish-German relations existed, by this short journey of a few dozen kilometres across Polish territory? In a few years, given the continuance of good relations, in Germany they would forget all about the "Corridor," and in Poland the question would cease to be acute. . . .

AUGUST 12 1936 HITLER TO COUNT SZEMBEK. . . . The National-Socialist regime would act in Danzig entirely by way of an understanding with Poland and respect for all her rights. Polish rights in the Free City, which he knew and understood, could not suffer the least detriment. The present statutory position need not be violated. . . .

FEBRUARY 16 1937 GÖRING TO MARSHAL SMIGLY-RYDZ. . . . Germany would not attack Poland and had no intention of seizing the Polish "Corridor." "We do not want the 'Corridor,' I say that sincerely and categorically; we do not need the 'Corridor.'" He could not give proof of this; it was a question whether his word was believed or not. . . . It was quite obvious that a strong Poland with access to the sea, a Poland with whom Germany could agree her policy, was incomparably more necessary and useful to the Reich than a weak and mutilated Poland. For Germany realised that an isolated Poland would be much easier to subdue, and then the whole Russian avalanche would strike directly against the German frontier. . . .

NOVEMBER 5 1937 M. LIPSKI TO M. BECK. The Chancellor defined his own attitude, doing so with great precision. He formulated the following points:

- (1) There would be no changes in the legal and political position in Danzig (*an der rechts politischen Lage Danzigs wird nichts geändert werden*).
- (2) The rights of the Polish population in Danzig would be respected.
- (3) The rights of Poland in Danzig would not be impaired. The Chancellor declared emphatically that his Agreement with Poland would be respected also so far as Danzig was concerned. Any word he gave was and would be kept. A surprise step was out of the question. . . .

JANUARY 5 1939 HITLER TO M. BECK. . . . The Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no *faits accomplis* in Danzig, and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government.

SCENE 2 : A FEW WEEKS LATER



SCENE 3 • A FEW MONTHS LATER

THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF POLAND COMPLETED, THE SCENE CHANGES RAPIDLY. THIS IS WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN DANZIG.

AUGUST 28
1939 EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF M. ZAWADOWSKI TO M. BECK.
... Since approximately the middle of the month the Danzig authorities have been sequestering the warehouses of Polish commercial firms engaged in the export of Polish commodities via Danzig. This is seriously injuring Polish interests, for it affects the export of such articles as grain, coal, mineral oil, and timber. . . .

... Officials of Polish nationality are being attacked and arrested under all kinds of pretexts. . . .

... The Danzig police are systematically arresting employees on the Polish railways and are conniving at attacks upon them by elements of the Hitler Party. . . .

... The Danzig authorities are continuing their illegal interference with the functions of the Polish inspectors, from refusing them access to their place of work, refusing them their right to examine customs documents, and to assist at customs despatch, down to attacking them, arresting them, and holding them under police arrest for several days. . . .

... Hardly a day passes without several, and even several dozen Poles being beaten up by members of Party formations. . . .


... In consequence of the police and licensing systems instituted by the Danzig authorities the small Polish traders and craftsmen have been deprived of the possibility of earning their living. . . .

... All attempts by the Polish population to assert their rights are crushed by resort to extraordinarily brutal force. . . .

THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED IN POLAND

AUGUST 26
1939 POLISH EMBASSY IN BERLIN TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The German Press is carrying on a systematic and violent Press campaign, in which the situation of the German minority in Poland is being discussed tendentiously and in a manner entirely out of accord with the facts. This campaign bears a remarkable resemblance to that waged last year against Czecho-Slovakia, except that the present propaganda is being carried on with far greater intensity than on that occasion. . . .

SEPTEMBER 1
1939 COMMUNIQUE NO. 1 ISSUED BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S STAFF HEADQUARTERS. "On September 1, 1939, in the early morning, Germany invaded our territory by a surprise attack from the air and on land, without a declaration of war."





COMMUNIQUE NO. 1 ISSUED BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S STAFF HEAD-
QUARTERS. "ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1939, IN THE EARLY MORNING, GERMANY
INVADED OUR TERRITORY BY A SURPRISE ATTACK FROM THE AIR AND
ON LAND, WITHOUT A DECLARATION OF WAR."

Activities of the German Air Force in the early hours of September 1 :
“ The German Air Force carried out a series of raids on many points over the whole of Polish territory. German airmen bombed Augustów, Nowy, Dwór, Ostrów Mazowiecki, Tczew, Puck, Zambrów, Radomsko, Toruń, Kutno, Tunel, Kraków, Grodno, Trzebinie, Gdynia, Jasło, Tomaszów Mazowiecki, Katowice. In the towns bombed from the air there are killed and wounded among the civilian population. . . . ”

SEPTEMBER 1 *NOTE VERBALE* FROM THE REICH FOREIGN OFFICE TRANSMITTED TO THE POLISH EMBASSY IN BERLIN. “ The Foreign Minister of the Reich has the honour to communicate the following to the Polish Embassy :

1939

“ “ *The German Air Force have received orders to restrict their action to military objectives. It is a necessary prerequisite to the observance of this order that the Polish Air Force shall observe the same rule. Should this not be the case, the most severe reprisals will immediately be taken on the German part.* ” ”



RUINS IN WARSAW

RIGHT: SISTERS—LIVING AND DEAD







ACT II

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THE EAST

DURING THE SAME PERIOD THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS
MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO PLACE POLISH - SOVIET RELATIONS
ON A MORE SATISFACTORY FOOTING.

JULY 25 PACT OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN POLAND AND THE
1932 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW.

... Should one of the Contracting Parties be attacked by a third State or by a group of other States, the other Contracting Party undertakes not to give aid or assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the aggressor State during the whole period of the conflict.

If one of the Contracting Parties commits an act of aggression against a third State the other Contracting Party shall have the right to be released from the present Treaty without previous denunciation. ...

FEBRUARY 14 M. LITVINOV AT SPEECH IN HONOUR OF M. BECK.
1934 "... Systematically pursuing a peace policy, the Soviet Government directs special attention to the establishment and maintenance of truly good neighbourly relations with its greatest western neighbour, the Republic of Poland. ..."

JULY 1 M. KRESTINSKI TO M. GRZYBOWSKI. "We are working to increase
1936 the prestige of the League of Nations and for collective security. We are combating all forms of aggression and all forms of fascism. At the present time we are pursuing an anti-German, anti-Italian, and anti-Japanese policy."

AS GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS DETERIORATED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BECAME INCREASINGLY ENCOURAGING AND INTIMATED THAT IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO GRANT POLAND LIMITED SUPPORT AGAINST NAZI AGGRESSION.

SIGNING OF GERMAN-SOVIET PACT



M. BECK TO POLISH EMBASSY, PARIS. . . . The Soviets realise that the Polish Government is not prepared to enter into any agreement with either one of Poland's great neighbours against the other, and understand the advantages to them of this attitude.

MAY 13
1939

M. Potemkin also stated that in the event of an armed conflict between Poland and Germany the Soviets will adopt "*une attitude bienveillante*" towards us.

As M. Potemkin himself indicated, his statements were made in accordance with special instructions which the Soviet Government sent to Warsaw for him.

SPEECH BY M. SZARONOV. " . . . The close and fruitful co-operation of our two countries is an important factor in the consolidation of universal peace, and is in harmony with the aims of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., which endeavours to have peaceful and friendly relations with all countries, and in the first instance with its neighbours . . . "

JUNE 2
1939


M. GRZYBOWSKI'S FINAL REPORT: " In June there was a series of offers on the part of the Soviets to supply us with armaments materials. It has to be admitted that they were always accompanied by unacceptable conditions. The Soviet propaganda never ceased to urge us to resist the German demands."

JUNE
1939

COUNT SZEMBEK'S MINUTE OF CONVERSATION WITH M. SZARONOV. When I asked him the position in regard to the Soviet-German trade negotiations, concerning which there have been rumours in the Press, M. Szaronov told me that no such negotiations were taking place.

JULY 8
1939

THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIST



AUGUST 27
1939

EXTRACT FROM INTERVIEW WITH MARSHAL VOROSHILOV, REPORTED IN "IZVESTIA." "Help in the form of raw materials and war materials is a commercial question, and no Pact of Mutual Assistance whatever, far less a Military Convention, is needed in order to supply Poland with these materials. . . ."

SEPTEMBER 2
1939

M. BECK TO THE POLISH EMBASSY IN LONDON. The Soviet Ambassador has called on me and asked why we were not negotiating with the Soviets regarding supplies, as the "Voroshilov interview" has opened up the possibility of getting them.
I have instructed Moscow to investigate the situation.

SEPTEMBER 3
1939

M. GRZYBOWSKI'S FINAL REPORT. "On the 3rd I was received by M. Molotov. He did not question our statement that it was a case of unprovoked aggression committed without previous declaration of war, by a surprise attack during negotiations. He agreed in recognising Germany as the aggressor."

SEPTEMBER 11
1939

M. SZARONOV TO COUNT SZEMBEK. ". . . There are rumours here about mobilisation in Russia. I know nothing about it. At the most it would concern five annual levies, which is no great matter. Apparently the Germans are bombing certain points on the Soviet western frontier. The Soviets do not wish to have frontiers with totalitarian States. With France the Soviets have a non-aggression treaty and an agreement for mutual assistance."



AND WHEN POLAND'S MOMENT OF NEED CAME . . .

M. MOLOTOV TO M. GRZYBOWSKI. . . . The intervention of Great Britain and France has created an entirely new situation, which Marshal Voroshilov did not know and could not take into consideration when giving the interview. At present the Soviets are compelled to safeguard first and foremost their own interests, remaining outside the conflict. For us Poland is now synonymous with England. . . .

SEPTEMBER 8
1939

TEXT OF RUSSIAN NOTE COMMUNICATED BY M. POTEKIN TO M. GRZYBOWSKI AT 3 A.M. . . . The Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Therefore the Agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of hazards and surprises, which may constitute a threat to the U.S.S.R.

SEPTEMBER 17
1939

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia. . . .

M. GRZYBOWSKI TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. M. Potemkin sent for me to-day, September 17th, at 3 a.m., and read me a note from his Government, signed by Premier Molotov. The note communicates that the Soviet Government has ordered its troops to cross the Polish frontier. The motives given in the note were of such a nature that I refused to take it into cognizance and categorically protested against its contents. In view of the absence of Soviet diplomatic representatives from Poland I agreed only to transmit the above information. I await instructions.

SEPTEMBER 17
1939

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE POLISH EMBASSY IN LONDON. . . . By the act of wanton aggression committed this morning, the Soviet Government stands self-condemned as a violator of its international obligations, thus contradicting all the moral principles upon which Soviet Russia pretended to base her foreign policy since her admittance into the League of Nations.

SEPTEMBER 17
1939



E P I L O G U E

MAY 5
1939 M. BECK'S SPEECH TO DIET. "... Peace is a valuable and desirable thing. Our generation, which has shed its blood in several wars, surely deserves a period of peace. But peace, like almost everything in this world, has its price, high but definable. We in Poland do not recognise the conception of 'peace at any price.' There is only one thing in the life of men, nations and States which is without price, and that is honour."

SEPTEMBER 30
1939 THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S PROTEST AGAINST THE GERMAN-SOVIET AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1939, presented by the Polish Ambassador in London to the British Foreign Office. "... In the name of the Polish Government I make the most formal and solemn protest against this machination woven between Berlin and Moscow in contempt of all international obligations and all human morality. ...

Basing herself on the unanimous sympathy of all the countries which respect liberty and good faith in relations between the peoples, and confiding in the steadfast support which is guaranteed her by treaties of alliance, Poland will continue the struggle by all means in her power, confident in her future and in the ultimate victory.

